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Executive Summary: The ‘good governance’ property rights reform agenda and the 
interpretations of colonial history on which it is based, are deeply flawed. A different 
analytical and policy approach is needed for promoting growth-enhancing governance 
capabilities for managing the property rights transitions in developing countries. 
 
To sustain growth property rights have to address three problems: i) how to create security for 
investors so that they have extended time horizons, ii) how to make asset transfers efficient; 
and iii) how to create incentives and compulsions for productivity growth. There are likely to 
be conflicts between different goals. As countries grow, rights that were appropriate in the 
past may require significant changes. Strengthening existing property rights may often be the 
wrong response. Growth may require changes in existing rights as well as the creation of new 
ones. 
 
Interventions to modify property rights trigger conflicts because they involve potential 
winners and losers, even if losers are compensated because there is no ‘right’ way of splitting 
future gains between affected parties. The new structures of property rights that emerge and 
the compensation for those who lose out depend on the bargaining power of the contestants 
often established through costly conflicts. Two important results follow. First, enhancing 
growth can involve not just the strengthening of some rights but also the weakening of others. 
Thus, growth requires the reduction of growth-constraining transaction costs. Second, 
property rights changes also trigger transition costs. The political settlements and the types of 
growth strategies that are attempted define the trade-off between reductions in growth-
constraining transaction costs and increases in transition costs. The less favourable this trade-
off, the more difficult it is to trigger or sustain growth.  
 
This ‘growth-stability trade-off’ defines the challenges for property right reforms in particular 
countries. Our examination of Thailand, the states of West Bengal and Maharashtra in India, 
Bangladesh and Tanzania shows the historical roots of differences in trade-offs across 
countries, and explains why different strategies and problems are observed in these countries 
today.  
 
Colonial history has often been damaging not because it destabilized property rights with 
extractive policies but because many conflicting rights were created to maintain political 
stability. These initial conditions shaped how states and businesses interacted to address 
serious land market failures. A number of partially successful strategies are identified with 
implications for how growth-enhancing governance can be improved in developing countries. 
One variant was of agencies aligning political, bureaucratic and economic interests to reduce 
transition costs to enable growth-enhancing restructurings of rights. Examples include the 
MIDC in Maharashtra which was very successful in setting up industrial zones (despite being 
very corrupt). Another variant involves significant financial compensations to reduce 
contestation costs but requires strong alignments of political interests with projects and the 
exclusion of outside political organizers.  
 
Donor and partner governments therefore need a different approach for promoting growth-
enhancing governance capabilities for managing the property rights transitions in developing 
countries. 
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1. Introduction  
The high growth of a number of developing countries in the 1980s raises important 
questions for our evaluation of the economic and governance strategies required to 
sustain and accelerate growth. This series of papers examines areas of governance 
reform that are most likely to sustain and accelerate growth in these countries and to 
develop a methodology that can be applied for policy analysis in these and other 
countries. The series of papers looks at the post-1980 growth experience of Thailand, 
the states of Maharashtra and West Bengal in India, Bangladesh and Tanzania. Our 
methodological approach is to examine the nature of significant market failures in 
land, labour, capital and technology markets in these countries (Khan 2008b) and the 
methods through which some of these were actually addressed during the growth 
takeoffs of the 1980s.  
 
This paper looks at the market failures affecting land markets. Policy responses to 
these market failures have focused on ‘good governance’ reforms informed by a 
narrow understanding of market failures and a particular reading and re-interpretation 
of evidence. We have argued in earlier papers (Khan 2007, 2008b) that good 
governance theory has important limitations in explaining the historical experience of 
developing countries and in particular for suggesting feasible policy responses.  
 
There are significant implications of inadequate theory in this area because failures in 
land markets seriously constrain growth in developing countries. Sustained growth 
requires significant changes in land use. Productivity growth in agriculture, the 
transition from agriculture to industry and services or the development of mineral and 
oil resources are all likely to require significant changes in land use. These can in turn 
face high economic, political and social “transition” costs, particularly in densely 
populated developing countries. Land use changes raise fundamental questions about 
the property right regimes in developing countries. The emerging consensus in 
institutional economics is that land market failures are symptoms of weakly protected 
property rights and/or predatory or extractive states. These problems have in turn been 
traced to deeper roots in the colonial past, to the relative newness of some states, to 
historical factor endowments that created path dependence in the development of 
property rights or to poor investments in human capital (Sokoloff and Engerman 
2000; Acemoglu, et al. 2001, 2002; 2004: 11; Rodrik, et al. 2004; Bardhan 2005; 
Austin 2008).  
 
Weak property right regimes are generally expected to be inhospitable for investors 
(North 1995). In fact the underlying arguments are complex, and the structures of 
rights that are appropriate for addressing one type of problem may be inappropriate 
for addressing other problems. We will discuss three different types of problems that 
property rights need to address in a context of growth. First, property rights have to 
prevent the theft of investor returns to enable investors to take a longer view of 
investment and conservation of assets. Secondly, in a context where changes in land 
use are required, rights have to be structured to enable efficient transfers. And thirdly, 
there are more complex incentives and compulsions that property rights can create to 
induce or compel productivity growth in the context of a capitalist economy. Each of 
these functions requires complex specifications and conditions for property rights. 
Unfortunately much of the theoretical discussion that informs policy is excessively 
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simplistic and assumes that property rights in developing countries are in some 
general sense weak or suffer from expropriation risk.  
 
Our alternative reading of the historical evidence and of property rights theory 
suggests a very different set of reform constraints and problems. We then use these 
insights to construct an alternative framework for looking at the property rights 
challenges facing developing countries. Finally, we use this framework to look at 
some contemporary responses to market failures in land and the implications these 
have for policy. We argue that the simple theory of property rights and the 
inappropriate reading of historical and contemporary evidence that is used to support 
it have hindered rather than helped the development of feasible growth-enhancing 
governance reforms in developing countries. The reform suggestions coming from 
current canonical theory does not provide an adequate account of the reasons which 
prevent property rights being ‘properly’ defined in developing countries. In reality, 
these failures are embedded in political constraints and are not always just errors of 
policy or the outcomes of venal intentions of states that only seek to achieve high 
levels of short term resource extraction from citizens.  
 
The evolution of the property rights appropriate for a modern capitalist economy has 
historically been a heavily contested process. An alternative reading of history 
suggests that countries that have moved faster on the property rights transition have 
done so because they have been able to absorb the ‘transition costs’ of these changes 
better, or as in the case of settler colonies, have had these costs imposed on them with 
intolerable levels of force. This provides a very different ‘transition-cost based’ 
reading of colonial history that challenges the version provided by Acemoglu et al. 
(2001; 2002). Settler colonies were not really benign states that created nice property 
rights while non-settler colonial rulers focused on extraction. Rather, settler colonies 
completed the transition to capitalism very quickly by imposing huge costs on 
indigenous populations, in many cases almost wiping indigenous populations out of 
existence. In contrast, weakly rooted non-settler colonial regimes created complex 
structures of rights to ensure political stability at the expense of rights that would 
accelerate an economic transition. In developing countries the difficult task of 
capitalist transition is still continuing, and the problem of how to manage the 
transition costs during this process explains the persistence of and responses to 
different types of market failures. If we want to devise reasonable responses to market 
failures, we need to understand this context, the types of transition costs that affect 
particular countries, and devise solutions that are implementable in specific political 
settlements.  
 
We begin in Section 2 by looking at critical aspects of the history of our case study 
countries going back to the colonial period. Thailand, which was not colonized, 
provides a very interesting counterpoint to the other countries which were. This 
excursion into history from the perspective of our property rights analysis is important 
because it provides us with the ‘stylized facts’ for our theory and to engage with some 
contemporary re-interpretations of colonial history that have now acquired currency in 
the debate on property rights.  
 
In Section 3 we develop an alternative theoretical framework for evaluating the 
property rights transformations in developing countries. Sustaining growth in 
developing countries requires solutions to at least three separate but closely related 
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problems affecting land markets. First property rights have to protect investors 
sufficiently to enable them to take the long view in making investment and resource 
conservation decisions. Achieving this solely through the protection of formal 
individual rights may not be efficient in any context and particularly not in developing 
countries where the fiscal base of governments is insufficient to provide high levels of 
formal protection of rights. Successful growth stories show that unorthodox structures 
of rights have often been the most appropriate response for reducing expropriation 
risk (Haber, et al. 2003; Qian 2003).  
 
Second and no less important, growth requires a solution to the problem of resource 
re-allocation in a way that satisfies the twin requirements of economic efficiency and 
political acceptance. The property rights structures that solve the problem of 
expropriation risk may not be appropriate for the efficient trading of assets. Indeed, 
making valuable assets like land highly tradable has historically been strongly resisted 
by peasants and other agrarian interests. As a result, there are serious market failures 
in most developing countries in these areas and many types of non-market asset 
transfers have evolved to respond to this. High levels of resistance to land transfers 
continue to determine the extent of this ‘market failure’. The operation of eminent 
domain type interventions is politically contested to a much greater degree in 
developing countries because the underlying rights are not well defined and market 
prices are often not meaningful indicators of socially acceptable transfer prices. The 
‘governance capabilities’ of developing countries in responding to these market 
failures have often been vital in sustaining growth during transitions.  
 
And finally, the structures of property rights that are appropriate for compelling 
productivity growth may be different again. The productivity growth that 
characterized early capitalism was based on very specific configurations of property 
rights. In late developers the adoption of new technologies becomes an important 
issue and more demanding conditions are required for achieving productivity growth. 
Given the fiscal constraints facing developing country governments and the global 
bias against formal or explicit industrial policy, states are increasingly trying to attract 
investors with advanced technologies by using land market transactions to provide 
hidden subsidies. The types of rights that would ensure efficiency and compulsions 
for productivity in these contexts are an important issue for growth-enhancing 
governance strategies.  
 
We will discuss the market failures affecting technology acquisition in our next paper. 
Clearly some of the problems of market failures in land markets cannot be effectively 
addressed if we do not make the market failures in learning and technology 
acquisition explicit so that comprehensive solutions to multiple market failures can be 
found. The problem with some of the informal and ad hoc solutions that have 
emerged is that while they may work for accidental reasons, they often fail in 
sustaining growth. For instance, non-transparent ways of providing industrial policy 
subsidies may often provide excessive incentives to investors that are socially 
wasteful. These incentives can also be socially unjust for those losing their land at low 
levels of compensation so as to provide subsidies to investors. The presence of 
multiple objectives makes it important to identify priorities in an integrated analysis. 
Simple property rights fixes are unlikely to work.  
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Our alternative theoretical framework makes explicit the complex objectives that 
property rights have to address to sustain growth. This explains why property rights 
have to be continuously evolving (even in advanced countries) if growth constraints 
are to be addressed. This process of evolution is clearly at a different stage in 
developing countries but much of the property rights literature is not geared to 
identifying the conflicts and choices that developing countries face. Conflicts between 
different property right objectives allow us to explain some inconvenient truths about 
the capitalist transition. Capitalist development requires stable property rights and 
expectations of non-appropriation for capitalist investors. This is indisputable. But 
while the capitalist transition is taking place, most assets are still in the hands of low-
productivity asset holders who have rights that are inappropriate for efficient asset 
transfers, or rights that are unclear and conflicting. In this context, strengthening all 
the pre-capitalist rights that defined agricultural systems where asset transfers were 
not a priority can hinder rather than help growth and poverty reduction. In these 
contexts, many existing rights are inappropriate for efficient asset transfers and are 
actually the source of high transaction costs. The growth of the productive capitalist 
sector therefore often requires non-market interventions to enable asset transfers to 
sustain growth.  
 
These non-market asset transfers do not necessarily mean that existing holders of land 
are ‘expropriated’. The acquisition and transfer of assets may be achieved through 
many different mechanisms including fully or partially compensated acquisition. 
While the historical experience has been dominated by uncompensated or at best 
partially compensated transfers, compensated transfers are preferable on grounds of 
justice as well as the requirement of minimizing political conflicts. Nevertheless, any 
intervention in processes of resource re-allocation is likely to be strongly resisted or 
held up by many groups, including but not restricted to the immediate occupants of 
the land required for alternative uses.  
 
The main point is that sustaining growth may well require the weakening or even the 
destruction of some pre-existing rights and not just strengthening the protection of all 
rights. The simple theory of property rights, using an unrealistic benchmark of a zero 
transaction cost world as a feasible policy goal suggests that strengthening all 
property rights will lower transaction costs and is the path towards greater efficiency. 
This proposition is rejected when we look at the details of property rights issues even 
in advanced countries. In reality choices always have to be made between several high 
transaction cost situations to select the ‘best’ one. The efficient solution even in 
theory is not to strengthen all property rights all the time.  
 
We argue that once we understand the complexity of functions played by property 
rights and the impossibility of achieving zero transaction costs, the conceptual task is 
to identify the specific property right changes that at each stage will do the most to 
reduce growth-constraining transaction costs. In addition, it is important to 
understand that any process of creating and destroying property rights is conflictual 
because there are winners and losers who will fight to an extent that depends on the 
specific organization of power (the political settlement) in that society. Thus, we 
argue that strategies of reducing growth-constraining transaction costs face political 
contestation and ‘transition costs’. Our main objective is to show that the persistence 
of market failures is not just a function of the stupidity or venality of states, but can be 
better understood in terms of particular ‘growth-stability’ trade-offs. These trade-offs 
 7
describe how rapidly transition costs increase when property rights reforms of a 
particular type are being pursued to achieve growth. 
 
The real cost of colonialism in non-settler colonies was in our view not the extraction 
of surplus or the creation of property right uncertainty, but rather the creation of very 
unfavourable growth-stability trade-offs. These were the result of long periods of 
social engineering that created many conflicting rights to achieve political stability. 
This interpretation of history appears radical in the context of contemporary 
institutional and governance debates, but is in fact strongly supported by a reading of 
colonial history.  
 
There is little dispute that land market failures are serious constraints on growth in 
developing countries. The problem is the policy consensus that the achievement of 
stable property rights and a non-expropriating state (based on institutions of political 
democracy) are preconditions for well-working markets in land (Khan 2007, 2008b). 
The policy consensus suggests that developing countries should focus on defining 
property rights better through measures such as improving and completing the 
registration of land, computerization of land records, improving the court system for 
dispute resolution and improving the general rule of law, including strengthening anti-
corruption capabilities. These theoretical insights, supported by a particular 
interpretation of the empirical and historical evidence have determined the bulk of 
governance policy on how to address land market failures in developing countries. 
 
In contrast our reading of theory and history does not support the view that successful 
transitions were primarily based on these types of reforms. Capitalist property rights 
evolve, they do not emerge with a big bang as a precondition of development. In 
countries where they appear to have suddenly emerged (in particular the settler 
colonies) this is only because a re-writing of history has missed out the much more 
violent transition in these societies that simply shortened the ‘evolutionary period’ at 
very high transition cost. The real governance challenge for developing countries is to 
manage the transition better and to minimize these transition costs. In that sense, the 
settler colonies should be a model of what not to do. It does not help contemporary 
developing countries to be told that they are still some way away from the property 
rights advocated by the simple theory. This simply presents developing countries with 
implausible ‘policy choices’ that are not feasible given the economic capacities of 
these countries, and in particular given the transition costs that such policies would 
actually face if anyone tried to implement them. 
 
Instead of pushing ahead with technocratic property rights reforms which have little 
chance of implementation or success, our approach suggests that the growth-
enhancing governance challenge is to understand the determinants of the growth-
stability trade-off in each country, identify the priorities for property rights reform to 
reduce growth-constraining transaction costs, and work with and through existing 
political constraints to make incremental improvements that can help to sustain 
growth. We argue that this is a considerably different governance reform project and a 
more challenging one. But it is also more likely to make a real difference to the 
growth prospects of developing countries.  
 
Finally, in section 4 we use this framework to make sense of some of the actual 
responses to market failures in our case study countries. The post-1980 growth 
 8
experience in our countries (and we believe more generally) shows a variety of formal 
and informal responses to market failures in the context of different types of growth-
stability trade-offs. Relationships between businesses, political organizations and 
government institutions created a range of arrangements, some of which effectively 
addressed market failures while others did not. We are more likely to evolve effective 
growth-promoting strategies if we understand the ways in which critical market 
failures were addressed in the past and the political or institutional reasons for their 
relative success or failure. This may allow future policy to work with the flow of 
evolving economic and political arrangements in particular countries rather than 
unrealistically seeking to impose entirely new arrangements from outside. And if we 
identify serious political constraints that prevent the solution of significant market 
failures in some countries, we will at least be able to identify the nature of the 
political problem so that a more informed debate can take place to promote growth. 
At the very least this may help development partners to be less negative about 
processes that may be both necessary and useful, and help them to focus on processes 
that are genuinely damaging and dysfunctional.  
 
2. Property Rights: Some Historical Perspectives  
The historical development of property rights in our case study countries provides the 
background for our discussion of contemporary responses to land market failures. In 
addition the variation in historical trajectories in the development of property rights 
provides interesting stylized facts which we will draw on in the next section to 
develop our analytical framework for the property rights transition. Thailand was one 
of a few countries not to be colonized by European powers. It has made steady 
progress in defining rights for productive capitalists, often at the cost of significant 
injustices inflicted on the peasants who worked hard to extend its land frontier into 
forest and swamp over the last century. Thailand is not only the most developed of 
our group of countries; it is furthest down the road in terms of clearly defining the 
property rights of critical high valued investors. The economic and political challenge 
facing Thailand is a somewhat different one: how to address the rights of the 
peasantry, particularly the poor, who have been left occupying lands and forests over 
which property rights are not clearly defined.  
 
India as the jewel in the crown of the British Empire is an excellent case study for 
testing the hypotheses of Acemoglu et al. (2001), Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) and 
others as colonial history has justifiably become an important area of study for 
understanding contemporary property rights issues. Bangladesh and West Bengal 
were the original acquisitions of the East India Company and as such provide useful 
case studies for looking at the long-term effects of a variant of non-settler colonialism. 
Contrary to many simplistic assumptions about the goals of extractive colonial 
powers, the historical evidence is that the British in Bengal attempted through the 
Permanent Settlement of 1793, however unsuccessfully, to create property rights that 
it hoped would create tax paying productive gentry farmers. The experiment failed not 
because it was a cynical attempt to maximize extraction but because the colonial 
power did not want to risk the political costs of forcing adjustments in the direction of 
greater efficiency. Over time, the creation of a huge variety of rights of different types 
in response to multiple pressures of revenue, productivity and in particular politics left 
India in general, and Bengal in particular, with a complex and unproductive set of 
rights that successor governments are grappling with.  
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Maharashtra in the west was colonized much later and the land settlement there was 
different from that in Bengal. The ryotwari system of revenue collection in 
Maharashtra and other later acquisitions where revenue-collecting rights and 
responsibilities were allocated to individual ryots or petty peasant landlords has been 
favourably compared to the zamindari system of land rights that characterized Bengal 
where revenue rights were allocated to substantial revenue collectors or zamindars in 
terms of the implications for growth (Banerjee and Iyer 2005). While Maharashtra’s 
contemporary land markets may be somewhat better placed than those of Bengal, the 
differences should not be exaggerated. Maharashtra’s agriculture is still far away from 
a capitalist agriculture, with the state suffering one of the highest levels of small 
farmer suicides. And in common with the rest of India, Maharashtra faces serious 
constraints and contestation in its development of industrial zones. The historical 
evidence suggests that property right evolution in the ryotwari areas was also 
constrained by political constraints that were very similar to those affecting the 
zamindari areas. 
 
Tanzania’s colonial history was different again, demonstrating important differences 
between Asian and African colonies. Not only did African countries have a much 
shorter colonial history, in addition their pre-colonial histories of state building were 
also different and in some respects shorter compared to Asian ones (Bardhan 2005). 
But there are also interesting similarities between the African and Asian colonial 
experiences that are often underestimated (Bayly 2008). Colonial attempts to create 
land rights in non-settler Africa were not very successful, and again it is tempting to 
attribute this to the intentions of extractive colonial states. But in fact with the 
exception of a number of egregious and widely quoted cases like the Belgian Congo, 
the historical evidence is more complex. In Africa as in Asia, attempts by non-settler 
colonial states to create productive property rights systems were constrained by their 
political concerns of creating and maintaining allies who may have been threatened by 
the capitalist transformations of these societies (Mamdani 1997). These insights allow 
us to radically recast the analysis of Acemoglu et al. (2001; 2002) in the next section. 
The difference between settler and non-settler colonies may have less to do with the 
productive and extractive intentions of the respective colonial states and more with 
the ability of settler colonies to push through social transformations without regard to 
the potentially massive internal social resistance to property rights transformations.  
 
Within Africa, Tanzania represents a somewhat unique example because of its 
political history under Nyerere. Strategies of villagization under Nyerere attempted to 
create a settled peasantry but with limited success. Nyerere’s political organization 
was able to absorb significant social resistance to change, but for political and 
ideological reasons, the change forced through was in the direction of a collectivist 
rural economy that did not in the end succeed. More recently, the successor state in 
Tanzania has been able to use the relatively centralized organization of the Tanzanian 
state (compared to most other African countries) to move towards the creation of de 
facto land rights for mining companies, particularly foreign ones. The valuation of 
mining rights has implicitly offered many investors significant subsidies to attract 
them to Tanzania. The much more vital task of creating an indigenous productive 
class of entrepreneurs in Tanzania remains to be addressed. 
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Thailand: The Autonomous Evolution of Property Rights 
Thailand is significantly different from most other developing countries in that it was 
never colonized by a European power even though it came under the sway of the 
British in India. For instance, it had to sign the Bowring Treaty of 1855 opening the 
country up to trade. But the absence of a colonial presence allows us to look at more 
complex and autonomous processes of developing property rights than in colonies. 
Although Thailand was clearly not a settler colony of the type identified in the new 
literature on the colonial roots of property rights (Acemoglu, et al. 2001, 2002), this 
did not preclude Thailand from making its own internal progress towards the 
evolution of capitalist property rights. This transition began gradually and then 
accelerated as its economy made a transition that was increasingly rapid in the 1980s 
and beyond. Nor did the absence of an extractive (non-settler) colonial presence mean 
that the emerging state in Thailand was not interested in resource extraction. As a 
general proposition, all states are interested in revenue extraction. But the absence of 
a colonial state did mean that the evolution of social classes (and therefore of property 
rights) was driven by internal conflicts of subaltern groups with an indigenous ruling 
class and not with a foreign ruling class with weak roots in society. The contrast with 
the Indian case along this dimension is important because an important factor in the 
development of property rights in India was the increasingly complex political 
calculations of the imperial power about the social balances that would best preserve 
its rule. These calculations (and not the desire to maximize revenue extraction) had 
significant implications for the complex and problematic rights that emerged in the 
Indian subcontinent. 
 
A second significant feature of Thailand was that possibly till as late as the 1980s 
Thailand had an internal land frontier which allowed extensive peasant settlement. 
The land frontier had important implications for the strategies that king and 
aristocracy could use to extract a surplus as peasants could always move away if 
surplus extraction became too onerous. This was different from India where the land 
frontier was largely exhausted in most parts of the country by the early twentieth 
century. The rice-growing ecology and the availability of unlimited supplies of 
imported labour from China also made Thailand different from Tanzania. Tanzania’s 
land frontier prior to and during the colonial period was perhaps too extensive relative 
to population so that settled peasant agriculture did not evolve in the same way.  
 
In Thailand, waves of immigration and settlement were managed by shrewd monarchs 
who were able to prevent either the aristocrats or the peasants from becoming too 
powerful. From a country with a population of only around one million in the early 
nineteenth century, settled mostly in the Chaophraya delta around Bangkok, Thailand 
emerged in the early twenty-first century as an extensively settled country of sixty 
five million (Phongpaichit and Baker 1997: 9). The interesting aspect of this 
transformation is that the peasants who did the hard work of clearing and settling the 
land did not in most cases have any clear title to the land. On the other hand, 
aristocrats and emerging merchants did manage to define their rights over the lands 
they controlled or acquired, and this greatly assisted the land consolidation and land 
use changes that were required during Thailand’s transformation into an industrialized 
country in the 1980s and beyond.  
 
Nevertheless, even as late as 1985 only 9.5% of occupied land had full ownership 
titles. A further 33.2% of land had certificates of utilization, which give less than full 
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title rights. The remaining 57.3% of land was illegally occupied forest land, land 
occupied with no title or land occupied with certificates of occupation (Phongpaichit 
and Baker 1997: Table 2.5). Significant land titling issues therefore clearly remain in 
Thailand, particularly affecting the poor who often find that they are ‘occupying’ land 
designated as public or forest lands. In the early 1990s when Thailand was already a 
middling middle income country, a quarter of the entire population was estimated to 
be illegal squatters on untitled land (Phongpaichit and Baker 1997: 63). Most of these 
were poor people.  
 
But the absence of titling for significant numbers of people and the weakly defined 
rights of most others hides a significant real change in social power that had left 
Thailand’s emerging capitalists with effective control over the most valuable lands 
and resources by the 1980s. That is why when in 1984 Thailand sought loans from the 
World Bank and Ausaid to rationalize its land titling system, the subsequent process 
of titling was a relatively smooth and to a large extent technical process. By 2004 the 
titling process of private lands, approximately 40 per cent of total land, was in its final 
stages (Nabangchang-Srisawalak and Srisawalak 2008). The relatively smooth 
progress in titling significant and valuable private holdings indicates that the effective 
informal control of valuable assets by private occupants had already become well 
developed, based on the less than perfect documents and titles that had evolved. This 
leaves a mass of small plots with less than full title, illegal squatters and those with 
occupancy titles whose claims will take time and effort to resolve. But in the Thai 
case the transition in terms of the emergence of a significant capitalist sector with 
access to reasonably well-working land markets is far ahead compared to any of our 
other countries.  
 
To understand how Thailand achieved this transformation we need to place the 
evolution of types of land rights in Thailand in the context of its specific political 
settlement. Also relevant was the extensive land frontier and access to significant 
immigrant labour from China with limited capabilities of political organization. A 
stylized summary of the phases of settlement and evolution of land rights based on the 
work of Phongpaichit and Baker (1997), Turton (1989a; 1989b) and Hirsch (1990) 
shows how by the 1980s effective control over significant chunks of valuable land 
had been acquired by a relatively small commercialized class who could then 
participate in the emerging capitalist land market. In many respects, this is a story of 
capitalist emergence from below which has some similarities with the emergence of 
capitalist land markets in European countries.  
 
Thailand is therefore a useful contrast to set against the more typical developing 
country story where the emergence of capitalist land markets faces significant 
political constraints today partly as a result of the rights created by colonial powers to 
manage political stability. Thailand is particularly interesting as a comparator because 
an effective capitalist land market emerged here without a prior set of clearly defined 
land rights and without the institutionalization of good governance. Rather, it became 
possible to institutionalize land rights over valuable and critical assets because the 
difficult political task of establishing effective control over valuable assets had 
already happened through a process involving the use of political power, weakly 
defined or missing rights for significant numbers of people and plenty of corruption, 
conflict and deception. The point is not to excuse these injustices or to learn how to 
replicate them elsewhere. Rather, the experience of Thailand, like that of the English 
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Enclosures shows that the creation of new property rights appropriate for a 
commercial economy is based primarily on finding economic, political, legal, or 
military solutions to what are essentially distributive conflicts (Khan 2005a). If 
conflicts over property rights were resolved in unjust ways in some countries, the 
response should be to find fairer resolutions elsewhere, not to deny the problem.   
 
The transition from a hunter-gatherer economy to settled peasant agriculture began in 
earnest in Thailand only in the nineteenth century. This period saw the transition from 
systems of forced labour to the emergence of a tax-paying peasantry, the phrai. The 
king formally owned all land, but the phrai had occupancy rights that were eventually 
recorded in a registry and were heritable. The royal land tax amounted to ten per cent 
of the rice yield and in addition the phrai had to contribute labour and crops to the 
local aristocracy, the nai. The ranks of the aristocracy were described in terms of units 
of sakdina which Phongpaichit and Baker (1997: 11) point out referred to their 
notional entitlement to command numbers of people rather than areas of land. This 
reflected the vast land frontier within Thailand and the scarcity of people. From the 
1830s the Crown encouraged Chinese immigration to enable the expansion of rice 
farming, and began to use Chinese wage labour for canal building rather than corvée 
labour.  
 
The tussle between the monarch, the aristocracy and the growing army of peasants 
defined the evolution of land rights in Thailand. The political weakness of the 
peasantry, and in particular the sustained inflow of Chinese immigrants meant that the 
king could use the immigrants to keep the aristocracy in check, but had no need to 
create credible land rights for the peasants. Near the capital large areas of new lands 
were opened up through the construction of canals from the mid-nineteenth century 
onwards. Initially the king’s family and the nobles held large tracts of these lands, 
leasing them out to peasant tenants. But in the 1870s in the face of conflicts between 
nobles and tenants, the king supported colonization by individual peasant households. 
While this excluded the wider body of the nobility from canal development near the 
capital, it did not in the long-run provide the peasants with well-defined rights. In 
1896 the government revoked the decision of 1866 that gave peasant occupiers legal 
ownership on the basis of tax payments. The peasantry on its own proved unable to 
resist. When land registration and certificates of ownership began to be developed in 
the early twentieth century, the main winners were the families close to the king. The 
incredible concentration of ownership over some of the most valuable land in the 
country proved to be a lasting legacy. As late as the 1970s three families accounted 
for one-third of the total tenanted land in the four provinces around Bangkok 
(Phongpaichit and Baker 1997: 26). 
 
Further away from the capital peasant smallholders continued to dominate as the 
frontier kept extending. The plentiful supply of land and almost non-existent formal 
rights for the peasants meant that the peasantry played a very useful function in 
extending the frontier but had little incentive to settle down or invest much in the 
land. The cost was the use of very inefficient labour-saving technologies, and the very 
slow penetration of credit and merchant capital given the absence of effective 
property rights that could serve as collateral. This situation only began to change 
significantly after the Second World War, with the government for the first time using 
the instruments of the state to penetrate the rural economy in an attempt to raise 
productivity. Village elites became absorbed into the administrative structure of the 
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state and they assisted merchants and outside capital to enter the village economy 
through credit and marketing chains. The marketization of the village economy and 
the pressures of tax and debt led to a differentiated peasantry emerging in the 1970s 
and beyond. A significant village working class also emerged, amounting to around a 
third of the rural population, with more substantial peasants acting as employers.  
 
The commercialization of the economy changed the way in which the frontier was 
being extended. One variant was the development of agribusinesses in the 1970s. 
Companies like Charoen Popkhand and Dole went into large scale agribusinesses like 
poultry, pineapple farming and fish farming particularly in frontier upcountry areas 
with government assistance. A more colourful ‘Wild East’ variant took the form of 
entirely private initiatives where new merchant money together with military officers 
took the initiative in clearing land, often forest land, settling new settlers and then 
providing protection without any form of government documentation. Local power 
brokers or kamnan often with their power base in local administrative offices 
collaborated in this nexus. As they were charged with collecting taxes, keeping 
records and settling disputes, they were potentially important from the perspective of 
outside investors for securing effective possession and eventually titles over valuable 
chunks of forest or newly cleared land. It was a gamble for the outside investors, but 
many fortunes were made when these gambles paid off (Turton 1989a, 1989b; Hirsch 
1990, 1993; Phongpaichit and Baker 1997). 
 
These historical developments in land clearance and the evolution of land rights were 
a critical part of the background against which the rapid industrial transformation of 
Thailand was organized in the 1980s. By the mid 1980s manufacturing overtook 
agriculture in its contribution to GDP and to exports. The rapid growth of 
manufacturing required a significant change in land use as new factories, 
infrastructure, roads and warehouses had to be constructed. Although formal and clear 
land rights did not exist even then, a significant part of the most valuable land in the 
country was by then firmly in the possession of a commercialized class. In addition, a 
significant chunk of the most valuable land around Bangkok was not only available in 
huge contiguous plots; much of this land already had clear titles given the history of 
the canal developments. Directly as a result of these developments, the market failures 
in the land market facing potential investors in new sectors were relatively minor. It is 
not surprising that some of the earliest industrial developments were in and around the 
Rangsit belt near Bangkok. Much more land was available further from the capital 
and in these cases though land titles were sometimes not complete the most valuable 
land was already in the hands of a commercial class who would be willing to sell 
effective possession at a market price. The missing titles raised transaction costs as 
informal methods of verification and protection had to be used for a time, but other 
aspects of transaction costs were low. Valuable land near the infrastructure of the 
capital and other towns was available in contiguous plots in the hands of individuals 
who would want to sell at a market price. Not surprisingly, market failures in land 
markets were not serious enough to make the market collapse. In this respect Thailand 
was significantly different from many other developing countries. 
 
In discussions with businessmen in Thailand it is clear that the difficulty of acquiring 
land is rarely perceived today to be an important constraint for business expansion 
plans. For specific reasons to do with political nationalism foreign investors have 
faced a number of legal barriers to land ownership in Thailand but these barriers are 
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not part of the structural transaction costs of the land market. The stylized history 
sketched above suggests that the relatively low transaction costs facing productive 
investors in Thailand in the 1980s and beyond can only be properly understood by 
looking at the historical evolution of rights. The reasons lie in the gradual acquisition 
of effective control over significant tracts of valuable land by a class of commercially 
minded landholders and their ability to transact these rights with the assistance and 
connivance of state officials at all levels even in the absence of full and clear titles. It 
is clear from this history that the relatively low transaction costs for productive 
investors are not directly the consequence of a favourable land-person ratio. Tanzania 
has more land per capita than Thailand but a different evolution of land rights in 
Tanzania has meant that investors requiring new land face more significant 
transaction costs.  
 
Nor can this outcome be attributed to the prior achievement of well-protected property 
rights across the board. Indeed it could be argued that the ease with which land was 
acquired by proto-capitalist classes from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth 
century had much to do with the systematic exclusion of the bulk of the population 
from effective land rights. Many of Thailand’s poor who still have little or no formal 
rights over the land they occupy often face very high transaction costs in protecting 
their tiny plots of land from the encroachment of well connected land grabbers. The 
land problems that remain in Thailand have to do with resolving the access to land for 
these poorer sections of the population who find themselves in occupation of ‘illegal’ 
lands within forests or with no title over land that they have long farmed. These are 
vitally important problems for ensuring justice today. The failure to address these 
problems is also likely to have political consequences particularly in areas like the 
increasingly disaffected north-east where Taksin’s populism found deep social 
support. But at the same time, Thailand did not confront to a significant degree the 
growth reducing problem of very high transaction costs facing investors attempting to 
acquire relatively large chunks of land for new productive uses.  
 
Underlying the Thai experience has been a very specific political and ecological 
history. A fortuitous balance of greed and power between competing classes allowed 
primitive accumulation to continue over a period of a century as the frontier 
expanded. Land steadily accumulated in the hand of a class of merchants and ex-
aristocrats whose interests in their holdings were increasingly commercial. 
Intermediate groups were either incorporated into these classes at lower levels (like 
the village-based kamnan) if they were useful for the processes of accumulation, or 
they were entirely excluded. But the distribution of power and rights was not such that 
these early primitive accumulators could impose high levels of labour discipline. Thai 
agriculture remained land-using and suffered from very low yields. Nevertheless, the 
relatively concentrated group of people with the political and later financial power to 
acquire effective control over substantial tracts of valuable land did not have to share 
their formal or de facto rights with any other significant political groups. Here, 
Thailand emerges as significantly different from the countries of the Indian 
subcontinent and many other developing countries.  
 
Contemporary Thailand therefore represents a success story in terms of an advanced 
stage of transition to well-defined property rights in land in urban and industrial 
usage, though a long path of travel remains for clarifying and granting rights to the 
majority of the population that remains in agriculture, informal activities and in small 
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urban settlements far from the capital. As far as the demand for land for high value-
adding activities in industry and services based near urban centres is concerned, land 
registration and titling is reasonably efficient. Speed money is sometimes reported as 
useful for speeding up the bureaucratic process, but the titling and registration are 
now sufficiently clear that in some cases transfers of ownership can be done in a 
single day. In rural areas, the spread of commercial farming and other land-using 
activities into areas where titling is weak or where forest and other public lands are 
involved often involves far more significant ‘partnerships’ with public officials and 
occasionally conflicts with environmental groups, local residents and others. But as 
Thailand has shifted to a manufacturing driven growth strategy in the 1980s and 
beyond, conflicts over lands far from transport networks have temporarily receded in 
political significance. If more land-using growth strategies emerge in the future, the 
political conflicts over titling in the more remote areas may become significant. 
 
West Bengal and Bangladesh: The Legacy of Colonial ‘Zamindari’ Rights 
The history of the evolution of land rights in the Indian subcontinent sharply contrasts 
with that of Thailand. The first major British conquest in the Indian subcontinent was 
the Mughal province of Bengal in 1757 which by then was already a settled peasant 
economy. The province included the modern states of West Bengal in India and 
independent Bangladesh, which are two of our case study areas. Parts of Bengal had 
settled agriculture from the second millennium BC and most of Bengal had been 
settled for at least four centuries before the British arrival (Eaton 1993: 3-21). 
Contrary to the simple story of a non-settler colonialism setting up an extractive 
system that was disruptive of stable property rights, the history of British imperial rule 
in India was one of a continuous but ultimately futile series of interventions to create 
rights appropriate for a more productive revenue-paying agriculture while attempting 
to maintain political stability. These two objectives proved to be conflicting and led to 
the creation of conflicting sets of rights that in the end significantly raised transaction 
costs for productive investors. The colonial state failed even to sustain the levels of 
revenue collection it had begun with. The history of British property rights 
interventions in the Indian subcontinent shows powerfully that it is not the presence or 
absence of rights that matters but rather the types of rights that are created or 
destroyed and how that affects the productive transformation of that society.  
 
From the Indian perspective, the impact of British imperialism came at a most 
unfortunate moment when the Mughal system of land rights and revenue collection 
was facing severe internal tensions. The growth of long-distance trade in the 
eighteenth century led to growing conflicts between merchants, financiers and the 
nobility who comprised the Mughal ruling classes over what to tax and by how much. 
These conflicts were in turn increasingly expressed in political intrigues within the 
state apparatus of the last independent ruler of Bengal, Nawab Siraj-ud-Daula. They 
led directly to a calamitous dénouement with the military disaster of 1757 at the Battle 
of Polashi (Plessey), where intrigue, deception and betrayal on the part of the nawab’s 
main financiers and generals led to a pre-arranged victory for the English against 
nominally much superior Bengal forces (Pavlov 1979: 83-107 and 215-56). The new 
balance of military power enabled the East India Company to install and remove 
subservient nawabs at the provincial capital Murshidabad, till in 1772, Warren 
Hastings brought the unnecessary facade of dual government to an end. An English 
council under a governor took over the administration and shifted the capital to 
Calcutta, which eventually became the capital of British India. 
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Before the colonial impact, Bengal was ironically a relatively prosperous and food 
surplus province of the disintegrating Mughal Empire. The agricultural technology 
used in India just prior to the colonial period was significantly inferior to that used in 
Europe but yields per acre were comparable or even higher than European levels 
(Raychaudhuri 1983: 17-18). Bengal in particular also appeared to be an especially 
promising region for the indigenous development of manufactures from the late 
seventeenth century onwards. The artisan sector, particularly textiles, was well-
established and was the basis of a thriving long-distance trade organized by Indian 
merchant capital. The agricultural surplus was large enough to maintain substantial 
urban populations, particularly at Dhaka and Murshidabad, even when the Mughal 
capital at Delhi could enforce the full payment of taxes to the central authority (N. 
Ahmad 1968: 98-104). Prior to the English, civil and military administration was in 
the hands of a tax-collecting nobility, the Indian equivalent of a ‘feudal elite’. It was 
not in the interest of this landed nobility to either accumulate inordinately or kill the 
peasants and artisans who produced their surplus, both of which would attract the 
unwelcome attention of higher-level administrators. This allowed the growth of a 
substantial artisan sector, which despite technical backwardness produced 
commodities which were in high demand throughout the world. Many artisans were 
directly settled in cities supplying the demands of the administrative and military 
elite. According to one estimate, the home market for luxury handicrafts alone 
amounted to about five per cent of Mughal national income, with the export market 
accounting for another one and a half per cent before the English takeover  (Maddison 
1971: 54). 
 
In the aftermath of the victory of the East India Company, some of its immediate 
actions came close to the expropriation model of a non-settler colony. While the 
company used the language of free trade, its strategy of unequal taxation and 
underpaying the Bengali artisans ensured the destruction of the artisan economy. The 
company and its servants acquired the right to move goods in the interior duty-free, 
depriving the nawab’s treasury of revenue and destroying local merchants who were 
forced to pay domestic tolls and duties. In 1763, Nawab Mir Kasim made a final 
attempt to save the local economy by declaring that since the English enjoyed free 
trade, his treasury would also absolve Indian merchants from paying any duty. The 
English reaction was swift and unequivocal. The head of the company’s factory at 
Patna attacked the city, and in the ensuing two and a half month war, the nawab’s 
depleted army was defeated in six successive battles. The company’s privileges were 
restored by restoring duties for indigenous merchants. This symbolic effort was in 
effect the last ‘nationalist’ stand of the fractious indigenous ruling elite (Mukherjee 
1974: 304-12; Islam 1984: 47-53). 
 
The company’s servants and gomastahs (local agents) now had unbridled power to 
underpay the artisan, and the company appeared to prefer vast short term profits to the 
survival of the artisan economy. William Bolts, a contemporary English merchant has 
left a graphic account of the system of fines, floggings, imprisonments and forced 
bonds which enabled them to do this (Bolts 1772: 73, 83, 191-4; Mukherjee 1974: 
302-4). Furthermore, the destruction of the Mughal elite destroyed a substantial part 
of the domestic demand for luxury handicrafts. As much as three quarters of domestic 
demand disappeared according to one estimate (Maddison 1971: 54). In less than a 
century, the thriving artisan manufacturing sector was virtually destroyed, with 
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serious implications for indigenous skills, technology and entrepreneurship. The vast 
urban settlements which visitors from Europe had once marvelled at also disappeared. 
Sir Charles Trevelyan reported in 1840 a decline in the population of Dhaka from 150 
to 30 or 40 thousand (Dutt 1950: 114). 
 
However, on the issue of land revenue and land rights, the early colonial discourse 
was much more constructive from the outset even if the actual outcomes appeared to 
conform to the extractive model. The declared aim was to create a productive landlord 
class by creating rights over land revenues that were formal and marketable. The fact 
that this was not just a cynical discourse is shown by the fact that when the results in 
Bengal proved disappointing, the colonial authorities experimented with different 
allocations of land revenue rights in other parts of India. As a result of these different 
experiments as well as important differences in initial conditions, there were 
differences in the character of the new middle classes which emerged across British 
India, and in the pace and extent of industrial development. Class evolution depended 
not only on pre-existing structures of land rights and the organization of merchant and 
usury capital, but also on the types of land rights that the British experimented with. 
Much depended on when a province was annexed and changes in prevailing fashions 
in the contemporary ‘institutional economics’ debates going on in England. Regional 
variations in the availability of raw materials and in the fertility of the soil were also 
of importance. But while some Indian regional results were indeed better than the 
Bengal experiment, nowhere did the British succeed in creating the productive 
agrarian capitalist class that they wanted to create to increase land revenue collection.  
 
The conflicting objectives and strategies of the evolving colonial state in India can be 
analysed in terms of the analytical distinction David Washbrook makes between the 
motivations of the ‘mercantilist’ colonial state of the mid-eighteenth to mid-
nineteenth century and those of the ‘High Colonial state’ that coexisted from the 
beginning but emerged in its full form after the 1857 Mutiny/War of Independence. In 
its initial phase, the colonial power was primarily interested in maximizing revenue 
from the land, and this was achieved by making the pre-existing Mughal and Nawabi 
land-tax collection system more efficient (Washbrook 1981). The Mughal state 
collected land-tax by appointing a chain of intermediaries, who though they had no 
rights to the land they collected from, had formal and often inheritable and 
transferrable rights to collect revenue (Sinha 1962; Habib 1963; Hasan 1969). While 
the disintegration of the Mughal Empire from the late seventeenth century onwards 
made some difference to the relative power of different levels of this hierarchy, the 
structure itself remained more or less intact. The Mughal subahdar (governor) of 
Bengal, Murshid Quli Khan, virtually declared independence in 1707 by stopping 
revenue payments to the centre, but within Bengal he rationalized the revenue 
collection system and attempted to exert greater pressure on the higher level revenue 
collectors, the zamindars, to increase revenue collection (Ray 1979: 1-51). 
 
The ‘mercantilist’ colonial state’s ambitious property rights experiment was in 
intention not just a mercantilist surplus extraction project but an attempt to create 
institutional incentives for agricultural ‘improvement’ along the English model 
(Arnold 2005). The Permanent Settlement of 1793 boldly declared that zamindars 
were ‘proprietors of the soil’ and granted them formal tradable rights to collect 
revenue (Chaudhuri 1983: 88). In fact, the Act only gave zamindars the formal right 
to buy and sell their revenue collecting authority, in exchange for a perpetually fixed 
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money rental paid to the state. Though the money rent was fixed at a high level, it was 
fixed in perpetuity in nominal terms, so the intention was clearly to create incentives 
for zamindars to improve the land. At the same time, failure to pay the revenue to the 
state would lead to the zamindari being auctioned. Historical consensus has now 
shifted away from the opinion that the Permanent Settlement created ‘capitalist’ 
property rights in land (Mukherjee 1974; Alavi 1975), to the more tenable position 
that it attempted to make the pre-existing revenue structure more efficient by ensuring 
that zamindars had strong incentives to make the revenue payment on time and to 
improve the land (Ray and Ray 1973; Ray 1974; Ray and Ray 1975; Ray 1979). But 
whether any of this could be done depended on whether the zamindar had adequate 
rights to compel the settled peasant producers to put in more effort or otherwise do 
things differently. And here lay one of the fatal flaws in its institutional design. The 
Permanent Settlement did not give zamindars any such rights, and the subsequent 
evolution of colonial law successively increased the rights of lower level 
intermediaries at the village level (though rarely the rights of the poorest peasants).  
 
The design failure could initially have been the result of thoughtlessly transporting 
bits of an institutional model from one context to another. The Mughal zamindari 
system worked through the zamindar using lower level tax collectors who included 
village-level petty landlords and professional tax collectors. In the original version, 
the zamindar had a strong hold over these lower level collectors and over peasants 
because the zamindar was not just a revenue collector but also at the apex of a local 
political unit providing policing and conflict resolution functions (Rahman 1986). 
These formal powers gave the Mughal zamindar a network of informal powers 
through which revenue collection could be enforced. But under the permanent 
settlement, while the British created formal rights for zamindars they also removed 
policing and judicial functions to new classes of professional functionaries. This 
undermined the informal powers of zamindars without giving them new rights that 
may have established a market-based discipline. For instance, peasant ryots could 
pledge land against arrears, but they could in theory also claim their land back by 
paying off the arrears even after generations, significantly weakening the possibility 
of zamindars permanently changing land use (Chaudhuri 1983: 151-2).  
 
Lacking market power, rural creditors and agents of zamindars often used crude 
forms of coercion that created hatred rather than efficient responses by the producers. 
The outcome was therefore not surprising. The increase in revenue could not be 
delivered in many cases without very crude and obvious coercion and large numbers 
of zamindaris went up for auction without many new takers appearing. As inflation 
reduced the real burden of the revenue settlement, zamindaris eventually did become 
viable investment propositions for merchants and traders, but the creation of 
zamindari rights never had the desired effect of creating incentives for improvement. 
The persistence of this experiment and others like it in other parts of India cannot 
simply be explained by a technical design error. Zamindars and merchants continued 
to demand that their rights vis-à-vis lower level surplus claimants and peasants should 
be strengthened but these demands were systematically rejected. Subsequent reforms 
made the situation even worse by further strengthening the rights of village-level petty 
landlords and revenue collectors. 
 
Why this happened can be understood in terms of the evolving motivations of the 
‘High Colonial State’ (Washbrook 1981). The colonial power clearly lacked 
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traditional sources of power and authority and its existence could not but undermine 
the authority of indigenous dominant classes. This made the maintenance of social 
order a matter of great concern from the outset but particularly after the 1857 
Mutiny/War of Independence. It is not surprising that the state’s policies 
demonstrated a growing concern to construct new allies and balances of power. The 
innovation was a new concern with the ‘peasant’ or ryot meaning not the 
impoverished tillers of the soil but the petty village landlords and intermediaries who 
were most likely to emerge as the organizers and representatives of mass discontent. 
Prior to 1857 this concern manifested itself in the refusal to extend zamindar rights 
too far against lower level intermediaries and peasants. After 1857 the state’s concern 
with the possibility of further disturbances took the form of positive legislation to 
protect ryots and strengthen their rights.  
 
This was clearly a political agenda of delivering to groups whose support the colonial 
power thought it needed. The strategy cannot be explained either by a desire to extract 
a greater surplus (indeed this was a period of falling land revenues) or to enhance 
growth (as these rights made it more difficult for zamindars, merchants and usurers to 
achieve effective control of the land to change production relations and technologies). 
Important legislation of this period includes the Rent Act of 1859 and the Tenancy 
Act of 1885. Both Acts, and particularly the latter, strengthened the rights of the so-
called ‘occupancy ryots’ who were the petty village level landlords often called 
jotedars in Bengal. As the jotedars were surplus farmers and sometimes also village-
level rentiers, they had structural conflicts of interest with the higher-level revenue 
collecting zamindars (Chatterjee 1982: 123-4). The Tenancy Act formally recognized 
the rights of ryots as formal tenants of zamindars but again without granting the latter 
any formal powers to compel their ‘tenants’ to do anything.  
 
The creation of these new rights meant that these ‘intermediate classes’ could keep a 
bigger share of the surplus for themselves. But the jotedars too did not have any 
effective capacity to change production relations at the village level because their 
powers to accumulate land, evict their own tenants on any significant scale or to settle 
new tenants were very limited. It was only through an amendment of the Tenancy Act 
in 1928 that ryots acquired the right to buy and sell their occupancy rights, but that 
too by paying 25 per cent of the sale price to the zamindar and with the zamindar 
having the right of pre-emption (Chaudhuri 1983: 152-3; Barkat and Roy 2004: 25-7). 
These complex checks and balances were intended to preserve the status quo in 
precisely the way in which a properly working land market would threaten to disrupt. 
The result was that by the 1870s it was clear that the surpluses of the village petty 
proprietor group were not being invested in agriculture but rather to finance the 
migration of their sons to the city. This migration was greatly assisted by another 
‘stabilization’ strategy of the raj: the rapid growth in the largely unproductive 
employment opportunities created by the burgeoning state that ‘managed’ empire 
(Gordon 1974: 28; A. M. Ahmad 1975; Chatterjee 1982: 121). 
 
Thus the rights the raj created for different categories of landed peasants and revenue 
collectors may have reduced some specific transaction costs but did not reduce the 
critical transaction costs facing potential investors who may have wanted to achieve 
effective control over land in the way Thai investors were able to do in the second 
half of the twentieth century. And certainly the new property rights did not help to 
change the organization of production in peasant farms. Paradoxically, the flow of 
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people from the intermediate classes to urban professions resulted in a further increase 
in the organizational power of the intermediate classes and the creation of further 
rights and protections for them. The increasingly assertive intermediate classes were 
behind the formation of the Indian Association in 1876, which split from the old 
British Indian Association dominated by the big zamindars. They were also to provide 
the organizational backbone of the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League, and 
in Bengal set up their own party, the Krishok-Proja (or Peasant) Party. Ironically, in 
the end the empire was brought down by the very classes the British nurtured to check 
the pretensions of the zamindars and merchant capitalists above and the poor below. It 
can then be argued that the damaging effects of British colonialism on the productive 
economy were not primarily due to its extraction of surplus but to its social 
engineering. This created competing rights that blocked a productive transformation 
of agriculture or even the acquisition of effective rights over contiguous territories of 
land, which could have reduced the transaction costs of a subsequent productive 
transformation into manufacturing. 
 
After independence in 1947 Pakistan abolished zamindari in 1950 and India in 1951. 
By then the real value of the rents the zamindars appropriated had in any case 
dwindled to insignificance. The ryots who had effective occupancy rights now 
became legal owners of land and directly responsible for the land tax which had 
become trivial in real terms. But land markets did not work to create any 
consolidation of land in Bengal. The very small scale of most farms meant that for 
many of them, the agrarian surplus was simply not there for expansion through buying 
up neighbouring lands. And the transaction costs for investors outside the village to 
attempt to take over significant quantities of land and then change the organization of 
peasant production were too prohibitive (Mahbub Ullah 1996; Khan 2004). As a 
result, demographic forces were the main determinants of the declining average size 
of farms in Bangladesh. Table 1 shows the worrying and continuing fragmentation of 
land in Bangladesh’s agriculture.  
 
Table 1 Land Fragmentation in Bangladesh 1984-1997 
1983-4 Census 1996-7 Census Size of holdings 
(acres) Frequency (%) Owned Area (%) Frequency (%) Owned Area (%) 
Small (0.05-2.5) 75.4 18.2 83.1 26.2 
Medium (2.5-7.5) 19.9 56.2 14.3 56.3 
Large (7.5- ) 4.7 25.6 2.6 17.5 
Source: World Bank (2000: Tables 1.5 and 1.6). 
 
The land market continued to have high transaction costs because the land rights the 
ryots inherited had not been designed to facilitate purchases and sales of land. The 
process of reconciling registered records of ownership of landholdings with the land 
records and maps that had served the colonial revenue system threw up millions of 
disputes that continue till today all across the Indian subcontinent. In Bangladesh, 
according to one estimate, of the roughly 1.8 million cases pending in the courts in 
December 2000, 1.4 million were land related cases, and the average time in court for 
a land-related case was 7.6 years (Barkat and Roy 2004: Tables 9 and 16). Major 
initiatives are under way to computerize land records and to resolve inconsistencies in 
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the dual system of registering records in the deeds registration offices and the 
cadastral records and mutations therein held in the land records offices (Uniconsult 
Ltd. 2009). However, the reason that court cases take so long to resolve is only partly 
because of shortcomings in procedures and management capabilities in record 
keeping.  
 
A successful land transfer involves not only a registered transfer between the legal 
holder of the title and the buyer, but also a record or ‘mutation’ in the maps of the 
surveyed lands. As the plots in the two systems of record do not necessarily overlap 
and as border disputes between neighbours or partition disputes between heirs can be 
significant, the resolution of claims can be a lengthy process of attrition. The system 
of land rights where different records do not have a clear legal primacy is a reflection 
of the colonial tradition of land management established by the British whose aim in 
its later phases was primarily to avoid conflict by preserving the status quo. Attempts 
at resolving conflicting allocations of rights were conflictual and avoided as far as 
possible. The resolution of inconsistencies will almost inevitably produce one or more 
losers and conflicting records and claims reflect the fact that this resolution has not 
been done in the past. As land values have risen the courts have become an arena for 
lengthy wars of attrition as a method of resolving disputes, at great cost to society. 
Once these conflicts are resolved for a particular plot of land, the system of land 
titling and transfers works reasonably well and transfers do not take long to make 
effective. The issue therefore appears to be not the system of record-keeping and the 
process of changing the records that land transfers involve but the cost of resolving 
disputes. 
 
In the meantime, the costs of resolving these disputes have grown exponentially 
because of the rapid fragmentation of land due to demographic processes. The 
absence of significant manufacturing employment opportunities makes poor peasants 
hold out in long disputes out of desperation (and also makes them easy recruits for 
political opportunists taking advantage of land disputes). At the same time, the high 
transaction costs of acquiring land contribute to the slow progress of manufacturing, 
creating a vicious cycle. Even in the absence of disputes over land ownership and 
boundaries, extreme poverty can be expected to raise transaction costs because poor 
peasants will hold out for very long for slightly higher prices, particularly given the 
low opportunity cost of waiting. Land fragmentation and poverty have therefore not 
only made it difficult to resolve the conflicts that could create property rights 
appropriate for a well-working land market, the likelihood is that with poverty and 
fragmentation transaction costs will be high even with well-defined property rights 
(Sarkar 2007). 
 
In West Bengal land reform to benefit the poor and middle peasantry was a central 
plank of the political strategy of the Communist Party Marxist (CPM) which came to 
power in 1977 as the dominant party in a Left Front government. The strategy of 
strengthening the rights of small and medium peasants was the cornerstone of the 
electoral strategy of the left front. The reforms had two major objectives. The first 
was to improve the bargaining power of bargadars or sharecroppers by registering 
them and making it legally more difficult to evict registered tenants. Between 1977 
and 2003 1.2 million additional bargadars were registered (the registration process 
had begun under the previous government), accounting for 9 per cent of all cultivators 
(Dasgupta 2005: Table 2 and Appendix Table 2). The second objective was to carry 
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out a redistribution of land to landless and land poor peasants making them minor 
landholders or pattadars. The land was acquired from landholdings greater than the 
land ceilings set by many Indian states including West Bengal in their land reform 
acts which had not been fully enforced. Over the same period, an additional 3.5 per 
cent of sown area was redistributed benefiting another 14 per cent of the agricultural 
population (Dasgupta 2005: 4).  
 
Table 2 Land Fragmentation in West Bengal 1971-1996 
1970-71 1995-96 Size of holdings 
(hectares) Frequency (%) Owned Area (%) Frequency (%) Owned Area (%) 
Less than 1 60.0 21.5 76.4 42.9 
1-4 35.6 54.6 22.6 47.8 
4-10 4.4 19.2 0.9 5.7 
More than 10 0.1 4.6 0.02 3.6 
Source: From Dasgupta (2005: Table 11) 
 
These policies benefiting small and medium peasants together with the expansion of 
high yielding varieties of seeds in the 1980s drove very high growth rates in West 
Bengal agriculture. In the 1980s foodgrain output increased at 5.5 per cent a year. 
Nevertheless, rural poverty remained higher than the Indian average and in the 1990s 
agricultural growth slowed to just over 2 per cent per annum (Sarkar 2007). The 
constraint to agricultural growth was the smallholder model which cannot sustain 
endless growth given that after a point scale economies in land use and mechanization 
become important. Table 2 shows that growing land fragmentation is as severe in 
West Bengal as in Bangladesh (note that Indian figures are in hectares, with 1 hectare 
= 2.47 acres). If anything, pro-poor land redistribution in West Bengal has kept the 
amount of land held in uneconomic tiny holdings at excessively high levels (43 per 
cent of agricultural land is less than 1 hectare each). The problem for the government 
was that when it realized the need for attracting industry to the state in the 2000s, it 
found that its land policies, while they were clearly pro-poor and had many desirable 
features, had actually further raised the transaction costs of organizing a significant 
change in land use.  
 
As West Bengal has a longer industrial history than East Bengal (Khan 2008b), West 
Bengal has more land near urban centres and transport networks with titling and land 
record issues sorted out. As in Bangladesh, where registered ownership and the land 
records based on cadastral surveys (maintained by the Land and Land Reforms 
Department in West Bengal) are consistent, land transactions are relatively efficient. 
The issue in both West Bengal and Bangladesh has been that the land already 
available in the industrial land market is insufficient and extending land use has 
proved to be very difficult given the types of land rights that were inherited. The types 
of conflicts that could emerge were brought to the fore by the conflict in Singur over 
the failed attempt to set up Tata’s Nano factory, which we will examine as a case 
study later. 
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Maharashtra: Did ‘Ryotwari’ Rights Make any Difference? 
Western India came under British rule fifty or so years after the fall of Bengal. 
Gujarat fell to the British in 1803 and most of the Bombay Presidency in 1818. As the 
poor results of the zamindari Permanent Settlement in Bengal were apparent, other 
experiments were tried in the newly conquered parts of India. Two major variants 
were the mahalwari system introduced in northern and central India in areas which 
now include western Uttar Pradesh, and the ryotwari system introduced in western 
India and parts of southern India. The areas that are now the state of Maharashtra 
came under the ryotwari system. In the mahalwari system the revenue collecting 
rights were settled on a lineage or clan of smaller village level zamindars who 
collectively controlled a group of villages. While the mahalwari system was 
effectively quite similar to the zamindari system (as a dominant coordinating landlord 
often emerged), the ryotwari system was different. In the ryotwari system the revenue 
was settled on individual landholders. In the zamindari and mahalwari systems the 
proprietary right to collect revenue could be bought or sold with no effect on the 
peasant or ryot who farmed a piece of land. In the ryotwari system the landholding 
peasant was also the ‘revenue collector’ so a failure to pay the rent could result in the 
dispossession of the peasant from the land. Partly because of this, the survey and 
assessment of revenue claims was done much more carefully. The Bombay Survey 
System was framed in 1835 and took sixty-six years to complete. Unlike the 
zamindari system the assessment was based on a judgement of ability to pay, and the 
assessment was to be revised every thirty years (Fukazawa 1983).  
 
Later observers have argued that zamindari areas consistently underperformed the 
ryotwari areas. In an influential econometric exercise Banerjee and Iyer (2005) argue 
that zamindari districts in India have ended up in the 1980s with lower agricultural 
yields compared to ryotwari and mahalwari areas. As zamindari was abolished in the 
1950s, these findings appear to show a significant lasting effect of institutions. But a 
careful reading of their article shows that the mechanisms that could explain the 
persistence of the effect are not very convincing. They point out that the differences in 
contemporary yields are largely due to differences in contemporary levels of 
investment. So we need to know if historic land revenue systems can plausibly 
explain differences in contemporary investment behaviour. They consider three 
mechanisms which could relate colonial land settlement to contemporary investment.  
 
The first possibility is that ryotwari and mahalwari areas were the main beneficiaries 
of colonial investment in infrastructure that in turn had a lasting effect on difference 
in profitability between regions. The colonial government may have preferred to 
invest in infrastructure in ryotwari areas because of the possibility of raising ryotwari 
revenue assessments. But the most significant colonial investments happened in the 
mahalwari areas of north-west India, including modern Pakistan. We know that these 
investments had little to do with revenue and were motivated by the need to pacify the 
areas from which the British Indian army recruited. Banerjee and Iyer themselves 
discount this mechanism as significant for contemporary differences in yields because 
the gap between zamindari and other areas only begins to emerge after 1965 and 
includes the southern Indian ryotwari states that did not benefit from colonial 
infrastructure to the same extent. A second possible explanatory mechanism could be 
that zamindari areas had a greater area of very small ‘marginal’ farms (64% of 
holdings were less than 1 ha in 1990 compared to 56% in non-zamindari areas). This 
could explain lower investment and growth, but Banerjee and Iyer discount this 
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mechanism on the grounds that the differences are not great enough, and in any case 
this feature of zamindari areas may have nothing to do with the revenue structure 
introduced by the British.  
 
The third possible mechanism is that the political environment that developed in the 
perhaps more unequal zamindari areas was not conducive to cooperation between the 
‘masses’ and the ‘elites’ resulting in lower development spending (13 rupees per 
capita in zamindari areas compared to 19 rupees in non-zamindari areas between 
1960-65, with the gap increasing even further subsequently). Interestingly, this 
mechanism has little to do with the structures of property rights established by 
revenue systems. It refers to rather broad differences in elite-mass political 
relationships that may have developed as a result, but these are not well established or 
explained. The link between structures of revenue settlement rights established in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the politics of Indian states in the late twentieth 
century fifty years after these revenue arrangements were abolished would need to be 
much more carefully established to be convincing. At best, we can agree that there are 
statistical differences in government development spending between regions and that 
the most likely explanation is a difference in political organization between regions. 
To attribute these differences in political organization to historic land revenue systems 
requires more convincing causal explanations. 
 
In particular, Banerjee and Iyer need to argue that the British choice of revenue 
system had nothing to do with pre-existing social structures in these areas, and was an 
accident of when the province was absorbed into empire. In fact, there was a great 
deal of continuity in the land revenue structures the British introduced and pre-
existing Mughal systems. Much of the British effort was to formalize rights that 
described how they thought the existing economy worked. This was certainly the case 
in Bengal, the northern and central states where mahalwari was introduced (Stokes 
1983), and in the west including Maharashtra, where ryotwari was introduced 
(Fukazawa 1983). Only in the south was there a significant randomness in the type of 
revenue rights introduced. To argue on the basis of the experience of the southern 
states that the entire revenue structure across India should be seen as an exogenously 
determined institutional experiment could clearly be misleading. The revenue 
structures introduced by the British could in many if not most cases be correlated to 
earlier differences in ecology, social organization and class structure, which could in 
turn be the real determinants of some of the contemporary differences in political 
organization across Indian states.  
 
Returning to Maharashtra and the ryotwari system introduced in the west, we know 
that this too was built on earlier Mughal and Maratha land revenue systems. The 
Maratha land revenue system was itself based closely on the Mughal system and the 
British built on this base. Unlike Bengal where the zamindar under the Mughals was 
in charge of a political administrative unit, in the Konkan, Deccan and North Kanara 
regions which include much of modern Maharashtra, land administration was in the 
hands of hereditary district level officials, the deshmukh and the deshpande. The 
Marathas introduced their own paid officials who fixed the land tax for each village 
with the village headman. Village landholders or mirasdars were then responsible for 
the share of the revenue allocated to them by the village, though they did not lose 
their land in case of a temporary inability to pay. When the British adopted the 
ryotwari system they were clearly working with the grain of the revenue system that 
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already existed. Indeed their intention of settling the revenue for each ryot or 
mirasdar was mainly to prevent the stronger peasants passing on an excessive share to 
weaker peasants within the village (Fukazawa 1983).  
 
Despite the obvious differences in the structure of rights created in the ryotwari 
system, the common outcome across India was that the different systems of rights had 
little effect on the ease with which land could be accumulated or its use changed. In 
Bengal there was an active market in zamindari rights but no significant change in the 
effective occupation and use of land. The really interesting feature of the market in 
ryotwari rights in the Bombay Presidency is that it too did not lead to any significant 
change in the overall distribution and use of land. Effective control of significant 
amounts of land did not pass to merchants or financial capitalists as one may have 
expected once the occupancy rights of the ryots became alienable. To understand why 
not, we need to go back to the political imperatives of the colonial state, which rapidly 
created countervailing rights precisely to prevent an outcome that may have had 
destabilizing political consequences for a state with weak roots in society.  
 
Following the introduction of the ryotwari system, revenue pressures on poorer 
peasants did lead to land acquisitions by Gujarati moneylenders and also by the more 
prosperous cultivating castes like the Kunbis. But riots broke out in 1875 in the poorer 
parts of the Deccan and turned to violence in Poona and Ahmadnagar districts 
(Natarajan 1979). The British response was swift. Nearly a thousand peasants were 
arrested within a fortnight but after quelling the uprising the government went to work 
on the law, redefining rights to ensure that this did not happen again. The Deccan 
Agriculturalists’ Relief Act of 1879 put limits on the alienation of land and on usury. 
Courts were enjoined to go into the history of each transaction and try to find a 
solution that did not require dispossession, including if necessary reducing the interest 
rate already agreed upon or increasing the repayment period. The result was that 
moneylenders reduced their lending. Far from any land concentration or even 
consolidation being achieved as a result of the ryotwari land market, in Maharashtra 
as in other parts of India, peasant landholdings actually became more fragmented 
throughout the colonial period, primarily as a result of the natural effect of 
demographic forces (Fukazawa 1983: 199-202).  
 
After India’s independence there was less to do in ryotwari areas as significant classes 
of intermediary rent-owning classes did not exist and no serious land reform to 
change actual farm sizes was considered anywhere in the Indian subcontinent. But 
here too, some landholders had become de facto intermediaries through the 
accumulation of significant landholdings that were then sub-let to tenants. Tenants on 
these lands were now further protected with legislation making eviction difficult and 
setting land ceilings on holding (though as elsewhere these land ceilings were not 
strictly enforced). Contemporary land fragmentation in Maharashtra is less serious 
than in Bengal, but the trends of growing fragmentation over time are just as strong as 
can be seen in Table 3. If we adjust the slightly higher average landholding sizes in 
Maharashtra for the significantly lower land productivity, the issues of rural poverty 
and peasant desperation are even more severe. A comparison of agricultural yields for 
2006 demonstrates the relative poverty of Maharashtrian agriculture. The yield for 
rice was 1768 kg/ha compared to an Indian average of 2102, and West Bengal’s 2509 
kg/ha. For wheat, Maharashtrian yields were 1393 kg/ha compared to an Indian 
average of 2619 and West Bengal’s 2109 kg/ha. And for cotton, Maharashtra 
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achieved only 187 kg/ha compared to an Indian average of 362 and West Bengal’s 
510 kg/ha (Government of Maharashtra 2008). Clearly, Maharashtra does not fit 
Banerjee and Iyer’s (2005) general statistical claim that ryotwari areas ended up with 
higher yields than zamindari areas.  
 
Table 3 Land Fragmentation in Maharashtra 1977-2001 
1976-77 2000-01 Size of holdings 
(hectares) Frequency (%) Owned Area (%) Frequency (%) Owned Area (%) 
Less than 1 26.1 3.3 43.7 13.2 
1-4 43.1 26.1 48.5 55.9 
4-10 23.5 39.5 7.1 24.2 
More than 10 7.4 31.0 0.7 6.8 
Source: Government of India Agricultural Census 1976-7 and (Government of 
Maharashtra 2005: Table 3.10).  
 
A most disturbing illustration of Maharashtra’s poor agriculture is provided by the 
staggering figures for peasant suicides in the state. The state has one of the highest 
rates of suicides of indebted peasants in India, with some estimates putting the figure 
at 29,000 deaths between 1997 to 2005 (Sainath 2007). Paradoxically, the poverty of 
Maharashtrian agriculture has meant that land acquisition for industry has been 
significantly easier compared to West Bengal. In West Bengal not only was the 
population density higher, in addition land reforms and agrarian growth benefiting 
primarily middle and rich peasants made them less willing to sell out even though 
their absolute standards of living were still very low. Land acquisition in Maharashtra 
for industry was in general easier but not because property rights on land were more 
appropriate for efficient land market transactions. Rather, the operation of the 
Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC) which we will look at later 
suggests that state institutions were able to exercise political power more effectively 
to acquire large tracts of land from relatively weaker and more impoverished 
peasants. 
 
Maharashtra is also one of several Indian states that made significant progress in 
computerizing parts of their land registry and land record systems (Uniconsult Ltd. 
2009). As land registration and land records are a state matter in India, there are 
important variations across states. The Maharashtrian experience is that the effect of 
computerization has been to speed up registration in straightforward cases but 
computerization by itself obviously does not resolve either the conflicts created by 
inconsistencies in records or the overall problem of high transaction costs when 
purchasing land from multiple small and/or very poor peasants.  
 
The differences between the zamindari, ryotwari and mahalwari systems from the 
perspective of how they affected the distribution of effective land use are therefore 
exaggerated. The zamindari system had a design fault from the perspective of 
developing a market in agricultural land because the revenue collecting right was 
delinked from the occupancy right. However, even after the implications of this were 
well understood, the raj made no attempt to correct this. On the contrary, the rights of 
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lower level intermediaries were strengthened over time, not only making it difficult 
for merchants to accumulate land, but even making it difficult for zamindars to collect 
their share of the agrarian surplus. The real failure of the land market in Bengal 
therefore had political roots which lay in the unwillingness of the colonial state to 
confront the potential instability that may have followed attempts to define rights in 
ways that would be consistent with accumulation and growth.  
 
The underlying political constraints that influenced colonial land policy can also 
explain why the ryotwari structure of revenue rights in western India that united 
revenue with occupation rights had little effect on land accumulation strategies. When 
trade in ryotwari rights led to some limited signs of peasant resistance to agrarian 
accumulation, the British felt compelled to create offsetting rights for the poorer ryots 
that made it very difficult for merchant capital to penetrate into and accumulate 
effective rights over the land using the land market that would allow them to 
determine land use. The legacy of this continues in Maharashtra’s agriculture where 
land fragmentation is continuing as fast as in other parts of India. The difference in 
Maharashtra is that at the margins of the impoverished agrarian economy aggressive 
state-led land accumulation strategies have worked in making significant amounts of 
land available for industrial development. Clearly, the creation of and evolution of 
property rights on land in Bengal and Maharashtra did not create compulsions for 
productivity growth. Nor did the formal rights over revenue and land set up during the 
colonial period assist the accumulation of land by commercial accumulators. In this at 
least, the colonial legacy made India significantly different from Thailand.  
 
Tanzania: The Legacy of Customary Authority and Collective Rights 
Pre-colonial political organization over large swathes of the African continent was in 
general less ‘state-like’ than in Asia, with a few notable exceptions. Low population 
densities and an ecology that produced a lower agricultural surplus meant that in 
general African societies could not sustain dense structures of surplus-consuming 
administrative classes. There were sparsely populated parts of Asia too, but as we saw 
in Thailand, state formation followed periods of rapid expansions of population. 
Tanzania like Thailand had a vast land frontier but the land was of poorer quality and 
Tanganyika was one of the poorer countries in Africa, certainly during colonial times. 
But it has to be remembered that Thai agriculture too had very low yields and 
extending land use required significant investments in drainage, canal building and 
the clearing of forests. The more important difference was possibly that unlike 
Tanzania, from the early nineteenth century the Thai king and nobles could access 
virtually unlimited supplies of immigrant labour desperate to build new lives and 
willing to work in harsh frontier conditions with almost no guarantees of rights. 
African societies had a variety of land-use arrangements and class structures but in 
general as long as labour scarcity was severe they were necessarily less hierarchical 
with fewer surplus consuming classes compared to the Asian norm. While these 
differences were real, the subsequent impact of colonialism on African societies had 
important elements of similarity with the Asian experience which are relevant for our 
understanding of property rights transitions.  
 
As in Asia, non-settler colonial rule had a variety of impacts in different parts of 
Africa and in different sectors that are difficult to summarize in a simple way. What 
we do know is that only between 2 and 10 per cent of land in contemporary sub-
Saharan Africa is held under freehold title while much of the rest is held in various 
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forms of communal or customary tenures (Deininger 2003: 62). Purchases and sales 
by individuals of land held in the latter types of tenure are not supported or not fully 
supported by the formal enforcement structures of the state. This suggests obvious 
problems for achieving changes in land use and changes in the organization of 
farming as land under communal or customary tenures accounts for the vast bulk of 
the available land. We would expect these structures of rights to further deepen the 
market failures that are anyway widespread in poor economies. It is not therefore 
surprising that the liberalization of fertilizer and other product markets in African 
agriculture has typically had weak and sometimes negative effects on agricultural 
productivity in countries like Tanzania (Skarstein 2005). These negative effects are 
not surprising in the absence of the full framework of property rights or other 
institutions to mitigate widespread market failures. 
 
Why did African countries inherit such structures of rights after a century or more of 
colonial rule? Explanations can be placed along a simplified spectrum. At one end are 
theories that say non-settler colonial states introduced ‘extractive’ structures of rights 
that were systematically inimical to development. To be so systematically damaging 
they had to be the product of deliberate colonial policies that sought to extract 
resources using institutions and politics that undermined productive rights. The now 
influential arguments of Acemoglu et al. (2001; 2002) are modern variants of this 
position. At the other end of the spectrum are arguments that claim that the colonial 
impact introduced capitalism in Africa which is now growing apace. These arguments 
look at other indicators of capitalist development, such as the growth of markets, 
particularly labour markets and infrastructure, and underplay the slow evolution of 
property rights (Warren 1980; Sender 1999). In between are a range of theories that 
point out that non-settler colonial states did not have a singular objective and that 
outcomes depended on the interplay between colonial objectives and the interests of 
indigenous social forces (Mamdani 1997; Daley 2005a, 2005b; Chimhowu and 
Woodhouse 2006; Austin 2008; Bayly 2008). Given the diverse transition experiences 
and outcomes across Africa, the last approach clearly ought to be carefully 
considered. Some of these ‘interplay’ approaches also offer potentially important 
insights that overlap with the Asian experience and allow us to generalize further 
about the impact of non-settler colonialism on the long-term evolution of property 
rights. 
 
The lack of fit between Acemoglu et al.’s (2001; 2002) arguments and African history 
in particular has been extensively discussed by economic historians (Austin 2008; 
Bayly 2008). Austin provides examples showing why British property right 
interventions in Africa are not in general consistent with the extractive state 
hypothesis. For instance, in Ghana the colonial state supported productive African 
property rights and intervened to moderate monopsonistic behaviour by European 
commodity purchasers (2008: 1011). However, Austin’s examples of support for 
productive African property rights can also be interpreted as a demonstration of the 
willingness of the colonial power to support conflicting sets of rights out of political 
expediency. Thus, Austin provides an example where the British colonial power 
supported the rights of cocoa planters to the trees they had planted under indigenous 
Akan land law even when the land did not belong to the chief of the planters. At the 
same time, the traditional rights of the chiefs were left intact. 
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The political constraints driving colonial land property policy is even more obvious in 
the example of the British West Africa Lands Policy when British policy suddenly 
changed from supporting individual ownership of land in Lagos in 1861 to a newly 
discovered preference for ‘traditional’ land tenure in the Nigerian territories acquired 
between 1892 to 1903 (2008: 1009). The shift to a form of property right that was 
theoretically inferior for a capitalist transition cannot be explained by the presence of 
an extractive state of the Acemoglu et al. type since the non-settler colonial power had 
supported individual property rights in the immediate past and it is not at all clear how 
traditional land rights would allow more expropriation. A more plausible explanation 
is that the thinning out of British military power as its territories expanded led 
colonial administrators to prioritize the avoidance of social conflict and to seek to 
retain the support of the broadest possible definition of ‘traditional elites’. There are 
parallels here with the mass of conflicting rights that the raj eventually supported in 
India in response to conflicting economic and political pressures. Efficient economic 
rights were supported as long as this did not require the creation, destruction or 
modification of any rights that threatened to destabilize important social balances on 
which the colonial power was based.  
 
A growing body of literature has corroborated critical aspects of Mamdani’s (1997) 
analysis of the ‘bifurcated state’. This argued that traditional or customary forms of 
tenure in Africa are largely colonial creations that had tenuous roots in pre-colonial 
history. The colonial power artificially created ‘customary authorities’ as a method of 
exercising social, political and administrative control in a context where direct rule 
was difficult given the military and demographic disadvantage faced by colonial 
administrators in non-settler colonies. In these cases, far from just ‘recognizing’ pre-
existing rights, colonial powers created new rights for the constituencies they needed. 
This perspective is supported by a considerable body of corroborating evidence 
(Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006). Clearly the recognition of traditional rights aimed 
to draw in different layers of traditional elites located in pre-colonial power structures. 
But as the motivation for granting these groups formal and semi-formal rights was 
political, it is not surprising that they very often created conflicting and incoherent 
rights that could impede economic transformations. Adjusting for obvious differences 
in the details of the types of rights created, this analysis suggests very remarkable 
parallels with the Indian experience of raj strategies of preserving stability by creating 
new rights for politically important constituencies.  
 
What is important is that while there were often negative economic consequences of 
supporting ‘growth-reducing’ rights, this was not necessarily based on the non-settler 
colony’s desire to extract the maximum surplus from these societies. Economic and 
social transformation in traditional societies would have been difficult whether or not 
external colonial powers arrived. Ethiopia, which was not colonized, did not thereby 
achieve a faster rate of transformation than its colonized neighbours. However, this 
does not mean that the formal recognition of an arbitrary mix of traditional rights was 
without consequence. In many cases the recognition of conflicting rights and the 
definition of ‘traditional’ rights that created collective ownership of land made the 
subsequent reorganization of land use even more difficult in post-colonial African 
societies.  
 
In most African societies, colonial strategies of indirect rule politically strengthened a 
broad range of groups who were the beneficiaries of the traditional authority system. 
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The political entrenchment of the ‘traditional elites’ through these processes ensured 
that post-colonial states had to maintain ambivalent positions towards customary 
tenure to the detriment of attempts to rationalize land use. The move towards an 
individual rights-based market in land has therefore been a slow process in Africa, 
though clearly there is growing evidence of individuals working through structures of 
traditional authority to buy and sell land and to establish individual rights over land 
(Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006).  
 
Contemporary Tanzania clearly does not suffer from an absolute scarcity of land but 
almost all land has multiple ownership claims and land market failures are a major 
constraint on investment. These problems are intense in areas with a long history of 
commercial agriculture such as the Arusha region where there are competing land 
claims and users, village residents, nomadic people and others. In the part of Tanzania 
surveyed by Daley (2005a) the traditional structure of the village from the late 
nineteenth century was of initial groups of ‘first occupants’ or wenyeji laying claim to 
unused land by clearing it. The wenyeji had the traditional right to determine which 
newcomers could settle on nearby lands and the lands newcomers could get. 
Somewhat higher in the social structure were the wajumbe or sub-chiefs the Germans 
and later the British installed as subordinate rulers, part of the ‘traditional authority’ 
structure of Tanzania. The wajumbe would oversee land matters but would typically 
not operate without consulting the wenyeji. The Germans tried to encourage 
agricultural productivity through various measures, including taxing the peasants, 
which required them to sell agricultural products. The British continued these policies 
with strategies of directing resources to productive farmers but attempts to make 
peasants more productive have nowhere been very successful in the presence of 
widespread market failures in land and other markets.  
 
In Tanzania these customary authority structures were formally replaced by elected 
village councils after independence in 1961. The relevance of the wajumbe 
disappeared rather rapidly, though individual wajumbe were absorbed as executive 
officers at the sub-divisional and later the village level. The wenyeji remained socially 
relevant for a time as they were the more established families in the village and many 
often joined the ruling party. At one level though there was no significant change. The 
new Tanzanian village government, though it was increasingly dominated by younger 
and better-educated people, had appropriated for itself the collectivist decision-
making rights of traditional village authorities. The de facto restrictions on individual 
transactions remained in operation (Daley 2005a).  
 
A further transformation took place with Nyerere’s grand experiment of villagization 
where large numbers of people were expected to relocate into more densely populated 
Ujamaa or collective farming village communities where the provision of public 
infrastructure could be more efficiently organized. Villagization began to be seriously 
enforced between 1973 and 1975 often with the use of considerable violence by 
village governments and all land was formally nationalized in 1976. Daley reports 
how village government officials would sometimes burn down peasant houses and 
deploy army trucks to move reluctant individuals. Villagization was a failure in terms 
of creating a viable form of collectivist agriculture. But the experiment did result in a 
further weakening of the informal traditional power structures and strengthened 
village government in a relative sense. It also introduced new elements in the 
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conditions of tenure as village land allocation was now based on usage, to discourage 
large fallow landholdings.  
 
Under current laws, seventy per cent of Tanzania’s land is classified as ‘village land’ 
supporting eighty per cent of the population (farmers and pastoralists). Another 28 per 
cent of land is ‘reserved land’ (forests, national parks, game reserves) and the last two 
per cent is ‘general’ (mainly urban) land supporting twenty per cent of the population. 
An informal land market gradually developed in Tanzania in the 1980s as surplus land 
began to disappear due to population growth (Daley 2005b). Village governments 
could no longer provide new land to newcomers and young people and so it 
effectively became a registry of land transactions, with individuals buying, selling and 
renting their occupancy rights to each other and recording these transactions with 
village officials. These transactions often had a quasi-formal aspect as individuals 
would contribute ‘fees’ to the village government for recording transactions.  
 
In 1999 a new Land Act and Village Land Act was passed giving village governments 
the authority to manage community-based land tenure systems in a decentralized way. 
The most significant change was to recognize customary land rights as legal and 
secure. The aim was to demarcate village boundaries, with villages getting certificates 
of village land if they could settle their ‘border disputes’ with neighbouring villages, 
to title individual landholdings (now called customary rights of occupancy) that are 
allocated by the village and to maintain formal records of these titles. These would be 
titles of occupancy rights, not formal ownership titles.  
 
However, little progress appears to have been made. The reasons are somewhat 
similar to those we have already come across in Asia. Even if only titles to use are 
being delivered, the demarcation of lands has important consequences, and conflicting 
titles have been issued in the past by different authorities. There are three registers of 
land rights, the Village Land Registry, the Local Land Registry and the Registry of 
Titles and the three do not provide coordinated or consistent information. The 
resolution of conflicting allocations and records of rights entails not just a 
bureaucratic cost but more importantly involves winners and losers who will engage 
in significant conflicts for a valuable resource. It is not surprising that very little 
progress has been made in clarifying unequivocal titles for land users (Lange 2008). 
In 2009 it was estimated that only about two per cent of rural land and 20 per cent of 
urban land carries titles (Kironde 2009). 
 
Effectively though, political authorities at the village and higher levels intervene to 
determine the allocation of land plots through village councils. Emerging Tanzanian 
‘capitalists’ who want to acquire land have to acquire political influence to operate 
through these formal structures of the community based tenure system. There are 
frequent disputes between villagers and investors over land use and these are usually 
resolved with the intervention of higher authorities. In most cases the interventions do 
not benefit the village as a whole but only the village elite whose help is required to 
get the required authorizations at the village level. Overlapping institutional 
jurisdictions make these problems worse, but they reflect the fundamental problem of 
overlapping rights and the political contestation they result in, rather than being 
simply administrative mistakes. The Ministry of Lands and the Regional 
Administration and Local Government section of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO-
RALG) have overlapping jurisdictions and different criteria for recognising 
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settlements (Kironde 2009). Both authorities have the power to allocate land and 
control development. 
 
Only about 165,000 land parcels have been registered nationwide out of an estimated 
8 million land parcels in the country that need registering. The registry is not yet 
computerised, but as the Asian experience suggests, computerization can only make 
explicit but cannot on its own resolve underlying inconsistencies in competing land 
records and claims. But given that in Tanzania the conflicts are between villages, and 
since occupancy is the only right at issue, in theory there should be fewer dimensions 
of contestation, and it is likely that some more progress can be made in titling under 
the Village Land Act. There are a number of different programmes that are pushing 
land titling issues in Tanzania, for example the Strategic Plan for the Implementation 
of Land Laws (SPILL), which is trying to accelerate the granting of certificates of 
village land titles to villages and occupancy right titles to villagers. The longer term 
question for Tanzania is whether titles of occupancy are sufficient for enabling a land 
market to develop that would be appropriate for the acquisition of land by long-term 
investors.  
 
The process for buying land in urban areas or close to urban areas free of disputes and 
with titles already registered at the Ministry of Lands appears to be straightforward. 
Starting with the seller conducting an official search at the Land Registry and clearing 
all taxes, a valuation report is obtained from a government valuer who inspects the 
property to determine its value. The Commissioner for Lands has to approve the 
disposition of the property and this requires full documentation of ownership and 
official valuation of the land. At the end of the process the transfer deed must be 
provided to the Land Officer who records the change of ownership in the Land 
Registry. The official fees for completion of this kind of transaction are very low and 
the whole procedure is meant to take a number of weeks. The issue is that the seller 
only has occupancy title and not full title and in theory the transaction can be blocked 
by other parties with rights over the land operating through the Land Office.  
 
This problem is most apparent in the case of the Land Bank established in 1998 to 
identify large tracts of land that would be made available for foreign and local 
investors. The Land Bank is officially managed by the Tanzania Investment Centre. 
Officially the Land Bank has 743 land parcels covering 3.14 million hectares of land 
of which 2.5 million hectares are suitable for investment purposes. In reality the Land 
Bank is scarcely operational due to local level conflicts over land that have not been 
resolved over this supposedly available land (Global Exchange 2009). The Tanzanian 
state remains publicly very ambivalent about the private ownership of land, clearly 
concerned by the possible political fallout, including strong political fears that private 
ownership could give foreigners the ability to directly own large tracts of land or 
effectively control land through the back door. Piecemeal land grabbing is tolerated 
but there is no concerted policy to transfer land ownership in order to stimulate 
productive investment. At the same time, illegal and semi-legal expropriations are 
increasingly resisted by peasants, villages and NGOs (Kironde 2009).  
 
The most significant change in land use in Tanzania over the last decade has been 
driven by the growth of gold mining. However, the growth of mining has involved the 
intervention of the highest levels of the state. Paradoxically, the absence of individual 
land ownership facilitated the central state’s allocation of mining rights because it 
 33
could legally override the rights of local occupants relatively easily. The 1979 and 
1998 Mining Acts build on earlier British policy and vest ownership of mineral 
resources in the state. As village plots are theoretically allocated for use and are not 
owned by the individuals using them, the government can legally ask people to move 
and pay compensation for the investment they have made on the land, not for the land 
itself. The Commissioner of Mines who has the power to issue prospecting rights has 
considerable powers to adjudicate and settle disputes (Lange 2008). Rangelands can 
also be allocated by the state for mining, dispossessing pastoralists who have 
depended on these ranges as commons.  
 
Ranged against the power of the state, smallholders in Tanzania have proved unable 
to resist the land use changes that mining has brought about. The alignment of the 
interests of high public officials with those of mining companies has not been difficult 
to achieve, and interests of village level users have been regularly suppressed, 
occasionally through violent confrontations (Lange 2006, 2008). The mining sector 
shows very clearly that property rights issues can be ‘solved’ when the stakes are high 
enough for significant political power to be deployed to settle conflicts. In this case 
‘settling’ conflicts involves the imposition of solutions taking advantage of the 
absence of freehold ownership in Tanzania and the political ability of the central state 
to overcome village level resistance, often with the assistance of village power 
brokers in the village government structure. The approaches used in the mining sector 
are difficult to replicate in the more ‘normal’ contexts of land disputes between peers 
or in attempts by relatively small-scale Tanzanian entrepreneurs to resolve land 
disputes so that the land they require can be acquired at low transaction cost. 
 
3. Property Rights and Growth  
This section develops a theoretical framework for looking at the property rights 
challenges that developing countries face. Property rights are rules that (if effectively 
enforced) give individuals the right to make specified types of decisions or carry out 
specified activities, usually but not necessarily concerning the use of an asset. Coase 
(1960) pointed out that individuals who possess property rights possess nothing more 
than the right to carry out a circumscribed set of actions. For an asset, this may 
include the right to use, sell, lease out, employ others to work on, and so on, and 
usually there are also detailed social and legal rules that limit these rights in particular 
ways. For instance, an owner of a car is allowed to drive the car but not in 
contravention of traffic, taxation, insurance and other rules. Some limits to the 
exercise of rights may be formal legal limits as in the case of traffic laws. But rights 
are only meaningful to the extent that they can be made effective and actually 
exercised. Effective property rights require a mix of formal and informal enforcement 
capabilities and the formal enforcement capabilities of the state are particularly 
important. As a result, particularly in developing countries, de facto limits to the 
exercise of rights could be set by the limitations of the enforcement frameworks 
underpinning particular rights.  
 
The simple theory of property rights summarized in Figure 1 often informs policy. 
Based on the work of Coase, Barzel, North and others in the new institutional 
economics tradition, the simple theory says that property rights make contracting easy 
and thereby reduce market failures (Coase 1960; Barzel 1989; North 1990, 1995). The 
expectation is that if the right to make specific decisions are clearly defined, a greater 
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number of potentially beneficial contracts will become possible. The general 
expectation therefore is that creating property rights defining rules of decision-making 
will in general be socially beneficial as will the protection of existing decision-making 
rights. As decision-making rights are clearest when they are attributed to individuals, 
individual property rights are always preferred. One way of describing this is to say 
that clearer definitions of property rights reduce transaction costs which are the costs 
of acquiring information, reaching agreements about how to organize collective 
activity, observing that these agreements are upheld, and subsequently enforcing these 
agreements. If the individuals who have the right to make specific decisions are 
clearly identified transaction costs will be lower. Note that transaction costs are not 
part of the price that has to be paid for assets or resources in transactions, but rather 
the cost of organizing the transaction. In standard economics transaction costs are 
typically assumed to be zero, but the new institutional economics has rightly pointed 
out that if rights are not clearly defined the transaction costs of determining whether a 
transaction can be carried out at all may preclude the transaction even if the buyer was 
willing to pay the price asked by the seller. 
 
Simple Theory of Property Rights 
How well property rights are defined 
determines ‘transaction costs’ for 
different types of contracting.
Policy Implications:
a) The Creation and Strengthening of 
Rights (particularly attributing specific 
rights to individuals) will increase 
economic efficiency, weakening rights 
have the opposite effect
b) Non-Market ‘Transactions’ can in 
theory reduce transaction costs (eminent 
domain transactions) but in general they 
raise transaction costs
 
Figure 1 The Simple Theory of Property Rights  
 
However, the creation and enforcement of property rights is not costless. Even the 
simple property right theory recognizes that it is not feasible to remove all transaction 
costs by creating property rights over all dimensions of decision-making (Barzel 
1989). The costs of creating and enforcing property rights means that the definition of 
property rights is never complete and significant transaction costs will remain. There 
may therefore be a role for administrative allocations of valuable resources, in 
particular land, using powers of eminent domain or other interventions. This may be 
justified if the transaction costs of administrative discovery and implementation of 
improved allocation are lower than the costs of market discovery and implementation. 
But in general the standard property rights theorists argue that non-market 
interventions are likely to fail in terms of discovering true costs and benefits and are 
likely to result in a loss of confidence in the ownership of assets with negative 
consequences for investment.  
 
The simple theory suggests that the property right problem in developing countries is 
essentially one of incomplete or weak implementation of property rights. This is an 
excessively limited view of the property right problem. The problem is not just that a 
full definition of property rights is infeasible. Given the many different decision-
making rights that can be defined over an asset, it is theoretically possible that some 
specifications of rights may block rather than facilitate optimal resource use from the 
perspective of economic efficiency, growth, social justice or any of a number of other 
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criteria. It may therefore not be very useful to argue that ‘stable’ or ‘well-defined’ 
property rights are in general important for economic growth. In advanced countries 
where modern capitalist property rights have been evolving in some cases for 
centuries, property rights in an everyday sense appear to be ‘well-defined’. In fact, the 
allocation and definition of decision-making rights are continuously evolving. Take 
for instance the ‘property rights’ of company shareholders which not only differ from 
country to country but are continuously evolving within countries. Apart from 
changes brought about by the politics of taxation and equity, many changes are driven 
by the realization that strengthening the rights of some categories of owners can be 
efficiency and growth-enhancing, while strengthening or protecting other rights may 
have the reverse effect.  
 
An example of the types of unexpected outcomes that can follow from strengthening 
property rights comes from the analysis of shareholder rights initiated by Grossman 
and Hart (1980). They pointed out that if small shareholders in a company have very 
weak rights they can be exploited by bigger shareholders and eventually small 
shareholders will stop investing. But if the rights of small shareholders are too well-
defined such that they can extract the full benefit of say takeover activity, this may 
dissuade raiders from investing in takeovers. As the threat of takeovers is a potential 
source of pressure on managers, it is at least theoretically possible that the rights of 
small shareholders could be protected to a point that is detrimental to their own 
interest. In addition, there are profound questions about whether shareholder rights 
defined primarily by claims on dividends are really in their own long-term interest 
given the short-termism this can induce in managers (Stiglitz 1996: 92-6). The 
financial crisis of 2008 raised further questions about the economic implications of 
complex rights over financial instruments, and many of these rights are likely to 
evolve further in consequence. Clearly, structures of rights are continuously evolving 
in advanced countries in response to new facts and to changes in economic and 
political conditions. Unfortunately, this insight has not in general been transferred to 
the analysis of the evolution of rights in developing countries.  
 
Extended Property Rights Theory 
At each stage, Losers will contest
Property rights perform different 
functions: 
Rights appropriate for one function may 
not be for another and require 
continuous evolution to sustain growth
Policy Implications:   
Extending time horizons, 
Enabling resource re-allocation, 
Compelling productivity growth 
b) Non-Market ‘Transactions’ can raise or lower 
growth-constraining transaction costs. The 
destruction or alteration of existing rights are ‘non-
market transactions’ and can sometime reduce 
growth-constraining transaction costs
a) New Rights or Better Protection of Existing 
Rights
Growth-Constraining Transaction Costs
 can raise or lower growth depending on 
the rights in question and the current constraints. 
The growth outcome depends on what happens to 
c) Transition Costs (the costs of conflict and 
bargaining when changing rights or engaging in 
non-market transactions) are critical. The intensity 
of conflict depends on the political settlement. 
Sustaining growth depends on strategies that can 
minimize or absorb transition costs  
Figure 2 An Extended Theory of Property Rights 
 
 36
Our analysis develops an extended theory of property rights by drawing on a number 
of strands of property right analysis in the literature to develop a framework for 
analysing the evolution of property rights in developing countries. The building 
blocks of our framework are summarized in Figure 2. First we draw on what property 
right theories say about the types and allocations of rights that are required for 
economic efficiency and growth. Note that specifications of property rights that are 
appropriate for addressing specific problems of growth and efficiency are distinct 
from specifications that may be recommended by concerns for social justice or equity. 
We begin by looking at the relationships between property right specifications and 
efficiency and growth, but as all specifications of property rights have distributive 
implications we will come back to the issue of distribution in our discussion of 
transition costs. In terms of efficiency and growth, the general focus on transaction 
costs is misleading. We argue that the conflicts between different types of rights can 
be better summarized by looking at growth-constraining transaction costs (GTC).  
 
Secondly, we ask what theory tells us about the costs of creating different types of 
rights and the implications of these costs for institutional transitions. The inclusion of 
the costs of creating or changing property rights as part of overall transaction costs is 
misleading because the determinants of these costs are largely political. To give these 
costs separate analytical attention we describe them as transition costs (TSC). 
Transition costs depend on how intensely the distributive implications of changes in 
property rights are resisted. The resistance to changes in property rights depends on 
the distribution of organizational and political power in society, but also on how 
specific changes are perceived in terms of prevailing concepts of distributive justice.  
 
The existing literature on property rights allows us to make useful distinctions 
between at least three ways in which property rights can reduce social losses or 
increase social gains. First, there is the very basic argument that property rights 
extend time horizons. The well-known free-access model in economics shows that 
property rights are necessary to create incentives to conserve assets from dissipation 
and overuse. Missing property rights lead to tragedies of the commons. A corollary is 
that if there is significant ‘expropriation risk’, investors will not invest, and may 
indeed deplete resources and export, consume or even destroy capital if they fear they 
may be expropriated. Second, there is the related Coasean argument that property 
rights create opportunities for trade. Without property rights defining claims and 
liabilities, all social costs or benefits may not be accounted for in decision-making, 
leading to lower aggregate social welfare. A corollary is the more obvious argument 
that resource allocation cannot be efficient if property rights are missing over vital 
assets (like land). Thirdly, there are arguments coming from Marxist economics and 
agency theory developed by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) that show that specific 
structures of property rights can create compulsions for efficiency and productivity 
growth. Efficient production and growth require not just decision-making rights 
within the firm, but also the absence of these rights for others. Too many people with 
decision-making rights within a firm can render these rights ineffective. There is no 
reason why a property right system that is adapted to address one type of problem will 
necessarily be effective in addressing other problems. 
 
Changes in property rights that improve one dimension of economic performance may 
have contrary effects on others. One way to look at these potentially conflicting goals 
is to describe the net effect of a change in property rights on the transaction costs that 
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happen to be constraining growth in that context. This net effect on growth-
constraining transaction costs is what will matter for growth. The relevant difference 
with the simple theory of property rights is that strengthening the protection of any 
existing property rights will not always enhance growth, and may indeed impact 
negatively on growth. In the same way, the destruction of some pre-existing rights 
may be a potentially growth-enhancing change. This extends the role of non-market 
transactions beyond the traditional importance given to eminent domain interventions. 
As changes in property rights and certainly the destruction of some rights always 
appear to be non-market interventions, this is another dimension along which non-
market transactions can be growth-enhancing. Of course, it remains true that the 
destruction of property rights and in particular predatory expropriation can often have 
significantly negative effects on growth. Finally, the simple theory of property rights 
does not make explicit the ‘political’ nature of the most significant costs of creating, 
altering or destroying rights. The concept of transition costs focuses on the political 
determinants of the potentially intense costs that can determine whether changes in 
property rights along a particular dimension are feasible or not.  
 
We use these building blocks to argue that many of the historical and contemporary 
difference between countries in their property right evolution can be described by 
differences in the trade-offs they face between growth-enhancing changes in property 
rights and political stability. The shape of this trade-off depends in theory on the type 
of growth-promoting property right transition being attempted and the political 
settlement in that society that determines the transition costs that the potential losers 
can inflict on the potential beneficiaries. The political settlement describes the relative 
power of relevant groups and classes in a society. The political settlement is relevant 
for an analysis of property right transitions because the relative power of gainers and 
losers and the ability of the state to absorb the resistance of losers are important 
determinants of the likelihood of particular rights being created or destroyed.  
 
If important features of the historical experiences outlined in our last section can be 
summarized in this framework, the nature of the growth-stability trade-offs will 
provide insights into the constraints these countries face today. While political 
settlements must change over time, our understanding of contemporary political 
settlements has to be built on an understanding of history. We look first at the three 
different mechanisms through which property rights impact on economic 
performance, then develop the concepts of growth-constraining transaction costs, 
transition costs and the trade-offs between the two. 
 
Extending Time Horizons 
Free access and expropriation risk are variants of a general problem: conserving or 
investing for the future requires looking at future costs and benefits and not just 
current ones. Since conservation or investment involves immediate costs to achieve 
future benefits, these costs will not be incurred if the individuals facing them are not 
sure that some at least of the additional returns will accrue to them. The most obvious 
solution is to establish a rule that gives a defined individual or group the rights to 
future income flows from the asset, and provided this is credible and effective, the 
rule (or property right) will create the appropriate incentives for investment in or 
management of the resource (Khan 2000b). The absence of the property right here 
creates a market failure by definition because the loss of potential net benefit can be 
attributed to the difficulty of contracting the allocation of costs and benefits over time. 
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The creation of effective and enforceable property rights can solve this particular 
market failure provided these rights can be enforced. 
 
The function of property rights in this case is to prevent free riders from appropriating 
the benefits of someone else’s conservation or investment efforts. However, the rules 
allocating future benefits have to be enforced and enforcement is never perfect even 
with strong state enforcement capabilities. Part of the responsibility of enforcement is 
therefore always shared by the property right owner, and their responsibility is likely 
to be greater in countries where external enforcement is weak. As enforcing the 
exclusion of free riders is critical in this case, the optimal allocation of the right 
should be based on the likelihood that the potential owner has the most credible 
capability of enforcing the right in question. In addition, and possibly in contradiction 
with the previous requirement, if investment is to be maximized, property rights 
should be allocated to individuals with the greatest capability of making investments 
in the resource over time (Barzel 1989).  
 
Thus, even from an efficiency perspective, we can get different answers about how 
best to allocate rights to an asset that is subject to free riding or underinvestment 
because of time horizon problems. But this is not all. There is a further set of 
problems that emerge because the allocation of exclusive rights over a resource to an 
individual or a collective of individuals excludes others by definition. If A gets the 
right and not B, A will benefit much more than B, even if in the end the general 
improvement in resource usage benefits B indirectly. It follows that there may be 
distributive conflicts between A and B about the allocation of these rights, and these 
conflicts have social costs. We will come back to these costs later in our discussion of 
transition costs, but one way of minimizing transition costs is to allocate rights to the 
groups who are most likely to create serious social disruptions if they are denied. We 
already have three competing criteria of allocation: to the individuals most capable of 
controlling free riding at the local level, to the individuals most capable of investing 
for the long run or to the individuals who would most strongly resist being excluded. 
It would be very good luck if the same individual would be selected on every criteria.  
 
Looking first at the prevention of free access depletion, consider for instance the 
problem of managing forestry resources in a remote area in a developing country. 
Property rights for any individual or group may reduce the problem, but not all 
individuals or groups may be equally good at enforcing the exclusion of outsiders and 
limiting overuse by insiders. In some circumstances, collective ownership of the 
forest by a local community may be more successful. This would be the case if state 
capabilities for enforcing contracts in the remote area were weak and the group could 
deploy collective monitoring and enforcement to achieve a better result (Ostrom 
1990). On the other hand, if state enforcement capabilities were moderately good, 
individual ownership may be more effective because this would avoid the possibility 
of free riding behaviour within the group of collective owners who may fail to put in 
high levels of collective effort in monitoring and enforcement. Thus, the theory 
suggests that the allocation of rights over a resource subject to free riding does not 
matter too much provided the ability to exclude free riders is maximized. Individual 
property rights may not always be the most efficient solution from the perspective of 
solving free rider problems. In general, while the theory tells us that free riding will 
be reduced by the creation of property rights, the success of the strategy will depend 
on the identification of an owner or owners who are most likely to enforce the right.  
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In contrast, significant investments in an asset are likely to require clearer allocations 
of rights to prevent free-riding behaviour. Investment involves more significant losses 
of current consumption for uncertain future returns and investors typically need 
stronger protection of these returns to justify investment. If individual ownership of 
the asset is not possible, clearer specifications of differential rights to the future 
returns between investors and others within the group are required to protect investing 
parties. This level of detail may be implausible in the context of agriculture in 
developing countries and may explain why significant investments in collectively 
owned assets are not widely observed in poor country agriculture. One of the 
problems in early peasant settlements is that while different types of collective control 
to address free access problems make sense at an early stage, if transitions to 
ownership structures that allow long-term investment are not eventually achieved, 
productivity can stagnate. In addition, we have seen how colonial interventions froze 
forms of collective control for political reasons, because the transition to other forms 
of control threatened to induce ‘transition costs’ in the form of peasant opposition. 
Thus, even in terms of the most basic property right requirement of providing 
extended time horizons, all we can say is that the complex combinations of landlord 
and peasant rights that evolved in different countries addressed some of these issues, 
but not necessarily in the most efficient way in every case.  
 
However, in contexts of high transition costs where the exclusion of powerful groups 
can result in significant conflicts, it is not unusual to find complex property rights 
protecting assets. Haber et al. (2003) and Qian (2003) describe variants of such rights 
in Mexico and China. If the ‘price’ of effective protection of the asset is some sharing 
of future returns between investors and protectors, this can work in preserving time 
horizons as long as the direct investors have a credible expectation of significant and 
predictable returns. These rights are clearly not the individual rights over future 
returns that simple theory says are necessary for maximizing investor time horizons. 
Nevertheless these unconventional structures of rights can sometimes achieve a 
combination of effective protection and predictable future returns that maximizes 
investor horizons in a context where individual rights over the asset may have resulted 
in rapid expropriation by excluded social forces.  
 
If the structure of property rights cannot even address the very basic problem of 
preventing free access and expropriation of investments, it is unlikely to address any 
other type of market failure. Conversely, if an economy is not in freefall, it is very 
likely that the basic problems of free access have been addressed through formal or 
informal property rights. This is one reason why the focus on expropriation risk in 
much of the contemporary literature on property rights is somewhat misleading. With 
a few exceptions, all traditional societies evolved some forms of formal or informal 
property rights to conserve assets, even in the presence of multiple users and non-
settled agriculture. In all the cases we considered, settled agricultural societies had 
evolved well before the impact with the west, with the partial exception of Tanzania, 
but even there we have no evidence of a collapsing ecology that could be attributed to 
a classic free access overuse. The de facto occupancy rights of peasants in pre-
colonial India or in nineteenth century Thailand were forms of property rights that 
effectively addressed the time horizon problem of the actual occupants of land. Of 
course, there may be questions about the extent to which a particular structure of 
rights was effective, and more importantly, the extent to which the structure of rights 
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addressed the time horizon requirements of investors with the capability of making 
long-term investments. More seriously, these structures of rights may have been even 
less appropriate for a number of other problems that property rights have to address.  
 
Opportunities for Trade 
If the current allocation of rights is not appropriate for some reason, the simplest way 
of solving this problem would be to re-allocate rights through the market mechanism. 
Those who can use an asset better should be able to buy it off those who use it less 
well. However, efficient market transactions themselves require very specific types of 
rights over assets, particularly in the vitally important markets in land. Coase pointed 
out a long time ago that trading opportunities may be thwarted if property rights were 
missing or even if they were difficult to assign and transfer (Coase 1960). Efficient 
resource re-allocation may therefore require as a precondition some specific types and 
allocations of property rights. If these do not exist, the re-allocation may not take 
place and we may be stuck with a persistent market failure that cannot be solved by 
making the market a little more efficient. For instance, peasant occupancy rights or 
collective rights of villages or clan lineages over land may have preserved assets from 
free riders but the way they were defined may not allow the easy transfer of assets. As 
a result, land re-allocation may not happen in ways that allow significant gains to be 
captured. If the rights that exist are not appropriate for efficient asset re-allocation, 
then any inefficiency in the initial allocation of rights is not likely to be resolved 
through the market mechanism.  
 
In some circumstances the weakness of formal state protection structures may mean 
that the optimal structure of rights to protect expropriation or free-riding behaviour 
may initially have been the creation of multiple claims over an asset. For instance, 
occupancy tenants sharing revenue with local administrators who provide protection 
could maximize protection from free riders and expropriators in some contexts. But 
with multiple agents having rights that can block changes in land use, transfers would 
subsequently be very costly if not impossible. To achieve efficient land markets to re-
allocate land to more efficient uses requires further and different specifications of 
rights. Some of these conditions are recognized in the new institutional literature and 
the political economy analysis of heterodox analysts, but the conflicts between these 
conditions and the ones required simply for achieving extended time horizons are 
typically not recognized.  
 
First, rights to each plot of land have to be specified to individuals or small groups 
who need to be able to decide on purchase or sale decisions without veto rights by 
others. Collective ownership or ownership that is not clearly attributable to 
individuals would not satisfy this condition, even if the ownership structure was 
adequate for preventing free riding behaviour. Achieving agreement between multiple 
owners about price and the distribution of benefits from sales may raise transaction 
costs to levels that preclude sales. This is entirely consistent with the analysis of new 
institutional economics that the simple property rights theory draws on. 
 
Secondly, if the initial distribution of holdings is too fragmented, the transaction costs 
of negotiating with a large number of micro-owners can raise transaction costs even if 
each plot is owned cleanly by single owners. Apart from the simple problem of 
multiple transactions, in fact transaction costs with multiple owners can go up 
exponentially and not just arithmetically because of holdup problems coming from 
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later sellers. The value of subsequent pieces of land goes up hugely for the buyer once 
the buyer pre-commits to buy tracts in a particular direction by actually buying a few. 
Subsequent sellers can hold out for a higher and higher price, increasing not just the 
overall price paid for the land, but more significantly, the transaction costs of reaching 
agreement about the price. This is well recognized in the literature and is the 
justification for eminent domain interventions by the state. Even in advanced 
countries with well established individual property rights, the purchase of a large 
number of plots say for road construction typically does not take place through 
sequential market transactions (Posner 1986).  
 
But in advanced countries, eminent domain transactions are relatively simple because 
the purchase price can be established with reference to the current market price. The 
administrative decision is only about the identity of the plots to be purchased and this 
can be organized in an open and transparent process, leading to the issuance of 
compulsory purchase orders. In developing countries eminent domain transactions 
have significantly higher implementation/transaction costs because the market price 
itself may not be known. In addition, the gap between the current economic value of 
the land and the economic value in the subsequent use may be vast, leaving 
potentially massive ‘gains from trade’ to negotiate over and this can significantly 
increase the transaction costs of reaching an agreement about a fair price even for a 
compulsory purchase order process (Sarkar 2007). And if each parcel of land has 
multiple and conflicting ownership rights, the process of compensation can implicitly 
recognize some rights and destroy others, further differentiating the process of 
eminent domain in developing countries from that in advanced ones.  
 
A final condition that is required to enable market transactions in assets comes from 
the heterodox political economy analysis of Marxist historians. Standard economics 
assumes that transactions take place because individuals are ‘rational’. This is 
assumed to mean that if someone is offered a price for an asset marginally higher than 
the return that person can achieve, the asset will be sold. In fact, uncertainty about the 
future, insurance against uncertainty or simply an emotional attachment to the asset 
may prevent a sale. The ‘rational’ behaviour that is observed to a greater extent in 
modern societies may have a lot more to do with the compulsions that a capitalist 
economy creates to compel sales of assets when better uses emerge. The compulsion 
in capitalist economies emerges because producers who fail to match social 
productivity cannot continue to hold on to land on a subsistence basis. With a 
significant commoditization of agricultural production when a particular piece of land 
is not being used productively, the owner rapidly becomes bankrupt and creditors can 
use bankruptcy proceedings to change land use. This is why clean individual title is 
not sufficient to achieve asset re-allocation through normal market processes. If 
peasant producers can opt out of the market and engage in self-exploitation then low 
productivity may not result in land sales. Of course, if in addition title is not clear or if 
debt cannot be recovered through bankruptcy proceedings it is even less likely that 
land re-allocation will take place.  
 
As Wood’s Marxist analysis of the transition to capitalism in English agriculture 
shows, the resistance of smallholders in agriculture to sell economically unviable 
landholdings is only overcome when their production is sufficiently commoditized 
and individual producers can no longer produce without buying most of their inputs 
from the market and selling to pay for these inputs (Wood 2002). Economic survival 
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under these circumstances requires each landowner to achieve the (rising) social 
productivity that is setting the prices of inputs and outputs. Aspects of Wood’s 
analysis were in fact anticipated much earlier in the 1920s by the Soviet economist 
and sociologist Chayanov in his argument that markets in peasant agriculture would 
not necessarily lead to a systematic transfer of land from less efficient to more 
efficient land users (Chayanov 1966).  
 
Peasant resistance to land sales is neither irrational nor unjustified. In particular, the 
absence of rapid industrialization in many developing countries means that significant 
employment opportunities do not exist outside agriculture. But land is first required to 
enable investment opportunities to emerge. In this vicious cycle, the political response 
of states, and in particular the colonial states, was to protect peasant rights. As we 
have seen in the last section, the British in India often reacted rapidly to the incursion 
of merchant capital into agriculture whenever land alienation became serious. A long 
history of protection of peasant rights created an expectation that these rights are 
important to protect and that the commercialization of agriculture was an anti-poor 
strategy. The fact that peasants losing land may actually become even poorer in the 
short run before industrialization can absorb labour does not help the achievement of 
transition in poor societies.  
 
If a commercialized agriculture is required for efficient land markets, we can see why 
the extreme fragmentation of agricultural landholdings can become an indirect 
obstacle to market efficiency. Small peasant holdings are likely to be the least 
commoditized in terms of reliance on hired labour and to rely heavily on the over-
exploitation of family labour to achieve subsistence needs. Large capitalist farms will 
use more hired labour and depend to a greater extent on purchased inputs. They are 
less likely to survive if they cannot produce marketed outputs whose sales cover their 
market costs of production, and therefore more likely to sell out if they fail to achieve 
minimal productivity. Thus the emergence of larger farms may indicate the possibility 
of a more effective land market emerging. However, the trend in most developing 
countries is the reverse: small and medium peasant farms appear to be fragmenting as 
we saw in the data in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 for our three regions in the Indian 
subcontinent, and this trend is replicated all across the subcontinent. These 
observations have spawned a debate about the relative ‘productivity’ of small versus 
large peasant farms that has further confused analysis in this area. 
 
The commoditization argument for large farms would obviously only apply to 
significantly large farms organized on a capitalist basis. In the Indian subcontinent 
comparisons of ‘large’ and ‘small’ farms in the literature on the relationship between 
size and productivity have been misleading because  most ‘large’ farms are actually 
slightly bigger peasant farms in reality. They simply cannot achieve the level of 
mechanization or scale economies to make them significantly commoditized and so 
they too depend to a great extent on family labour to supervise labour-intensive 
production processes. A comparison of these ‘large’ farms with very small farms 
often shows that the very small farms are not only more productive in terms of yields, 
they also use more hired labour per unit of land, giving the misleading impression that 
small farms are more commoditized. This is essentially because the ‘large’ farms in 
question are actually not large enough to deploy mechanization or otherwise change 
the technology of production away from the labour-intensive production methods that 
require a large amount of supervision. Very small farms have more family labour to 
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deploy on each unit of land, therefore they can use hired labour more intensively. This 
obfuscating debate on the relative productivity and labour market exposure of ‘large’ 
and small farms has unfortunately dominated a large part of the discussion of land 
policy in poor countries, including in South Asia (Boyce 1987; Faruqee and Carey 
1997; World Bank 2000; Griffin, et al. 2002; Deininger 2003; Khan 2004).  
 
The evidence of slightly greater yields in very small farms is often misleadingly used 
to justify redistributive land reform that seeks to achieve even greater land 
fragmentation than already exists. The greater yields of micro-farms have clearly not 
produced prosperity for them, indeed the reverse. Moreover, the difference in yields 
between the micro-farms and their slightly bigger neighbours is typically very small. 
The land fragmentation that we saw earlier in South Asia is not coming about because 
more productive or efficient small farms are buying land from less efficient large 
ones, but rather because of demographic forces. The challenge for agrarian 
transformation in poor densely populated countries is to reverse these demographic 
trends and create not just slightly larger farms but significantly larger farms that can 
benefit from scale economies, thereby generating the productivity growth that is 
essential for poverty reduction. Such a transition would also, as a result of significant 
commoditization, arguably create the compulsions to sustain an efficient land market.  
 
These transitions are not costless particularly in densely populated countries, so even 
marginal movements in these directions are not likely to be achieved without conflict. 
But the international evidence on farm productivity provides no example of a 
prosperous agriculture based on the type of land fragmentation that we find in South 
Asia and other developing countries with peasant-based agriculture. Only by 
understanding the alternatives can policy be devised to achieve growth transitions at 
the lowest social cost. Clarifying and strengthening the property rights of micro-sized 
peasant farms will not address the market failures in re-allocating land because non-
viable small peasant farmers have no compulsion to sell land and poverty gives 
unviable micro-plots an emotional insurance value that further precludes land markets 
from working. The creation or clarification of titles for marginal farmers or the better 
protection of existing titles will certainly reduce the transaction costs that small 
peasants face in protecting their land. But it is unlikely to result in active land markets 
for re-allocating assets to the most optimal uses, and may actually raise the 
transaction costs of land acquisition by providing significant legal holdout powers to 
non-viable subsistence farmers who have no compulsion to come to sale agreements. 
In comparison, if the initial allocation of rights had favoured much larger and more 
commoditized farms, a clarification or better protection of their titles may have 
strengthened compulsions for market-driven land re-allocations. 
 
The conflicting functions of property rights means that to achieve land rights 
appropriate for a capitalist transition, pre-existing land rights that played a function in 
pre-capitalist agriculture may have to be attenuated or even destroyed. This is one 
reason why many agrarian transitions to capitalism, including the English one, 
required significant non-market transfers of land that amounted to the destruction of 
the complex structures of rights on which English peasant agriculture was based. The 
English Enclosures were not directly transfers of peasant property to emerging 
capitalist farmers but they created private property for large landholders out of the 
commons. Large plots could then be leased out to emerging ‘capitalist’ tenant farmers 
who were under strong compulsions to raise productivity in an increasingly 
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commoditized agriculture (Wood 2002). Nevertheless, Wood’s argument suggests 
that if the commons had first been transferred to small peasants in individual plots, 
then even with well-defined and transferable property rights, emerging English sheep 
farmers may not have been able to get access to land if they had to buy this land from 
self-sufficient subsistence peasants.  
 
While all our agrarian societies had evolved clear structures of rights that prevented 
free riding and land overuse, only Thailand had an initial allocation of rights that gave 
a relatively small group of primitive accumulators the ownership of large tracts of 
valuable land. The agglomeration and land concentration in valuable areas close to 
Bangkok resulted in the emergence of an effective land market in Thailand in a way 
that did not happen in the other countries in our sample. The concentration of valuable 
land rights in the hands of individuals who had a commercial interest in marketing the 
land if the price was right later allowed commercial investors to acquire land from 
these accumulators through land market transactions. The initial creation of rights for 
these politically powerful primitive accumulators in Thailand was, as we saw, often 
based on overriding the emergent claims and interests of the smallholders who made 
the initial investments in clearing the land.  
 
In contrast, the history of South Asia and Tanzania showed that for different reasons 
at a critical phase of emerging land rights, land rights were consolidated for initial 
settlers who were typically smaller, together with multiple local power brokers whose 
collective incentives and compulsions for trading in land were very different. This is 
not because property rights over land were absent, but because they were not 
structured to make transfers cheap or to compel non-viable users of assets to sell. The 
colonial state consolidated these complex rights because of the political constraints it 
faced. This is particularly obvious in India, where the High Colonial State took an 
increasingly pro-cultivator position in the late nineteenth century, which amounted to 
a complex series of interventions to protect the status quo on the land. In Tanzania, 
land settlement was still continuing during the colonial period, and collective 
‘traditional’ ownership was invented and strengthened by colonial powers to create 
incentives for investment in clearing and consolidation. Land markets aimed at 
efficient land transfers are least developed here, as we have seen. 
 
Thus, market failures in asset transfers cannot be solved by simply enforcing and 
protecting whatever pre-existing structure of rights happens to exist on the land. If the 
pre-existing structure happens to be appropriate for a commercialized land market, as 
in Thailand, titling can be a success and strengthening the legal protection of pre-
existing land rights can improve the efficiency of the commercial land market. But 
this is because in Thailand the conflicts between the rights of the land-clearing 
peasants and commercial investors in the land were resolved long ago to the detriment 
of the peasantry. In some of our other cases, our analysis suggests a paradox for land 
rights reform. Strengthening and protecting the mass of micro-claims on land may 
have a paradoxical effect of further increasing the transaction costs of efficient asset 
re-allocation to more productive uses. Achieving efficient asset allocation may 
paradoxically require overriding some of the rights and interests of the pre-existing 
structure, which does not preclude generous compensation arrangements. Otherwise 
the task of organizing a productive transformation may become progressively more 
difficult, a conclusion that is in stark contrast to the property rights reform agenda 
outlined by De Soto (2000). Our analysis therefore suggests a role for non-market 
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transactions and transfers in developing countries that is much more significant than 
the role of the eminent domain transactions recognized in the context of advanced 
country land markets.  
 
Compulsions for Productivity Growth 
Effective markets for transferring assets are necessary but not sufficient to achieve the 
productivity growth that characterizes the capitalist system. Paradoxically, some of 
the most convincing analysis of the institutional features that made capitalism so 
dynamic came from the Marxist analytical tradition even though it was in general 
critical of capitalism’s social injustice and proneness to crisis. Here we focus on the 
Marxist analysis of capitalist dynamism and some developments in modern 
institutional economics that come close to that analysis. The analysis overlaps with 
the analysis of compulsion already referred to but is developed further here. Capitalist 
dynamism depends not just on the presence of clear rights over assets, but also on a 
range of decision-making rights which are exclusive in that not all individuals in a 
capitalist society can have these rights.  
 
One of the powerful insights in Marx’s analysis of capitalism was that its dynamism 
did not in the main derive from efficient markets for exchange (though markets are 
necessary for capitalism). Markets after all had existed for centuries before capitalism 
emerged. Rather the distinctiveness of capitalism was the emergence of a structure of 
rights that ensured discipline in the production process and compelled both capitalists 
and workers to achieve productivity growth (Wood 2002). As we have seen, 
commoditization ensured that individual capitalists would have to rapidly match the 
productivity of the most efficient producer to survive. But to do this they would also 
need the capacity to enforce discipline on their own workforce. This discipline 
required not just that capitalists owned capital; it also required that workers owned 
none, so self-sufficient artisan production was not possible. These mutually exclusive 
rights made capitalists dependent on hired labour and made labour subject to capitalist 
discipline. This allowed and compelled capitalists to continuously change the 
organization of production in the direction of greater productivity.  
 
Aspects of this insight reappear in the ‘agency theory’ of new institutional economics 
(Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Agency theory argues that the organization of the 
capitalist firm which gives the capitalist exclusive decision-making rights needs to be 
explained. It cannot be explained simply in terms of property rights, because the rules 
that give the owner of capital these decision-making rights in turn need to be 
explained. The agency theory explanation is that team production using modern 
technology is subject to free riding because a small decrease in the effort put in by a 
single individual cannot be traced back to that individual, and may not even have an 
observable effect on output. But if too many individuals engaged in such free riding, 
output could precipitously collapse. Some system of ‘monitoring’ needs to be devised 
and the monitor has to have strong incentives to monitor effectively. The structure of 
rights in a modern capitalist firm then begins to make sense: the capitalist is the owner 
of the residual or surplus and this gives the capitalist strong incentives to monitor 
workers. According to agency theory, this explains why property rights over capital 
are defined not just in terms of the right to buy and sell assets, but also provide their 
owners rights over the residual income of team production (profits) and to act as 
‘monitors’ who can hire and fire members of the team. 
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The agency analysis is significantly different from that of Marx in some respects. It 
argues that because the capitalist firm makes sense in terms of efficiency, the team 
will voluntarily contract to create a monitor and cede monitoring, hiring, firing and 
residual return rights to that monitor for mutual benefit. In reality capitalist firms do 
not emerge through this type of voluntary contracting because workers are unlikely to 
voluntarily cede claims over the surplus to achieve greater monitoring efficiency as 
they would rightly suspect that they will not be able to capture most of the increase in 
productivity. In reality capitalist rights are typically defined through contestation and 
conflict as the Marxist analysis stresses. Nevertheless, the area of overlap is that both 
traditions point out that the capitalist firm can transform social productivity because 
of its very specific rights structure. This is based not just on the rights of the capitalist 
to own capital, but also to make production decisions and on the absence of 
equivalent decision-making rights for workers, including in particular their right to 
decide whether they should continue to work with the team.  
 
The capture of decision-making rights by small groups of people has been a long and 
contested process in capitalist countries. The assumption that simple property rights 
reform will achieve conditions for productivity growth is deeply misleading. A 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the imposition of capitalist discipline over 
the workforce is the presence of a large class of people without access to land and 
other means of organizing their subsistence. In England, the Enclosures accelerated 
the creation of a working class by depriving poorer peasant households of the 
common lands on which their livestock production depended. The undermining of the 
peasant economy for poorer peasants together with the consolidation of large farms 
through the Enclosures which could employ them as workers began to see the early 
emergence of the English working class. This created the conditions for the 
imposition of discipline in the transition to agrarian capitalism in agriculture and 
subsequently in industry. In contrast, the persistence of the peasantry in France helped 
to explain its much slower transition to capitalism (Brenner 1976, 1977, 1985).  
 
But a proletariat is not a sufficient condition for the imposition of capitalist control 
over production. Many contemporary developing countries, particularly densely 
populated Asian ones, have long had large populations of landless workers. But even 
the landless may find alternative ways of eking out a living and the ‘rationality’ of 
accepting capitalist discipline for a higher wage may not strike them as obvious. The 
creation of a disciplined working class involves further conflict and contestation to 
impose a social discipline that rules out other ways of making a living and indeed the 
choice of living in poverty as vagrants. Historically, European countries went through 
long periods of ‘socialization’ through the establishment of legal and social rules that 
made idleness or a life of poverty difficult if not impossible (Thompson 1991). The 
Marxian analysis shows why the emergence of private land ownership, an effective 
land market and even the presence of a class of landless workers are not sufficient for 
the imposition of capitalist control over the production process, without which 
production efficiency and the introduction of new processes are unlikely to emerge. 
The link between property rights and growth is therefore much more complex than 
may appear at first. 
 
The balance of rights that may have compelled productivity growth in agriculture was 
not achieved in any of our case study countries. Even in Thailand where the landed 
classes were closely allied to the monarch and powerful merchants and were already 
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effective owners of the land, effective control rights over the labour process could not 
be successfully implemented. Thai agriculture remained land-using with limited 
investments. Labour scarcity and the extensive land frontier made it difficult for Thai 
capital or the state to impose the discipline of capital over labour in agriculture. 
Nevertheless, while Thai agriculture did not become capitalist, the effective control 
that commercial interests achieved over sizable chunks of valuable land proved to be 
very efficient later when land was required on a significant scale for an industrial 
transformation. Imposing discipline over a smaller emerging industrial workforce 
proved to be somewhat easier in all developing countries.  
 
In the Indian subcontinent as well as in Tanzania, capital could not even achieve 
sufficient land agglomeration for proper capitalist farming to begin. In these countries 
the fragmentation of land was also to constrain the later emergence of effective land 
markets that could allocate land for industrial development. In the Indian 
subcontinent, the rights granted by the colonial power to peasant occupiers prevented 
both the agglomeration of land and the acquisition of effective control rights over land 
in the hands of financial interests. The structure of colonial land rights only allowed 
the agglomeration of rent receiving rights in the hands of the more business-minded 
of the zamindars but these rights declined in value over time and became entirely 
valueless with the abolition of zamindari after independence. In Tanzania, the 
colonial period did not even see the creation of clear peasant land rights that would 
indicate a settled peasantry. 
 
In late developers there is a further problem in attracting investments in high 
productivity industries where skills and experience are missing. The existence of 
significant market failures constraining the adoption of new technologies means that 
the structure of rights that compelled productivity growth in early capitalism are no 
longer sufficient in catching up countries (Khan 2005a). In particular, new investors 
often require risk sharing arrangements or subsidies to induce them to invest, and this 
has significant implications for the structures of rights that are necessary to compel 
productivity growth. One way in which many developing countries have attempted to 
attract investments is to attenuate the rights of small groups of existing landholders so 
that their land can be acquired by or for new high value investors at a low price.  
 
However, we know that industrial policy subsidies of any sort are only likely to have 
the desired effect if there are clear procedures for comparing alternative investment 
opportunities and defining performance conditions for investors getting assistance. 
Most importantly, the efficient allocation of these rights now requires the presence of 
institutional capabilities to reverse allocations or otherwise withdraw subsidies if 
subsequent performance is weak. Without these conditions, the compulsions for ex 
post productivity growth in the newly attracted industries may be too weak. As 
subsidies given through land market transactions are by their nature opaque, this is a 
problematic way of transferring subsidies to attract high-value investors. Yet the 
absence of formal industrial policy mechanisms in most developing countries means 
that we often find examples of land markets being manipulated to attract investors, 
but without any compelling conditions attached. We will describe examples of such 
transactions in India and Tanzania in our case studies, but in neither case were the 
institutional conditions adequate to ensure that productivity growth would in fact be 
maximized. This aspect of the problem will be further discussed as part of the 
problem of technology acquisition in a later paper.  
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Growth-Constraining Transaction Costs 
If property rights have multiple ‘tasks’, the structures of rights that are appropriate for 
addressing one type of problem may not be appropriate for another. The broad 
concept of transaction costs blurs the distinction between the specific transaction costs 
that are relevant for each of the problems that we have been discussing. Implicit in our 
discussion so far is the possibility that the creation or improvement of a specific type 
of property right can reduce one set of transaction costs but increase another. 
However, if we are aware of these trade-offs, a transaction cost framework can still be 
useful for describing possible conflicts in a simple way. We can do this by 
distinguishing between transaction costs (TC) in general and growth-constraining 
transaction costs (GTC). The latter focuses on the transaction costs of achieving 
growth-enhancing changes in the allocation of assets, effort and investment. A 
reduction in growth-constraining transaction costs by definition improves the chances 
of growth. But a general reduction in transaction costs does not in general have that 
effect in a world where transaction costs are high along many dimensions. It is even 
possible that reducing a transaction cost that is irrelevant for growth may have an 
adverse effect if it inadvertently raises a critical growth-constraining transaction cost.  
 
We have already seen that strengthening some property rights can actually make the 
organization of a growth-enhancing change more difficult. Strengthening the 
definition and protection of the property rights of small peasants in a context where 
growth is constrained by land fragmentation would be an example. In this case, the 
transaction costs of small peasants in protecting their asset would be reduced, and this 
is desirable in itself. But small peasants are not often drivers of growth, and the 
improvement in investments that this may bring forth may be relatively small. On the 
other hand, their stronger rights may increase the complexity of the bargaining that a 
bigger investor may have to go through to buy many individual parcels of land. So 
growth-constraining transaction costs may have been increased. The paradox from the 
perspective of the simple theory of property rights is that sometimes weakening or 
even destroying some property rights can decrease growth-constraining transaction 
costs and thereby promote growth. For instance, this may happen if a weakening of 
the rights of collective landholdings made it easier for individual investors to take 
over land and thereby achieve efficient land use re-allocation.  
 
The generalizations coming from simple property right theory about the 
unequivocally good effects of strengthening property rights are misleading. These 
conclusions are based on a misleading comparison of reality with an imaginary 
benchmark of a world free of transaction costs. Since a perfect world has no 
transaction costs, the argument goes, any reduction of transaction costs must be a 
good thing. This conclusion need not hold in a world where we are comparing 
scenarios to identify the second-best. Ironically, the work of new institutional 
economics has itself established that zero transaction costs are unattainable (North 
and Wallis 1987). The work of Stiglitz has also shown that using the benchmark of a 
first-best world with zero transaction costs can be deeply misleading for policy 
(Stiglitz 1996). Any real world policy intervention is never going to achieve zero 
transaction costs and can only change specific transaction costs. The same 
intervention may raise some transaction costs and reduce others, and the net reduction 
is less relevant than the incidence. A reduction in the transaction costs of groups who 
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are not engaged in driving growth at the expense of even a small increase in the 
transaction costs of groups that are may have paradoxical effects on growth.  
 
It is important to keep in mind that weakening any rights has immediate impacts on 
the time horizons of those who possess these rights, and can lead to asset consumption 
or even destruction. If transfers to better uses have to be achieved through weakening 
some rights, the new owners have to rapidly achieve security of rights in the sense of 
protection and non-expropriation. Otherwise the re-allocation is likely to fail in its 
objectives. Successful non-market transfers of rights such as in the English Enclosures 
or the transfer of public land in China over the 1980s and 1990s first to TVEs and 
then to private hands succeeded because they protected new users at the same pace as 
the asset transfers were being achieved. If they had not, the result could have been 
disastrous. But equally, the English Enclosures or the Chinese transformation did not 
protect all rights to the land. Rights were destroyed and created in short succession. It 
is very misleading to forget about the destruction and focus only on the protection.  
 
Non-market asset grabbing in many countries fails to achieve any improvement in 
growth outcomes because the expropriators are themselves not certain of their future 
protection and so do not have the incentive to take a long view to conserve their 
investment. Without this, any further progress towards a productive ‘capitalism’ is not 
likely. In these cases, the destruction of the property rights of the initial users does not 
reduce growth-constraining transaction costs because the damaging effects of the 
initial destruction are not balanced by any improvement in subsequent asset use. It is 
therefore important to repeat the obvious, namely that undermining the basic rights 
that give asset users an extended time horizon are damaging and only justified for 
relatively short periods if there is no other way of achieving other objectives like asset 
re-allocation or the introduction of some of the conditions necessary for compelling 
productivity growth.  
 
Figure 3 summarizes the implications of our analysis for the types of property right 
interventions that are typically of concern in developing countries. It compares the 
expectations of the simple or standard theory of property rights with the expectations 
that follow from our extended theory that distinguishes growth-constraining 
transaction costs from aggregate transaction costs. The simple theory supports across 
the board improvements in property right protection and definition. Our argument 
suggests that every policy needs to be specifically looked at to identify the types of 
rights affected and the identity of the beneficiaries and those adversely affected. The 
first row in the figure looks at policies that strengthen some existing rights or create 
new rights. The expectation of standard theory is that these reforms will always 
reduce some relevant transaction costs and thereby improve economic efficiency. Our 
analysis shows that strengthening or creating particular rights can have indeterminate 
effects on growth-constraining transaction costs. In some circumstances, 
strengthening existing rights can increase growth-constraining transaction costs with 
adverse effects on potential growth.  
 
The second row in Figure 3 describes policies that destroy or weaken specific rights. 
The standard theory predicts that these policies will raise transaction costs and indeed 
they will for specific right-holders. Our analysis suggests that the net effect of 
weakening or destroying some rights can occasionally be to reduce growth-
constraining transaction costs and thereby assist growth prospects.  
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 Non-market allocation 
of resources, eg 
through exercise of 
eminent domain
↑ ↓or 
(TC could 
be lower 
than in 
market)
↑ ↓ or  
(GTC could decline if non-market 
allocation makes assets available to 
growth-promoting investors constrained 
by high market transaction costs)
Usually ↑
POLICY/
INTERVENTION
Effect on 
Transaction 
Costs (TC) 
in Standard 
Analysis
Effect on Growth-Constraining 
Transaction Costs (GTC)
Effect on 
Transition 
Costs 
(TSC)
Creation of New or
Strengthening of 
Existing Rights
↓
TC 
expected to 
decline
↓ or 
(Depends on net effects on investor time 
horizons, asset re-allocations to investors 
and compulsions for productivity)
↑
Usually ↑
Destruction or 
Weakening of Some 
Existing Rights
↑
TC 
expected to 
rise
↑  ↓or
(Depends on net effects on investor time 
horizons, asset re-allocations to investors 
and compulsions for productivity)
Usually ↑
Increase in surplus 
extraction by the state
↑
TC 
expected to 
rise
↑ ↓ or  
(If state’s surplus extraction creates 
political incentives for supporting growth 
GTC can decline)
Usually ↑
State withdrawal from 
the economy
↓
TC 
expected to 
decline
↑ ↓ or  
(If state’s capacity for assisting growth 
declines GTC can rise)
Usually ↑
 
Figure 3 Aggregate versus Growth-Constraining Transaction Costs  
 
The third row in Figure 3 looks at the impact of policies that represent attempts by 
political coalitions in control of the state to increase surplus extraction, typically 
through taxation. In the standard theory this will unequivocally raise transaction costs. 
This is because it is typically assumed that taxation raises uncertainty about future 
returns and owners of assets may also face difficulties in contracting for the future. 
However, in the context of the transformations that we have described this is a very 
limited analysis. If the political coalitions controlling the state face significant 
transition costs in pushing through growth-promoting changes they may be more 
likely to accept these costs if they have incentives. Surplus extraction provides that 
incentive. Historically, the need to raise revenue, particularly in the face of external 
threats has often moved states to take risks to define property rights in growth-
enhancing ways (Tilly 1975). Surplus appropriation by the state can of course be 
growth reducing if the state has a short time horizon and simply extracts for 
consumption by politicians. This can reduce the time horizons of investors who may 
also begin to destroy and consume assets. In this case the prediction of the simple 
theory would be borne out.  
 
The fourth row summarizes a similar qualification by looking at the reverse policy. A 
withdrawal of the state from the economy does not necessarily reduce transaction 
costs in a way that is beneficial for efficiency and growth. In the standard theory, state 
withdrawal assures property owners that their expropriation risk is reduced. In reality, 
the withdrawal of the state can have the opposite effect and raise growth-constraining 
transaction costs if it diminishes the political ability of investors to push through 
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growth-promoting changes. If these changes are likely to be strongly resisted, the 
chances of making progress are much reduced without active state support. 
 
The final row shows some areas of overlap between the simple theory of property 
rights and our own. The simple theory accepts that in conditions of significant market 
transaction costs, administrative interventions can lower transaction costs and thereby 
improve resource allocation. This is the basis of support for eminent domain 
interventions. However, administrative interventions can also get valuations and 
allocations wrong, generating resistance and implicitly raising transaction costs. 
Similar conclusions follow from our analysis, except that ‘administrative 
interventions’ or non-market resource allocations now cover a very significant part of 
the allocative process in developing countries. Straightforward eminent domain 
interventions are difficult in developing countries because initial rights are often 
overlapping and unclear and meaningful market prices do not exist for many assets. 
Here, administrative allocations implicitly end up destroying, attenuating or amending 
pre-existing rights. As we have seen, these interventions can be growth-promoting or 
the reverse, depending on the net effect on time horizons, resource allocation and 
productivity growth. 
 
It is important to keep political and moral judgements separate from the institutional 
analysis. We may judge on moral or political grounds not to promote growth (if, for 
instance, the distributive implications are dire) and that may be a perfectly valid 
judgement. Indeed we will argue that political judgements continue to constrain 
growth in the countries we are looking at. But in making such judgements we should 
be compelled to be transparent about the trade-offs we are making. If we reject any 
interference in the rights of some people and as a result they or others continue to 
remain in sustained poverty, we should at least make that decision explicitly. It is also 
important to point out that growth in developing countries is typically constrained not 
by political concerns for the very poor but rather by political conflicts between the 
moderately rich. To investigate the political constraints that states have operated 
under we now move to a discussion of transition costs. 
 
Transition Costs 
We define transition costs as the collective social costs of creating new rights or 
altering or destroying existing rights. These costs can be of two broad types. First, the 
costs could refer to the costs of organizing negotiated transitions, perhaps using 
compensations. The compensation itself is not part of the transition cost because it is 
paid effectively to acquire control over an asset and is therefore equivalent to its price. 
But the cost of organizing these ‘transactions’ are transition costs and includes the 
cost of possibly complex negotiations with multiple claimants to agree on the price 
and terms of the transaction. It is because transitions can in theory be carried out 
through negotiation and compensation that the simple property right theory often 
incorporates transition costs as part of normal transaction costs.  
 
However, secondly, in many if not most transitions, including those in which some 
compensation is offered, a significant part of the costs of the transition are ‘political’ 
contestation costs between different parties. Contestants typically impose costs on 
each other, on the state and often on broader society to signal that they will not give 
up their claim to the rights in question or to demand a different level of compensation. 
Often there is no substantive difference between a transition that is achieved with 
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contested and enforced compensation and one that is enforced without any 
compensation at all. In both cases, these political transition costs or costs of 
contestation may be the biggest part of the transition cost. Transition costs can be 
transmitted in a variety of forms, including electoral mobilizations, political 
mobilizations to bring down governments, strikes and lockouts that inflict direct costs 
on specific targets but also on broader society, riots, targeted political violence and 
even civil war.  
 
When property rights stand to be transformed, intense conflicts can break out for 
many reasons. Traditional ways of life are threatened, and at the same time new 
opportunities for dramatic enrichment open up. The possession of control rights over 
assets that promise to have significant economic value in the future can transform the 
class status of individuals and their heirs for generations forward. Equally, those who 
lose out may find their relative status in the new society has dramatically worsened. In 
addition, the negotiation over compensations is likely to verge on violence and 
frequently descend into it because dramatic changes in resource use increase the 
potential value of assets by orders of magnitude. Paradoxically, the greater the gain 
from asset re-allocation, the more intense is the conflict likely to be between current 
and future users in determining the ‘price’ of the right.  
 
The intensity of the conflicts depends on the relative organizational and political 
power of the contestants, their links with the state and how successfully they can 
mobilize themselves and broader social coalitions. Differences in the social and 
political organization of societies can therefore explain differences in the opposition 
that similar transformations face. Differences in social organization can therefore 
explain different trajectories of property right evolutions. A detailed analysis of social 
organization will be the subject of a later paper in this series. 
 
Some simple insights from game theory can help to identify the types of factors that 
can determine the costs of conflict but also to show the limits of trying to explain 
these costs in terms of a strictly economic logic. A transfer or alteration of rights over 
an asset can be seen as generating a potential gain from asset re-allocation. The 
bargaining game is over how to split this potential gain between those who are giving 
up (or losing) their old rights and those establishing new rights. In the case where new 
rights are being created conflicts are also likely to emerge between the many aspirants 
for the new right, since all of them typically cannot be satisfied. In all these cases we 
have variants of the conflict-with-cooperation bargaining game (sometimes called a 
chicken game in game theory literature) with each party benefiting if they can capture 
all or a bigger share of the potential gains. Game theory shows that these games have 
no determinate outcome. The way aggregate gains are split depends on the relative 
bargaining power of the parties which in turn depends on how long each can credibly 
hold out in costly conflicts. The social costs of the institutional change are therefore 
not determinate and depend on how long conflicts go on. The length and intensity of 
the conflicts depends on the ‘holding power’ of the contestants and this determines 
whether the institutional change will happen at all, and if it does, how the benefits are 
split (Knight 1992).  
 
Holding power is a measure of how long each side can credibly engage in a conflict, 
given that conflicts have costs. Holding power measures the relative ability to absorb 
the costs that follow from engaging in, for instance, strikes, mobilizations and 
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ultimately violence. The theory is that the side that can credibly hold out the longest is 
most likely to win. If one side has transparently greater holding power the conflict 
may not begin at all because if there is no chance of winning, the weaker side may 
feel compelled to accept whatever is offered. The interesting implication of this 
analysis is that conflicts are likely to be more prolonged and intense when the 
contestants are evenly matched in terms of their initial economic conditions. 
 
But Knight’s holding power is difficult to pin down in purely economic terms. As a 
first approximation holding power appears to be related to economic power because 
we might expect that richer contestants should be able to last longer in conflicts and 
inflict more costs on the other side by investing in the ‘technology’ of fighting battles. 
However, economic power is only a first approximation for holding power, and may 
not even be a good approximation. After all the poor do engage in contests and they 
occasionally win as well. This is because holding power is more indeterminate than 
economics would suggest. The poor can have significant holding power if they are 
able to absorb more pain than the rich. They could also mobilize themselves and other 
social forces to inflict costs on their opponents using their organizational ability to 
compensate for a weaker financial capability. Taking these political, organizational 
and motivational differences into account means that the outcome of conflicts cannot 
be predicted by the initial economic (or even military) differences between the 
participants.  
 
We need a summary description of social organization to say anything useful about 
the likelihood and intensity of conflicts and therefore the transition costs facing any 
strategy of property right transformation. We will use the concept of a political 
settlement to summarize the distribution of political and organizational power in 
society between the groups and classes that are significant for analysing a specific 
strategy of social transformation (Khan 1995). The political settlement is therefore 
relevant for understanding the costs that different groups and classes are likely to 
impose on their opponents in the course of conflicts. The capabilities of different 
groups to absorb these costs are also relevant for understanding the likely outcomes 
of conflicts.  
 
The insights from game theory only help us to a limited extent in outlining broadly 
defined hypotheses that can indicate the magnitude of transition costs. It tells us that if 
the groups potentially losing out from a change are evenly matched with the groups 
that stand to benefit, the contest may be prolonged and intense. Under these 
circumstances, neither side may give up too quickly. The ability of groups to impose 
costs on their competitors is particularly indeterminate in reality because it depends 
not just on the economic base of the group but also on their political and 
organizational ability to form alliances with other social groups. In developing 
countries this is particularly important because of the factional organization of politics 
which means that all sides are able to find allies at a price (Khan 2000a, 2002, 2005b).  
 
The critical role of the ‘intermediate classes’ in developing countries can be 
understood in this context. Individuals from within these classes have the ability to 
mobilize patron-client factions that are potentially large social coalitions. These can 
inflict significant social costs through political conflict. These political realities have a 
significant effect on strategies of property right transformation. The contending 
parties in an actual conflict in developing countries do not have to rely only on their 
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own abilities to engage in conflicts. They can significantly increase their holding 
power and capacity to inflict costs on the other side in exchange for a share of the 
‘rents’ coming from increased bargaining power. Thus transition costs can depend on 
how patron-client factions are structured and how they network with different 
economic and social forces within their societies and the outside world. We will 
examine patron-client politics in our case study countries in detail in a later paper.  
 
The likelihood of any particular growth-enhancing property right transformation 
being implemented depends on the transition costs they unleash. A few broadly 
defined scenarios are described in Figure 4. Note that transition costs are only partly 
economic costs. It is possible to sustain growth with high transition costs measured in 
terms of non-economic conflict costs. Even if some of the costs of conflict are 
economic, if they are largely inflicted on groups that are not driving growth, high 
economic transition costs can also be consistent with economic growth. However, in 
both cases, high transition costs may indirectly impact on growth if the political 
system is unable to absorb these costs and growth is abandoned as a result. Finally, 
transition costs can of course directly impact on growth by affecting the growth 
economy directly, and in this case high transition costs directly raise growth-
constraining transaction costs. 
 
2. High TSC
(Lower growth or growth
with high social costs)
Creation / Destruction of 
rights and/or
other interventions can 
result in:
Potentially Growth-
Promoting Changes 
(GTC ↓) : Final 
outcome depends on 
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Growth-Reducing 
Changes
(GTC constant or ↑) : 
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depends on transition 
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1. Low TSC
(High growth sustained 
at low social cost)
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(Output collapse with 
social conflict)
3. Low TSC
(Growth not attempted: 
Stagnation with Stability)
 
Figure 4 Growth Effects and Transition Costs of Changes in Property Rights 
 
The most fortunate combination is shown in box 1 at the top right hand of Figure 4. 
This is a fortunate conjuncture of growth-promoting changes in rights that face low 
transition costs. In this optimistic scenario growth-enhancing changes are not strongly 
resisted because the losers are politically weak and do not contest strongly. Few 
countries are likely to be in this fortunate position for very long. Sequential changes 
in property rights are likely to be required to sustain growth over time, and as new 
groups are affected by change, the combination outlined in box 1 is unlikely to be a 
permanent position for a country.  
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Box 2 summarizes the cases where growth-enhancing transformations face high 
transition costs. This describes a range of scenarios that are very important for most 
developing countries. There are a number of important variants within this broad 
category. In some cases growth-promoting changes may be forced through at high 
transition cost because the ruling coalitions can absorb or tolerate significant social 
costs from the sources that are affected. In these contexts growth can be sustained 
despite social conflict. However, if the social conflict begins to affect the growth 
sector directly, growth-constraining transaction costs may increase and growth will 
suffer. A more common variant is one where continued resistance forces some 
changes to be abandoned. Growth in many contemporary developing countries is 
often of this type: driven by gradual, ad hoc, interventions in rights that are often 
blocked or reversed. The sustainability of these processes can vary from case to case 
and the challenge for policy-makers is to intervene in rights to sustain growth. In 
extreme cases, the transition costs may be so high that growth strategies are almost 
entirely abandoned and we then collapse into the third scenario. 
 
The scenario shown in box 3 is one where attempts to change property rights to 
support growth are largely abandoned or even reversed because of potential transition 
costs. The actual transition costs may be low because few if any growth transitions are 
attempted. The political compromises on which non-settler colonial powers were 
based in Asia and Africa were often of this type. High growth developing countries 
can also revert to stagnation for these reasons if the transition costs of sustaining 
growth become too high. This could happen if ‘populist’ political parties based on the 
power of redistributive patron-client factions protect the rights of inefficient clients in 
industry and agriculture.  
 
Finally, the worst case is represented in box 4 where growth-enhancing rights are 
actually destroyed through conflicts that in turn have significant contestation costs. 
This is a scenario of destructive civil war or the outbreak of warlordism. 
Distinguishing between these scenarios is obviously extremely important. Some of the 
destruction of property rights in the first or second box could be driving growth but 
the destruction of rights in these scenarios is very different from the destruction of 
rights in the fourth which may be responsible not just for a growth collapse but 
eventually a collapse of the social order. This again shows why the simple theory of 
property rights can be misleading.  
 
The Growth-Stability Trade-off 
We can now bring together these conceptual building blocks to show that there are 
conceptually different paths along which we can proceed to change structures of 
rights to support higher growth. Each of these paths is defined by how much 
additional improvement in growth is achieved for an additional ‘price’ in terms of 
social contestation. In Figure 5, the height of the starting point P0 tells us the initial 
level of growth-constraining transaction costs. The higher we are, the lower the 
growth achievable with the existing structure of rights. From this starting point, we 
can consider different types of changes in rights that may reduce growth-constraining 
transaction costs. Any particular type of change is likely to have detrimental effects 
for specific groups and we can expect transition costs that are likely to increase the 
further we go along that direction of reform. 
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Figure 5 The Growth-Stability Trade-off 
 
The slope of this ‘trade-off’ curve tells us how steeply transition costs increase for this 
strategy of improving growth. The more vertical the curve is, the bigger the 
improvement in growth that is likely to be achieved for any given increase in 
transition costs. The flatter it is, the higher the price in terms of transition costs that 
has to be ‘paid’ for any given improvement in growth. We should obviously look for 
the strategy that achieves the greatest growth effect at the lowest social cost, in other 
words, the trade-off curve that is the steepest in each period of reform. The steepest 
available reform path is not however equally steep in all societies. The shape of the 
trade-off and the maximum acceptable transition cost are not only likely to be 
different across societies and over time, but also across strategies targeting different 
changes within a society. 
 
How far the participants are likely to proceed even along the most promising path of 
change depends on the maximum ‘acceptable’ transition cost, TSCmax. This is defined 
by the absorption capacity of the coalitions in state and society driving the changes to 
absorb the costs inflicted on or by the groups adversely affected by these changes. 
Both the shape of the trade-off and the maximum acceptable transition cost describe 
features of the political settlement which determine the likely constraints that will be 
faced by that strategy of transition. The slope of the trade-off curve and the maximum 
acceptable transition cost defines the limits to the implementation of any specific 
strategy over the period in question. In this case the limit is a transition to P1. This 
does not mean that change will actually be pushed all the way to P1, as the transition 
costs may deter the groups pushing for these changes even if they could theoretically 
have been absorbed. For the sake of simplicity we are ignoring the organization of 
agency in these diagrams but will return to this in a later paper. Finally, the growth-
stability trade-off is not a summary of all the institutional changes and political 
conflicts that may be going on in a society, but a way of focusing on specific growth-
promoting changes in property rights structures.  
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Figure 6 shows how differences in the slopes of the most favourable trade-off curves 
available to a society at any time and in the maximum acceptable transition cost can 
define the limits of growth-enhancing property right changes. The four curves in the 
figure correspond to the four scenarios described in Figure 4. The trade-off curve 
marked 1 in the figure corresponds to a scenario where growth-enhancing changes in 
property rights beginning at P0 face very limited opposition and rapid reductions in 
growth-constraining transaction costs can be achieved. Implicitly in this political 
settlement the groups adversely affected by these changes are weak. The tolerance 
limits of the ruling coalition for the transition costs depend on the political settlement 
and the identity of the groups affected. If the change adversely affects groups whose 
support is necessary for the coalitions in control of the state, the tolerance for 
transition costs could be at a low level shown by the line A. If on the other hand, the 
adversely affected groups are not politically important for ruling coalitions their 
tolerance for transition costs could be much higher, for instance up to line B. 
Movements in the direction of growth-enhancing changes in rights could then go even 
further, though at a higher social cost in terms of conflicts.  
 
 
Figure 6 Most Favourable Trade-Off Paths Can Vary Across Societies  
 
The other three lines in Figure 6 show how growth outcomes can change with 
different combinations of the best available trade-offs and tolerance levels. The trade-
off curve marked 2 shows the case where resistance to change is much higher. With 
the same levels of tolerance to transition costs more limited improvements in growth 
prospects are likely. Most developing countries experiences are variants of this case 
as discussed earlier. The limiting case when even trivial attempts to change rights in 
the direction of greater growth are very strongly resisted is shown by case 3. Here a 
growth improvement is hardly discernible even for significant increases in transition 
costs and therefore there is no incentive to move from P0. This could represent the 
extreme case of stability with no growth.  
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As the trade-off curve becomes flatter, case 2 becomes more like case 3. Reform in 
the direction of growth becomes increasingly costly which means that sustaining 
reform requires a change in the underlying political settlement. The only viable 
strategy for societies where growth-enhancing changes in rights are seriously blocked 
is for alternative coalitions to emerge or be organized that can take on the blocking 
coalitions. This will also involve conflicts and perhaps a period of conflict without 
growth, but there may be no alternative but to restructure political coalitions if 
growth-enhancing changes are seriously blocked. If successful, these political 
mobilizations could change the underlying political settlement and enable a more 
favourable growth-stability trade-off to emerge. But equally, political mobilizations 
can also be in the direction of strengthening patron-client factions that block change, 
so that the trade-off curve becomes flatter.  
 
Case 4 represents a pathological case where growth-reducing changes in rights may 
be taking place in a context of intense conflict. This could happen if some groups 
drive growth-reducing changes in rights for their own benefit and unleash increased 
social conflicts in the process. There are some sectors in every developing country 
that might fit this picture but when these activities become widespread we have a 
descent into a warlord society. Fortunately, none of our case study countries were in 
this category.  
 
Colonial History and its Misleading Narratives  
One of the most influential arguments frequently referred to in support of the good 
governance agenda comes from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (Acemoglu, et al. 
2001, 2002) henceforth AJR. Our analytical framework demonstrates why their 
analysis and the underlying re-interpretation of history they offer are deeply 
misleading. The comforting narrative they offer suggests that bad colonialism created 
the problem of unstable property rights in some countries. Instead, we need to learn 
the lesson of the good colonialism in settler colonies that created stable property 
rights and prosperity. This comforting but deeply misleading narrative diverts our 
attention from the economics and politics of growth-enhancing property rights reform 
and the governance capabilities required by developing countries to sustain growth 
during their contemporary transitions. 
 
AJR’s innovation was to use exogenous proxy variables (the incidence of malaria as 
well as low initial population density) as instruments for locating where white settlers 
settled and set up settler colonies. It turns out that settler colonies did significantly 
better in achieving development than non-settler colonies. The bias that their 
instruments arguably correct for is that they ensure that the analysis does not pick up 
the possibility that white settlers settled in areas that had an advantage for some other 
reason. But in the end, their econometric sophistication says little more than 
something that is quite uncontroversial: white settler colonies did a lot better than 
other developing regions. The question is why? Here they make an assertion that has 
nothing to do with their econometrics. They assert that the reason was that settler 
colonies set up stable property rights while non-settler colonies set up extractive 
systems that disrupted property rights, apparently with lasting and persistent 
consequences. This reassuring version of colonial history, summarized in Figure 7, 
has become widely accepted as having been proved by the econometric exercise 
carried out by AJR. 
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Figure 7 The Acemoglu et al. Version of Colonial History 
 
In fact, nothing of the sort is actually demonstrated in their work. All that the work 
demonstrates is that settler colonies ended up with significantly higher per capita 
incomes and high scores in property right stability a century or so later. AJR present 
no conclusive argument that the eventual outcomes were achieved because these 
states first established stable property rights and set up limited government. In reality, 
as Glaeser et al. point out, the same evidence could be used to argue that what the 
settlers brought with them was primarily their human capital (that is themselves) 
rather than their institutions, which arguably developed much later (Glaeser, et al. 
2004). What is worse, since the acquisition of human capital is in the long run a 
policy choice, a sophisticated racist could use the AJR evidence to argue that the 
superior performance of white settler colonies demonstrates the genetic advantage of 
whites in acquiring human capital (or indeed in setting up good institutions). AJR’s 
regressions only establish that white settler colonies did better (which no-one 
questioned anyway), and that where white settlers settled probably had little to do 
with the pre-settler productivity of the region. However, AJR’s own work shows that 
settler colonies were more likely to be set up in areas where indigenous populations 
were not dense (Acemoglu, et al. 2002). The significance of this for transition 
strategies has not been picked up.  
 
From the perspective of our discussion of transitions, the re-telling of history 
summarized in Figure 7 is not just misleading but very damaging for improving our 
understanding of how to intervene in contemporary transition processes. Not only 
have significant historical facts been misrepresented, more significantly, critical but 
inconvenient aspects of the processes of transition have been airbrushed out. While 
historians have pointed out that AJR have missed or misrepresented some historical 
facts, they have not focused on the implications of misrepresenting the history of the 
transition. For instance, Austin (2008) points out that AJR’s assertion of how 
extractive colonialism worked in non-settler colonies is overly simplistic and perhaps 
only applicable to the Belgian Congo. Bayly (2008) points out that AJR ignore the 
way in which some colonial subjects, particularly in India, used non-settler colonial 
institutions to develop productive capabilities. But the most obvious and striking fact 
about settler colonialism is the qualitatively more violent process that was unleashed 
on indigenous populations, verging on and in some cases amounting to genocide. The 
Belgian Congo was a possible exception to the rule that non-settler colonies faced 
lower levels of violence compared to settler colonies.  
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If anything, AJR’s story of expropriation can be turned on its head for the early period 
of colonialism in settler and non-settler colonies. In the non-settler colonies the 
colonial power faced dense populations that were relatively well organized and they 
immediately made complex political compromises with pre-existing and new elites to 
sustain colonial rule. In contrast, in settler colonies pre-existing populations were 
thinly spread out and the consequences of this turned out to be devastating for them. It 
meant that settlers were not threatened to quite the same extent by densely organized 
indigenous populations and could follow much more aggressive military strategies of 
land grabbing and destruction of pre-existing collective rights. Here indigenous 
populations faced dramatic and rapid expropriation of their lands, were pushed into 
smaller and smaller pockets of territories and in many cases suffered precipitous 
collapses in numbers that in some cases amounted to genocide.  
 
In North America the size of the ‘pre-contact’ American Indian population has been 
the subject of debate but the fact of its precipitous decline into near disappearance and 
the rapid and largely uncompensated loss of American Indian communal land rights is 
not (Snipp 1989; Sale 1990; Stiffarm and Lane Jr. 1992; Stannard 1993). In South 
Africa, the militarism and unwillingness to compromise that is evident for instance in 
the writings of Lord Garnet Wolseley during the Zulu Wars is in stark contrast to the 
strategies the British followed in India (Gump 1996; Lieven 1999). Indeed, Lieven’s 
description of the uncompromising ‘total war’ the British waged against the Zulus and 
their economy has elements of similarity with the German genocide of the Herrero 
people in neighbouring south-west Africa (Lieven 1999: 631) In Australia there is an 
explicit discourse of genocide to describe what happened to the aboriginal population 
(Tatz 1999; Moses 2000). Violence against aboriginal peoples in Australia was 
directly related to settler demand for land and the need to clear the land of the hunter-
gatherer aborigines. The simple expedient was to deny any recognition of prior rights. 
The forceful exclusion of aboriginal peoples from their livelihoods led to precipitous 
population declines, in some areas by as much as 80 per cent (Moses 2000). To 
describe these processes in terms of the settler states establishing a rule of law and 
stable property rights clearly does huge injustice to our understanding of history and 
is at least manifestly economical with the truth. 
 
Figure 8 draws on the colonial histories summarized in our case studies and what we 
know about the violent transitions in the settler colonies. Settler colonies did indeed 
make a transition to ‘stable property rights’ but only after the rights inappropriate for 
the new capitalist economies were thoroughly destroyed. Settlers from already 
capitalist countries came with ideas of how to organize production but they did not try 
to work with pre-existing rights, defining them better, creating markets and then 
trying to re-allocate assets through markets. For reasons that we have extensively 
discussed, such a process may well have been blocked. Instead, the transitions here 
were not periods of stable property rights but the absolute reverse. They were periods 
of systematic and widespread destruction of almost all pre-existing rights because 
these rights did not serve the interests of settlers who were setting up capitalist 
economies in their own interest.  
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Figure 8 Colonial History’s Inconvenient Truths 
 
The reason why settler colonies could push these painful changes through so rapidly 
and with so little concern for the human costs is precisely because settler states were 
based on significant settler presence and did not require the support of indigenous 
peoples at all. Nor did the resistance of indigenous people register in the political 
concerns of these colonial states to any great extent. The transformation of rights over 
assets in the direction of protection, accumulation and the creation of incentives for 
productivity growth was achieved completely and rapidly only because the indigenous 
society ‘paid’ massive transition costs. Moreover, these transition costs could be 
absorbed by the state and its supporting coalitions because the support of indigenous 
society mattered little if at all in settler colonies.  
 
Pre-existing property rights were much better protected in the non-settler colonies. 
Ironically, many pre-capitalist rights were coming under pressure for renegotiation in 
the more advanced pre-colonial societies like India as commoditization increased. But 
with colonialism pre-capitalist rights came to be better defined and became more 
permanent as a result of colonial political strategies. In addition, the colonial power 
was often compelled to create further ‘non-capitalist’ rights to protect the new 
intermediate classes that were emerging as mediators of imperial rule. The effect was 
that the transition was protracted and incomplete, and is indeed still continuing. On 
the positive side, the transition costs in non-settler colonies were significantly lower. 
On the negative, the colonial power institutionalized many pre-existing pre-capitalist 
rights and made them even more difficult to change. Where the settler colonies paid 
the price of very high transition costs (in some cases verging on genocide), non-settler 
colonies paid the price of many pre-capitalist rights being created, strengthened or 
even formally institutionalized. The really negative legacy of empire in places like 
India was probably not the extraction of surplus that AJR are concerned about, or the 
disruption of property rights stability, but rather the strengthening of many non-
capitalist rights and the creation of many new and stable non-capitalist rights that are 
still proving difficult to change.  
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Figure 9 Transitions in Settler and Non-Settler Colonies 
 
Figure 9 summarizes these arguments. Settler colonies probably started off in a less 
advantageous position because their economies were even less developed, and initial 
growth prospects were low, shown by the point P0settler initially being higher than 
P0non-settler. But there were two significant differences in the political settlements 
underpinning these colonial states. Compared to non-settler states, settler states 
probably had steeper trade-off curves because the thinly populated indigenous 
populations in the settler societies could not inflict the same level of transition costs 
for similar changes in their structures of rights. Secondly, and more importantly, the 
maximum transition cost that the state could absorb was much higher, significantly 
higher, in settler states compared to non-settler states. While critical elites from within 
the indigenous populations had to be incorporated in the power structures in non-
settler states for the colonial enterprise to be politically viable, there was no such 
necessity in non-settler states. Here the political viability of the state was based almost 
entirely, and in some cases solely, on the settler community.  
 
Not surprisingly, growth-enhancing changes could be pushed much further in settler 
colonies during the colonial period to P1settler. In contrast, changes in rights in non-
settler societies were driven by complex motives, including in particular the need to 
maintain political stability. Growth prospects improved marginally if at all, from 
P0non-settler to P1non-settler. Thus, settler states achieved a significant decline in growth-
constraining transaction costs but also a very significant increase in transition costs 
over this period. The human suffering this entailed has already been referred to. In 
contrast, non-settler states achieved minimal or no reductions in GTC, but transition 
costs did not increase much either.  
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Figure 10 Colonial Compromises Worsen Trade-offs  
 
The problem in some non-settler colonies was compounded because the greater 
protection and formalization of some pre-capitalist rights and the invention of new 
‘traditional’ rights increased the political resistance over time to asset re-allocations or 
the creation of conditions that could compel productivity growth. This is shown in 
Figure 10 as a movement upward of the trade-off curve, making growth-enhancing 
transitions more difficult. In Bengal, for instance, we saw how the colonial creation of 
new rights on the land rolled back the incipient growth of merchant capital and its 
penetration into agriculture as well as reversing the rapid growth of the artisan 
manufacturing industry. Over time these rights evolved in progressively more 
complex ways, blocking asset re-allocations and the accumulation of land, and 
creating strong incentives for intermediate class entry into politics as the most 
promising avenue for accumulation. In less dramatic ways, the creation of 
‘traditional’ land rights in Africa is also likely to have had similar effects. 
 
The analysis of colonialism is important for contemporary policy for several reasons. 
First, the challenge facing contemporary developing countries has to be understood 
properly. The challenge is not to create through good governance the stable property 
rights that settler colonies apparently created. A rapid creation of such rights is 
precluded once we understand what that would entail in terms of transition costs. 
Once these are taken into account, the settler colonies should serve as models of what 
not to do, because such high transition costs cannot be recommended today and were 
not justified in the past. If developing countries today are not following the example 
of settler colonies and moving rapidly in the direction of capitalist property rights it is 
not because they necessarily lack the political will, but more likely because they 
implicitly understand the issue of transition costs. Secondly, the long history of non-
settler colonial rule has also left serious problems in the form of social engineering 
that created a multitude of rights and social entitlements that were inappropriate for 
asset re-allocations and for creating the productivity compulsions necessary for 
driving growth. A comparison of the property right evolution in non-colonized 
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Thailand with the problems in different areas in the Indian subcontinent illustrates the 
nature of this legacy.  
 
The third point takes us to our next section. Contemporary developing countries that 
are growing rapidly are doing so through ad hoc, sector-wise changes in property 
rights that allow some reductions in their growth-constraining transaction costs at 
acceptable levels of transition cost. These moves are haphazard; they often involve 
hidden business-government relationships and the use of political influence and 
sometimes corruption. They are vulnerable to reversal because social forces 
threatened by these changes can often easily mobilize patron-client factions which can 
inflict serious transition costs on growth strategies. At the same time some changes or 
interventions in property rights are of course predatory and damaging. Policy-makers 
need to be able to assess different processes that are simultaneously going on. A 
simplistic adherence to the good governance strategy derived from a misreading of 
history can do more harm than good. The challenge is to work with developing 
countries in areas where property rights are being transformed in productive ways, 
understanding the political difficulties of doing these things and the strong social 
resistance that can be evoked by all kinds of interests who are not acting in the 
interests of growth or poverty reduction. At the same time, predatory interventions 
and destructions of property rights that damage investment horizons also need to be 
identified and targeted. These are not simple challenges and the complexity of our 
framework unfortunately reflects the complexity of the world.  
 
4. Contemporary Strategies and Governance Implications 
Many of the initial conditions of the economies of our case study countries were quite 
different in the 1980s (Khan 2008b). The preceding discussion has identified further 
significant differences in the evolution of property rights in our countries and the 
degree to which property rights were appropriate for growth transitions in the 1980s. 
They also differed significantly in their political organization and the relevant 
distributions of power (their political settlements) that could plausibly affect the 
evolutionary paths of changing property rights. As a result, the processes that we 
observe in our case studies in the 1980s and beyond through which market failures 
were being addressed through ‘interventions’ in property rights are also very different 
as we would expect. This section draws on a series of case studies of property right 
interventions that we conducted in our countries, using a combination of interviews, 
observations and a reading of the secondary literature.  
 
The object of this section is not to provide a comprehensive picture of the property 
right transition that is going on in each country or region. This would be a very 
extensive task to conduct even for a single country. This is because countries are 
themselves very diverse across sectors and regions and are developing using very 
different processes in different sectors and for addressing different problems. The 
property rights challenges in say the residential sector, small and large industries, the 
informal sector, different types of agriculture, homesteads and land requirements of 
the poor and the marginal and so on raise very different issues. Our aim is rather to 
focus on a few examples that pick on specific growth constraining market failures to 
examine the processes through which different players respond to these market 
failures and the degree of success with which these challenges are being addressed.  
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Our contention is that the generic developing country problem is that existing 
property right structures are far removed from the structure that would be necessary to 
sustain growth in an efficient capitalist market economy. Big changes in property 
rights are not possible because of significant transition cost constraints. So we would 
expect to see many different types of informal and often ad hoc processes that are 
different across sectors, types of technologies, and countries. Their success or failure 
depends on the details of the strategies, the context but also on the kind of 
involvement that political factions or governments have in these processes. This is 
consistent with our framework because we would expect the involvement of particular 
political forces in favour or against a strategy to determine the transition costs and 
tolerance limits for these transition costs in the way discussed in the last section. The 
exercise is therefore one of a series of investigations to identify specific problems, 
opportunities or missed opportunities. At the end we identify some patterns that may 
help to identify areas where growth-enhancing governance reforms could focus. 
 
Thailand: Land Rights Supporting Capitalist Development 
We saw earlier that within our set of countries, Thailand made the most significant 
progress in transforming its property rights structures in the direction of rights 
appropriate for an industrial capitalist economy. Much of these changes happened 
during the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century as the land frontier was being 
extended and the labour supply was rapidly expanding. The absence of complex 
political alliances made by a weak colonial power was a critical part of this story. So 
were the land frontier and the availability of virtually limitless labour supplies. 
Together these factors implied that peasant resistance to the gradual incursion of the 
king, the nobles and eventually merchants in establishing superior rights over the 
most valuable tracts of land was relatively weak. Figure 11 shows that the trade-off 
curve during this critical period for changes in property rights in the direction of 
tradable rights over significant tracts of valuable land was relatively steep.  
 
Growth-Constraining Transaction Costs (GTC)
in Relevant Period
Transition Costs (TSC) 
During Relevant Period
TSCmax
P0
P1
 
Figure 11 Thailand: Emergence of Tradable Land Rights Mid-19th to Mid-20th Century  
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While much of Thailand’s land remains agricultural and much of this is not yet 
properly titled, the transformation of significant amounts of valuable land close to 
infrastructure and ports that became available for industrial and high-value 
commercial and residential development is critical for understanding contemporary 
land issues. Discussions with businessmen, lawyers and academics in Thailand 
suggest that as far as growth is concerned, the contemporary structure of easily 
tradable land rights around Bangkok and extending to a number of emerging 
industrial zones including in particular the extensive Eastern Seaboard area means 
that land availability for industrial development is not a significant constraint. Indeed, 
in contrast to most other developing countries, industrial land development is supply-
led, with large industrial development companies like Amata and Hemaraj taking up 
available land, developing large industrial zones, building infrastructure on the land, 
then selling factory space and ready-made factories once they are built. The relative 
ease with which these industrial zone developments have happened in Thailand over 
the last two to three decades cannot be understood outside the context of the evolution 
of land rights over these tracts in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
 
Much of the industrial zone developments are in the Eastern Seaboard zone that the 
government had begun developing as early as the late 1970s as part of its import 
substituting industrialization drive. Located to the south-east of Bangkok and served 
by two deep sea ports at Laem Chabang and Map Ta Phut in Rayong, the Eastern 
Seaboard zone covers sixteen separate industrial estates and more are being 
developed. Occupancy rates in 2009 were around 70 per cent despite rapid take-up, 
showing the supply driven nature of these developments. Much of Thailand’s 
chemical, automobile, automobile component and electronics industries are located in 
these estates. Apart from the Eastern Seaboard, discussions with real estate lawyers in 
the Bangkok area suggest that businesses do not find it difficult to rapidly identify and 
acquire land for commercial purposes. Thai law does not allow companies with more 
than 49 per cent foreign ownership to buy land in Thailand, but foreign owned 
companies investing in a promoted activity can readily get Board of Investment (BOI) 
authorization to acquire land for industrial or other commercial activities. The only 
constraint is that if the authorized business ceases activity, the foreign owner has to 
sell the land within a year of the business being suspended. These laws are aimed at 
preventing foreign ownership of land for speculative or store of value purposes. 
 
The situation is somewhat different in agriculture where much land is still not 
properly titled. Around 60 per cent of land in Thailand is public and forest land and 
many poorer people find they are living on lands that turn out to be public or forest 
lands. The full titling of the occupancy rights of the agricultural population and poorer 
people in particular will take more time and is likely to be a conflictual process if the 
government were eventually to take a hard line of evicting significant numbers of 
people from forest and public lands. As a land surplus country, an easy option would 
be to recognize occupancy rights as legal rights in most cases, and there is some 
evidence that this is happening in the land titling that is going on (Nabangchang-
Srisawalak and Srisawalak 2008). But clearly there are problems of announcing that 
this is the strategy in advance.  
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Figure 12 Contemporary Thailand: Resistance to Extending Capitalist Rights over Land  
 
The recognition of the rights of poor landholders is a relatively new development in 
Thailand. The dominant process in Thai agriculture has been the occupation of public 
lands by commercial interests acting in concert with local power brokers who then 
gradually changed local land records over time. Now titling is gradually happening 
for some of the poorer squatters and occupants of public and forest lands. Greater 
awareness by the poor of their rights, the activities of NGOs and the deepening 
political mobilization of the poor in rural areas has probably ruled out a continuation 
of land agglomeration by commercial interests at least at the old pace. Taksin’s 
populist politics rose on the tide of a more assertive rural society in the 1990s and 
perhaps strengthened it further. It is likely that attempts to extend commercial 
interests over new lands in contemporary Thailand will face a flatter trade-off curve 
as in Figure 12. If trade-off curves become sufficiently flat small extensions in these 
rights can generate significant transition costs. Extensions of these policies will either 
be much slower or abandoned entirely because the transition costs may not be worth 
the relatively small benefits (even if the beneficiaries could theoretically have 
absorbed these costs). 
 
Extending the land titling programme into the agrarian hinterland would primarily 
benefit Thailand’s peasant farmers and the poor. It would be a policy with lower 
transition costs but with much lower reductions in growth-constraining transaction 
costs as well: the trade-off curve for this programme of property rights reform is 
likely to be flat and truncated. Property rights for smallholders may marginally 
improve their time horizons, may enable them to borrow more easily using their title 
documents as collateral. But these property rights would be unlikely on their own to 
set up a capitalist land market or compulsions for capitalist productivity growth. We 
would not therefore expect to see the rapid emergence of a capitalist agriculture in 
Thailand as a result of an extension of land titling. But land titling can be justified on 
other grounds. Thailand faces serious political challenges if it fails to rapidly improve 
 68
the social protection of the poor. Extending the land titling programme to cover the 
poor and marginal in an inclusive manner would contribute to this. Moreover, there is 
no immediate conflict with growth sectors. Sufficient land with appropriate tradable 
rights is available for industrialization strategies for some time to come. 
 
Apart from land titling, there are other governance issues affecting land but they do 
not appear to be binding constraints for growth sectors. Administrative corruption and 
delays in land registration and land transfers are occasionally reported but corruption 
rarely allows the changing of land records or titles. There is no evidence that 
corruption can be used to amend clear ownership titles over valuable land. Its role is 
limited to speeding up some transactions which are not too slow in any case. For the 
commercial sector, much of the business is conducted by professional lawyers and 
agents. The close alliances between finance, politics and local administration that 
allow encroachments of public lands in remote areas and can change land use 
classifications are not reported in urban areas or in industrial zones. However, there 
are exceptions. In discussions with the National Anti-Corruption Commission 
(NACC) of Thailand a number of cases were cited involving land acquisition that the 
Commission had identified and prosecuted. A high profile example was the ADB-
financed Klong Dan Wastewater Treatment Plant project where a scandal in 2003 
eventually led to the sentencing of a senior minister to ten years in prison. The 
minister, Mr. Vatana used his influence to acquire land cheaply that was then bought 
by the state for the project at a much higher price. In the process some public land was 
also declared as private land with the connivance of Land Department officials. An 
interesting aspect of this case was that the acquisition of land for public works in 
Thailand clearly appears to be at very favourable prices.  
 
The relatively efficient operation of the land market in Thailand makes it difficult for 
the state to try and provide industrial policy support to specific industries through land 
acquisition and transfer strategies. Industrial policy in Thailand increasingly takes 
horizontal forms, through the provision of high quality infrastructure and tax breaks in 
industrial zones. Board of Investment tax privileges for investing in the Eastern 
Seaboard zone, for instance, include up to eight years corporate income tax holidays 
(capped at the level of the initial investment), a 50 per cent reduction for a further five 
years, import tax exemptions for machinery, and up to 75 per cent cuts in duty on 
essential raw materials. Industrial policy regimes in Thailand and elsewhere will be 
the subject of a later paper on technology adoption strategies. But in Thailand land 
policy is not used as a surrogate for industrial policy so the issue of the effectiveness 
of land allocation procedures for inducing productivity growth does not arise. 
 
Although it is tempting to see Thailand as a model for developing countries in areas 
like the successful construction of industrial zones and its rapid progress in land 
titling, there is a longer history that enabled Thailand to make progress in these 
directions in the 1980s and beyond. The political settlement in Thailand in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries was significantly different from that of most 
contemporary developing countries and explains the rapid emergence of tradable land 
holdings and land rights over these holdings. This history also helps us to understand 
the political importance of extending land titling to the poor and to remote areas in 
Thailand today.  
 
 69
Features of South Asian Transitions 
The next three sections deal with different regions in the Indian subcontinent. The 
interventions of the non-settler colonial state had common features across the 
subcontinent. As part of the very earliest colonial conquests in India, West Bengal and 
Bangladesh acquired a different set of land and revenue rights compared to 
Maharashtra. But in general, the underlying trade-off for the colonial state was 
unfavourable for significant changes in the direction of effective tradable rights over 
land. In terms of the trade-off graph, the experience of the Indian subcontinent is 
described by the non-settler colonial strategy described in Figure 9.  
 
The colonial state did try to improve land rights to enhance their revenue collection 
but also intervened to restrain the penetration of merchant capital into agriculture at 
every sign of peasant discontent. These countervailing interventions created new 
rights and entitlements for a variety of agrarian interests that blocked significant 
agrarian transition. These interventions were more damaging in Bengal because 
political stabilization in the zamindari system empowered layers of intermediary 
landed and political interests. Not surprisingly, intermediate class political 
mobilization was stronger in Bengal compared to Maharashtra at the end of Empire. A 
peasant party (the Krishok Proja Party) led by intermediate class politicians played a 
dominant role in Bengal politics in the 1930s while the regions that became 
Maharashtra were dominated by Congress with its close associations with Indian 
capitalists in the region.  
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Figure 13 Initial Conditions in Indian Subcontinent Regions c. 1980 
 
In addition, eastern Bengal was less developed in terms of industry and per capita 
income in 1947 compared to West Bengal which had a significant industrial base 
around Calcutta. These initial advantages led to somewhat different post-
independence economic development strategies. For a comparison of the initial 
economic conditions and a summary of early development experiences in our case 
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study countries see Khan (2008b). These initial differences in the relative size of the 
capitalist sectors and the relative strength of intermediate class-led factions in politics 
persisted into the 1980s despite the growth of the capitalist sector in all these regions. 
These differences in initial conditions are likely to have given Maharashtra an 
advantage over Bengal as a whole and a slight advantage to West Bengal over 
Bangladesh in terms of the growth-stability trade-off available for many types of 
growth-enhancing property right interventions. This is summarized in Figure 13. 
However, we would expect important differences in the trade-offs within each of 
these regions for different types of changes in property rights, and for the trade-offs to 
change over time as political conditions and economic development progressed. 
 
A number of case studies from across the Indian subcontinent are discussed in the 
next three subsections, which demonstrate a number of common themes. First, with 
unfavourable trade-offs to begin with, successful interventions necessary for 
sustaining growth have often been informal, and often required the direct involvement 
of political allies to push through particular changes in the allocation or definition of 
property rights. The specific and sometimes accidental alliances between particular 
factions and contestants in conflicts over rights have often had significant effects on 
outcomes. Some groups of the poor are well-organized and could be mobilized by 
political factions who wanted to cash in on land transactions and in these cases even 
projects with reasonable compensation packages could be blocked. The experience of 
the Nano project in Singur in West Bengal is an example. The other side of the coin is 
the unfortunate observation that weakly organized constituencies like minorities, 
tribals or dalits have a higher chance of losing their rights in processes of 
transformation (Fernandes 2007). For property right transformations, states and 
corporations often find that trade-offs are more favourable for them when dealing 
with isolated groups, less well-connected to political factions that can enhance the 
bargaining power of these groups significantly. Clearly, this solution has severe 
implications for distributive justice, but in many cases in the Indian subcontinent, it is 
only a matter of time before isolated groups become much better organized.  
 
Secondly, resistance to property right changes is easier to overcome if there are good 
financial packages of compensation that can be called upon. This is more likely in 
aid-funded projects or mineral extraction projects driven by companies with deep 
pockets. If some of the transition costs are monetized, the politics of handling the 
transition becomes easier. However, the monetization is not simple and can often also 
require significant political intervention because there are typically wide 
discrepancies between current market valuations and the valuation at which affected 
holders of rights are likely to want to ‘transact’. Monetization can also attract the 
attention of political players who want to cash in on these bargaining games. The 
politicization of land transfer issues in India suggests that monetization of some 
transition costs also requires new institutional arrangements if these strategies are to 
be effective. There is also an important paradox that compensated transitions are 
likely to assist big corporates and foreign investors, particularly those involved in 
minerals and oil, but they may disadvantage smaller local manufacturing sector 
investors with more limited financial abilities. 
 
Thirdly, where trade-offs are unfavourable because of features of the political 
settlement, a successful response appears to be the construction of decentralized 
coalitions between investors, local government bureaucrats and politicians that can 
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result in ad hoc and unplanned acquisition of relatively small pieces of land in a 
piecemeal way. Because each ‘transition’ is a small one, transition costs never 
become too high. But here there is a serious consequential set of costs due to path 
dependency in the spatial evolution and scale of productive sectors. A classic example 
of this is the unplanned spatial growth of small garment factories in Bangladesh and 
the problems they now face in achieving scale economies.  
 
Bangladesh: The Limits of Capitalism from Below 
The land issue is intense in densely populated Bangladesh and West Bengal. Small 
peasant farms have a ceiling of productivity and profitability set by their limited 
ability to achieve scale economies in mechanization and marketing. Nevertheless, the 
growth of triple cropping using HYVs in many parts of the country means that much 
of the land is farmed well above a subsistence level. The absence of significant pre-
existing industrial employment opportunities means that land market transactions with 
smallholders face high transaction costs. In addition, for reasons we have discussed, 
land titles and land survey records remain inconsistent. The legal system has come to 
be used as an arena for settling these conflicts through prolonged wars of attrition 
rather than a place for deciding ownership based on documents. The law cannot deal 
with genuine inconsistencies in documents and records. Formal attempts to make 
conflicting records consistent through computerization may simply transfer conflicts 
from the courts to other arenas. These conditions undoubtedly provide a promising 
environment for criminals to use political power and corruption to forge documents 
and deeds. Yet in the midst of this otherwise unpromising environment significant 
growth has happened including the growth of new manufacturing sectors and rapid 
urbanization. It has been driven by a version of capitalism from below, with emerging 
entrepreneurs negotiating ad hoc arrangements that give them access to land. 
However, the experience is different from Thailand because this works only if the 
land required is relatively small. And even then, a high price had to be paid in the 
sense that many entrepreneurs have been unable to achieve scale economies. 
Nevertheless, it is important to understand the ‘governance’ capabilities that allowed 
capitalism from below to continue to grow rapidly for two decades. 
 
 The Garments Industry: Growth despite Inefficient Land Markets 
The dramatic growth of the garment industry from the 1980s onwards was initially 
able to deal with the absence of a well-working land market by flouting zoning and 
residential regulations. Many very small units were set up in the middle of residential 
areas, sometimes using upper storeys or rented property that their owners were willing 
to let out at a higher rent. As scale economies became more important with bigger 
machines and multiple processes within a single plant, garments industries began to 
move out in search of non-residential locations. Areas to the north of Dhaka like 
Mirpur saw a rapid expansion in manufacturing, and soon factories began to go 
further afield to Savar and Gazipur which had previously been solely agricultural and 
forest land, in most cases without authorization. The demarcation and ownership titles 
of much of these agricultural lands, including forest lands was confused, with 
contradictory records, leaving ample opportunity for litigation and contestation. 
Despite these problems, the unplanned growth of the sector was meteoric. By 2005, 
the number of garment sector firms was estimated to be around 3500, employing at 
least around 2 million people and accounting for well over half of the country’s export 
earnings (Rashid 2006; Khan 2008a, 2008b). 
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The experiences of a few entrepreneurs may shed light on the complexity of local 
level processes through which land was acquired and protected. ‘A’ is an entrepreneur 
of a moderately sized garment factory currently employing around 500 workers, 
located in Gazipur, north of Dhaka. The factory was set up in the late 1980s with the 
entrepreneur buying several tiny plots which were initially not contiguous and then 
buying other small plots as they became available. The help of local power brokers 
was employed to negotiate prices with smallholders and to confirm that the people 
claiming to sell the land were indeed genuine local people who had been on the land 
in the past. Despite this, many conflicting documents and claims emerged. In the past 
land records kept at the land survey office were not updated (or mutated) as land was 
subdivided through inheritance or sale and over time sale deeds (which are legally 
recognized) and the land records (which were the basis of land tax in British times) 
had often become divergent. As land was not a traded commodity in the past, what 
mattered was possession by the occupant and title deeds to show how the land was 
initially acquired. The consistency of these documents with other records was not an 
issue. Fortunately for entrepreneur A land in Gazipur had not sky-rocketed in price in 
the 1980s. Today, the number of forged and conflicting claims emerging on every 
piece of land in that area has significantly increased.  
 
Having acquired enough land to set up the factory, A had to retain a manager to deal 
with ongoing land disputes with other individuals who claimed that some of the land 
sold had not rightly belonged to the people who had sold it initially. Many of these 
disputes were between relatives disputing the shares in which land had been inherited 
in the past. Going back in history, registered documents could often be discovered 
where a father had gifted land to a wife or to a relative, which could not then be 
enforced because the land was occupied. But years later when a valuable land sale 
happened, descendants would emerge claiming their share. Sometimes claims were 
false, based on forged documents, at other times additional compensation had to be 
paid to those with ‘genuine’ conflicting claims. The same plot sometimes had to be 
‘purchased’ more than once so that all paper claims could be extinguished, at prices 
determined by the ability of each claimant to make trouble. Court cases frequently 
emerged but because the entrepreneur was able to sit out prolonged cases, the war of 
attrition worked in his favour.  
 
Matters became more complicated five years ago when some locals sold a piece of 
land which split the growing factory complex into two to a powerful Dhaka-based 
land speculator. The entrepreneur had tried to locate title for this land and purchase it 
but had not been able to locate the owners. The sale was potentially serious because 
the speculator could extort a high price from the entrepreneur or even buy out the 
entire factory by making it unworkable. A desperate search through complex land 
records ensued as well as a court case. The entrepreneur’s manager discovered a 
potentially very significant anomaly in the historic records when he searched back to 
the early 1960s. Apparently when the last major land survey was conducted in 1966 
some locals had paid government surveyors to record a part of forest land as private 
property. The land speculator had ‘bought’ forged documents based on this faulty 
land survey record. The entrepreneur informed the forest department of this and is 
assisting the forest department with the documents that the entrepreneur discovered 
proving the fraud. As the forest department lost a very large amount of land (and was 
apparently ‘unaware’ of this), the entrepreneur is currently hoping that when the 
forest department wins its court case and reclaims the land from the speculator, it will 
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treat the entrepreneur kindly. This could mean either a side ‘deal’ so that the Forest 
Department turned a blind eye on this tiny piece of land on which there were no 
constructions but which was inside the perimeter of the factory, or even better, 
exchanging that land with some other land when the records are finally corrected. 
None of this is likely to be resolved in the near future. In the meantime, the factory is 
doing well with rapidly rising export orders.  
 
Even in this highly simplified presentation, the complexity of the case shows why 
transition costs would be very high if a big bang solution to land titling were 
attempted. Even for a plot of land of less than an acre dozens of claims are involved 
and most of the claimants believe their claim is justifiable. Even the land speculator 
and those who sold him the land may not have been fully aware of its dubious 
provenance. All titles are shaky to some extent, and our entrepreneur was lucky in this 
case because there was a glaring gap in the amount of forest land in that block in a 
survey done in the mid-1960s compared to the previous survey completed in the 
British period, given that forest land could not have been sold or transferred in the 
interim legally. More often, the fragmented nature of forest lands adds to the 
complexity faced by entrepreneurs. Although originally they were contiguous blocks, 
they were recorded in surveys as parts of big blocks (cadastres) that included privately 
owned lands. As the private owners staked claims to different parts of a cadastral 
block, by the time detailed surveys were done, the forest lands often emerged as tiny 
plots scattered all over the block. This means that entrepreneurs often find (as did A) 
that there may be a tiny piece of forest land in the middle of and totally surrounded by 
their property and there is nothing they or the forest department can do about it. The 
solution is often a regular payment to overlook the inconvenient problem.  
 
The garment industry experience suggests that when entrepreneurs get involved in 
decentralized conflict resolution over records using local land administrations, they 
can just about solve their land use requirements at a price. The price is not just the 
time and effort spent in managing these transitions at the local level. These types of 
solutions also result in some serious path-dependent consequences for the garment 
industry and other emerging manufacturing sectors. Surveys of garment industry 
entrepreneurs show that scale economies are often impossible because of the 
difficulty of finding contiguous plots of land (Khan 2008a). When entrepreneurs have 
the opportunity to expand production, they often find that the only option is to set up 
additional production units miles away from the main production site. This obviously 
leads to higher overhead costs than necessary and can preclude the development of 
integrated production processes.  
 
Our case study also suggests that many of these problems of conflicting land records 
are not likely to be resolved by technical solutions like computerization, a process that 
is being widely supported as part of the current governance reform efforts in 
Bangladesh. Computerization will reveal significant inconsistencies in land records 
without creating any mechanism for resolving them. As all inconsistencies are not due 
to fraud but rather due to conflicts in records never having been addressed, a 
precondition for a successful land titling process is to set up the mechanisms which 
may address these conflicts somewhat more efficiently than the courts. The problem 
is that any solution that does not rely on attrition (the weaker side giving up 
voluntarily after several years of contesting in the courts) is likely to involve upfront 
transition costs for the state. Those who champion these strategies appear not to be 
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aware of the underlying conflicts that need to be resolved or they assume that these 
will be smoothly resolved once transparent records begin to be established.  
 
It is not clear that the huge expenditure in computerizing titling will achieve such a 
smooth conflict resolution outcome. It will certainly centralize the conflict resolution 
process and this may increase the transition costs by making explicit all the 
inconsistencies in the records affecting each piece of land, and perhaps it will do this 
simultaneously for many pieces of land. In the worst case scenario a badly designed 
attempt at titling may clog the land market while the titling process is going on 
because investors will not want to buy titles which may be unequivocally rejected 
soon. Investors may hold on to see who ends up having clean titles, and if the process 
goes on for a while as it must, they are likely to engage in ‘investing’ in the titling 
process. This will simply transfer what goes on in the courts today into the titling 
process. In short, there is no reason to believe that the titling problem can be resolved 
quickly or at low transition cost. In the meantime other solutions have to be found to 
sustain the growth process. The most likely solution, though one which has had a bad 
track record in Bangladesh, is to focus on setting up industrial zones with adequate 
infrastructure, using compulsory purchase powers that exist in law. While the reversal 
in the Karnaphuli export processing zone (EPZ) in 2009 (discussed below) shows an 
ambivalent attitude to industrialization at the heart of government, experience with 
public land acquisition as such has not been entirely negative.  
 
Public Land Acquisition: The Jamuna Bridge and RAJUK 
One of the biggest infrastructure projects in the country was the construction of the 
Jamuna Bridge which required the acquisition of 2860 ha of land. The availability of 
concessionary foreign credit from the ADB and other sources and the strong political 
commitment of successive governments to push the project through changed the 
nature of the transition costs. The land acquisition happened over a relatively long 
period, from 1988 to 1997. Compensation was very generous, based on current 
market prices (rather than the much lower prices typically used for land registrations 
to reduce tax liabilities) plus a 50 per cent premium. A total of around 16,000 
landowners were recognized for compensation. There was compensation for houses 
and constructions (which led to occasional rent seeking as new structures were 
sometimes constructed to claim the compensation). There were additional payments 
for resettlement, relocation, stamp duty refunds for new land purchases, skills training 
and so on. An entirely new category of affected people were recognized who were 
‘erosion and flood affected people’ who could submit claims on that account. Around 
15,000 people did and most of these claims were also recognized. Finally, there was a 
one-time cash compensation for landless workers and others who would also be 
displaced. Many NGOs were involved in assessments of compensations.  
 
Given the context, the degree of success in implementation was quite good. Instead of 
civil strife, the effort of many local people went into maximizing their compensation. 
There were the inevitable cases of bureaucratic corruption, and one estimate put a 
figure of around 10 per cent of the compensation that had to be paid as ‘speed money’ 
to the local administration (Rahman and PPRC Team 2001: 278). While pointing out 
areas of weakness such as some people not being compensated and some 
misappropriations, these and other evaluators generally concluded that the 
compensation and resettlement schemes were satisfactory. The critical evidence is 
that a significant amount of land was acquired without civil war breaking out. The 
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critical determinants here were first the clear signals that had been sent by the political 
leadership over a long period of time that the project would go through. The project 
was also broadly supported in the region and the country and the compensations were 
very generous. Indeed, by compensating virtually everyone conflicts were hugely 
reduced. But the bill was also big, and could not have been paid without significant 
soft loans. There is a lesson in this for industrial land development. If haphazard and 
fragmented land acquisition is to be avoided, given that land availability is a serious 
constraint for industrial transformation, the setting up of industrial parks through 
public land acquisition, assisted if necessary by generous loans from international 
banks may be a viable strategy in the future.  
 
A very different model of the use of political power to acquire land, more or less 
effectively, is provided by Dhaka city’s Rajdhani Unnoyon Kortripokkho (RAJUK) 
which roughly stands for Capital City Development Authority operating under the 
Ministry of Housing and Public Works. This body is in charge of developing the 
master plan for the capital city and to acquire land for its extension, on its own and by 
authorizing private sector developers. It is widely known that RAJUK is more than a 
little corrupt and that it operates closely with political power in the capital (Masum 
2009). Indeed, RAJUK’s operations are often cited as examples of violations of 
transparency and accountability and there are many examples of land use laws being 
flouted. However, what we want to focus on here is that RAJUK is also reasonably 
effective in acquiring land from rural smallholders near the capital where land values 
are already reaching first world levels. Land is acquired at market prices in the rural 
areas, without any negotiation of sharing the difference in land valuation between 
these prices and what the land will soon be worth as a result of incorporation into the 
capital’s master plan. Here the full weight of administrative and political persuasion is 
critical for achieving the transfer of land rights at low transaction and transition cost. 
The significant fact here is that by incorporating a large chunk of dominant political 
interests as potential beneficiaries, RAJUK ensures that counter-mobilizations which 
could raise transition costs become very unlikely.  
 
The interests of the political elite are aligned with this process because the developed 
land is allocated for sale by ‘lottery’ but with explicit categories for ministers, 
members of parliament, judges, journalists, civil servants, professionals and so on. 
After all these categories are satisfied, the general public is unlikely to win anything 
in the lottery. Winning the lottery gives the right to buy a plot at a very steep discount 
to the market. This ‘governance model’ is effective because it concentrates most of 
the dominant political factions and important segments of the bureaucracy behind 
these land transactions because many of them stand to benefit. In addition, powerful 
politicians can get other types of RAJUK approvals for their own property 
development plans that are of considerable commercial value. If we treat land re-
allocation to significantly higher valued uses as being consistent with the interests of 
sustaining growth in the capital city, RAJUK’s political strategy effectively keeps the 
trade-off curve for this particular set of property right transformation efficiently steep. 
Relatively rapid property right transformations are achieved through a mix of market 
incentives and non-market pressures but with low transition costs (though there is a 
considerable cost in terms of social justice and transparent urban planning).  
 
Property developers in and around Dhaka are typically very critical of the methods 
RAJUK uses and the bribes they have to pay, but they also say privately that RAJUK 
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gets the work done. Given its political backing, when RAJUK gives approvals to 
developers they are in most cases enforceable decisions. There are typically well 
established rates that developers have to pay for different types of approvals, but as 
these are mutually beneficial transactions, they are sustainable. These are of course 
relative judgements. But in the context of a developing country if land acquisition and 
development had to happen without an institutional structure like RAJUK that 
allowed the buy-in of political support, transaction and transition costs may have been 
much higher. While the RAJUK model works after a fashion in sustaining Dhaka’s 
(fairly anarchic) growth, it is unlikely to work for industrial land acquisition. It is 
difficult to imagine how the interests of a large number of political leaders and others 
can be aligned so well behind the acquisition of industrial land which is unlikely to 
benefit them unlike the chance of getting a valuable plot of land in Dhaka city.  
 
Political Lessons from the Reversal of Karnaphuli EPZ 
A striking demonstration of the difficulty of aligning the interests of politicians to 
industrialization and industrial land development is shown by the dramatic decision in 
March 2009 to suddenly halt investment in a newly set up export processing zone 
(EPZ) at Karnaphuli. The reversal happened after the project had been approved a 
year earlier and despite at least fourteen foreign investors paying rent on the plots 
leased to them since July 2008. Some of them already had machinery on ships to 
Bangladesh. The decision was ostensibly taken because the land belonged to the 
Ministry of Food who suddenly decided it needed more storage for stocking 
foodgrains. Behind the story is a tussle within the ruling Awami League over control 
over scarce land. It is unlikely that this valuable land 6 kilometres from Chittagong 
port will in the end be used as a storage depot for foodgrains. The likely story is that 
politicians did not want to be tied down to a land use allocation decision made by the 
immediately preceding caretaker government without considering other more 
lucrative allocations. But it shows how difficult it is to align political interests with 
the interests of labour-intensive industry where wages are low and profits are good 
but not astronomical. The payoffs to politicians making industrial land allocations will 
only be over a longer period of time compared to land allocations in Dhaka.  
 
There is thus a reverse danger of relying on political interests to deliver growth-
enhancing land use changes or even to stick to apparently efficient decisions that have 
already been made. Unless politicians get significant payoffs, as they appear to do 
with RAJUK, they can readily reverse efficient land use decisions or contest 
allocations that may make economic sense. It is important to remember that 
politicians are themselves major contestants over the rights to land in a land-scarce 
country. They have constituents who may range from small peasants to land-grabbing 
speculators, and all of them may have interests that may be different from industrial 
investors. It is difficult to align the interests of a collection of leading politicians with 
the land use requirements of labour-intensive export oriented industries where the 
rents are not very high, but potential growth contributions to society may be 
significant.  
 
It is not surprising that progress in extending EPZs and setting up industrial parks and 
zones has been rather slow in Bangladesh. The contrast with Thailand is striking in 
this respect, not just for Bangladesh, but across South Asia generally. The trap is that 
ready supplies of land that industry needs cannot simply be purchased through 
existing land markets. There are two possible routes to achieving a steeper trade-off 
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curve in land use re-allocation, thereby achieving land use re-allocation at acceptable 
transition costs. One is the possibility of buying out resistance by using generous 
compensations, if necessary at rates above prevailing market prices. But domestic 
land acquisition for setting up industrial parks does not have access to the levels of 
compensation that the Jamuna Bridge project had. The second route is to use 
concentrated political power to overcome resistance in the way that RAJUK achieves 
to some extent for acquiring very valuable land near Dhaka. Although RAJUK offers 
market levels of compensation, it is very likely that without political backing there 
would be very high transaction and transition costs in achieving these transfers so 
near the highly-valued land of the capital. But it is difficult to achieve this level of 
political interest for small industrial zone projects as the Karnaphuli case 
demonstrates. Indeed, political interest in and support for setting up industrial zones 
has not been very high in Bangladesh (World Bank 2007).  
 
Given these political and institutional realities, a viable strategy would be to draw on 
features of different strategies that have worked in the past and to develop new 
institutional capabilities to experiment with other models for land acquisition for 
industrial parks. International development partners could assist by investing in 
capacity-building in the requisite ‘governance’ capabilities. Training for the agencies 
tasked with these projects is vital, together with achieving a broader understanding 
within the group of major stakeholders of the constraints that have to be overcome. 
Learning from a country’s own experiences and bringing in the knowledge of 
bureaucrats and politicians who were involved in successful land acquisition projects 
in the past would be very useful if the wheel is not to be reinvented. Many of the 
methods that were used may be far removed from good governance. But a better 
understanding of why some methods were used in the past is the only way to 
construct more transparent methods and achieve better social justice in the future. 
However, an agency with high quality leadership could also try new experiments on a 
trial basis. For instance, land could be leased from small landowners instead of being 
purchased, giving owners a stake in future land values. The viability of these 
experiments cannot be decided in advance because they would face specific 
transaction and transition costs. In particular a resolution of local land titling disputes 
and compensation to the landless and to those who sharecrop land belonging to others 
would be necessary to make a leasing approach viable. 
 
One of the lessons of the past is that an industrial land project cannot always rely on 
the weak incentives of political leaders in countries like Bangladesh. Some basis of 
political support is however required and this perhaps needs the construction of new 
alliances between business, reform-minded politicians and bureaucrats. International 
partners could assist with stakeholder dialogues to help the emergence of a broader 
understanding and new alliances. Countries like Bangladesh also need long-term 
credit lines from international financial institutions for these types of land acquisition 
projects, but the capability to run the acquisition in contexts of high transition costs 
has to be simultaneously developed. The next phase of industrialization in land scarce 
countries like Bangladesh is otherwise likely to face very hard constraints.  
 
West Bengal: Political Mismanagement and Changing Trade-offs 
Economic growth in West Bengal was driven to a significant extent in the 1980s by 
very successful land reforms and incentives for the agricultural sector. However, these 
reforms were not aimed at creating a capitalist agriculture. Apart from the ideological 
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preferences of the Communist Party, such an attempt would have faced very high 
transition costs given the pre-existing structures of rights and the population density in 
the state. The Left Front strategy strengthened peasant rights and helped consolidate 
the creation of a middle and rich peasant economy. Aspects of this transformation 
were discussed in our earlier paper  (Khan 2008b). The emerging challenge in West 
Bengal in the 1990s was to respond to the limits of peasant agricultural growth. In the 
1990s growth of foodgrains output dropped to just over 2 per cent per annum from 
around 5.5 per cent in the 1980s. Many of the poorer peasants who had benefited from 
tenancy reform could no longer sustain themselves in agriculture. According to one 
estimate, 13 per cent of the beneficiaries of land reform gave up their tenancy rights 
or sold their land. The real paradox was West Bengal’s performance in rural poverty. 
The percentage of the rural population in poverty was 31.85 per cent in West Bengal 
compared to an Indian average of 27.09 per cent (Sarkar 2007). This was a stark 
demonstration of the limits of the peasant based agrarian strategy.  
 
In this context, the Left Front government that had ruled the state since the late 1970s 
took a series of momentous decisions to shift the emphasis of development towards 
industrialization. A new industrial policy was announced in 1994, making it easier to 
get permissions for industrial development and offering assurances that unions would 
be curbed. But the major challenge to the new industrial policy eventually came from 
a land crisis. The land crisis took on grave political dimensions in the course of 
attempts by the Left Front government to intervene in land acquisition in favour of big 
industrial investors. Only two per cent of West Bengal’s land is not cultivable. But to 
accelerate industrialization, the state government included in its priority areas land 
intensive sectors like petrochemicals and iron and steel (Purohit 2009; SIDBI 2009). 
These strategies required government support to reduce or overcome land market 
failures as the difficulty of land acquisition was likely to impede these plans 
significantly. 
 
The formal power of compulsory acquisition was established in India by the Land 
Acquisition Act of 1894 which was an application of the concept of eminent domain. 
In its original manifestation, the Act only enabled the acquisition of land for strictly 
public purposes with compensation limited to market prices. An amendment of 1984 
improved the terms of compensation to enable compensation at rates higher than the 
market to take account of additional losses suffered by the original landowners. But it 
also allowed the acquisition of land by the state for private development purposes. 
State governments now had the power to amend the act to determine the details of 
how compensation was to be decided, the agencies empowered to determine the 
public purpose and so on (Guha 2007). The significant change was that the legal 
framework was being used for a purpose somewhat different from its initial intention, 
which was solely to acquire land for public purposes. However, what is a public 
purpose is debatable, and implicitly Indian states were saying that solving land market 
failures for the private sector served a public purpose. 
 
In addition, as a lagging industrial state within India, the West Bengal government 
also felt compelled to provide substantial implicit subsidies to attract investors, 
particularly in the case of the Tata Group’s Nano project. The outcomes of some of 
these interventions were politically disastrous for the Left Front government. While 
some significant land acquisitions quietly took place, two high profile failures in 
Nandigram and Singur proved to be very damaging for industrialization strategies in 
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the state and for the political fortunes of the Left Front government. A successful 
mobilization of peasants opposed to land transfers in these areas by the populist 
Trinamool Congress led by Mamata Banerjee led not only to the withdrawal of the 
Tata investment but to a collapse in the broader political support for the Left Front 
government. In the 2009 general elections the Left Front’s seats dropped from 35 (in 
the 2004 elections) to 15 out of a total of 42 seats in the state.  
 
The reasons behind these catastrophic setbacks for the Left Front are complex. On the 
one hand, the property rights reforms of the 1980s had strengthened peasant rights and 
made some peasants more able to hold out for longer in contests over land transfers. 
This implied a structural worsening of the growth-stability trade-off for some 
strategies of land acquisition. On the other hand, the slowdown in agrarian growth 
was already leading some of the poorest peasants to abandon their land and many 
were willing to accept the relatively generous compensations that were on offer in 
some land acquisitions. The middle and rich peasants who were the political backbone 
of the Left Front alliance were themselves dissatisfied with their limited agrarian 
prospects. In general they supported the drive to industrialize. They just did not want 
to be affected themselves, and if they were, they wanted to extract a high price for 
their land. This suggests a more complex set of trade-offs, differentiated by region 
and ecology within the state. In areas where agriculture was doing particularly poorly, 
and poorer peasants dominated, the political management of land transfers was easier. 
However, in areas where agricultural reforms had worked and peasants were 
somewhat better off, strong resistance to land transfers was mounted. This suggests 
that the Left Front’s problems came from a combination of less favourable growth-
stability trade-offs in areas where strengthening peasant rights had resulted in growth. 
But there was also its own political mismanagement in selecting the wrong areas, and 
using inappropriate strategies of land acquisition.  
 
The land issue has recently dominated economic development across India, but 
particularly in eastern India. The experiences in West Bengal are part of a series of 
costly stalemates that have affected the region. In neighbouring Orissa, South Korean 
steel producer Posco signed a 12 billion dollar memorandum of agreement in June 
2005 but has been waiting since then because the land in Jagatsinghpura could not be 
acquired. The government has not even been able to put up the notification of 
acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act in the district revenue inspector’s office as 
protestors blockaded the office. Four years later the impasse continues. Another large 
Tata Steel project in Kalinganagar in Orissa has also been on hold for four years. 
Protests against land acquisition have also taken place in Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, 
Delhi, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra.  
 
These conflicts, particularly the ones in West Bengal resulted in the central 
government revising India’s Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act in 2007 to limit their 
maximum size to 5000 acres. It was also decreed that states could only acquire land if 
they or their State Industrial Development Corporations were the developers. Land 
could no longer be acquired by states to be transferred to an SEZ developed by private 
developers. Till 2009, 568 SEZs were approved but only 87 were operational and the 
smaller ones are only 5 to 6 hectares in extent.  
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Successful Land Acquisitions: Rajarhat, Haldia, Salboni 
To understand what was different about the debacle at Singur it is useful to look at the 
background of a number of successful land acquisitions that the state government was 
involved in over this period. There were some significant successes in land 
acquisitions and these may have lulled the political leadership to be excessively 
sanguine in extending this approach to other areas. In fact, the areas where land 
acquisition was successful were significantly poorer in terms of their ecology and 
cropping, and peasants there were correspondingly weaker and less well-connected to 
state-level political parties.  
 
The involvement of the ruling Left Front and in particular its dominant member, the 
Communist Party of India Marxist (CPI-M) in land acquisition processes began in the 
early 1990s when the state government decided to extend Greater Calcutta into an 
area called Rajarhat. In a process that had echoes with the activities of RAJUK in 
Dhaka, but which was even less institutionalized, the party used its disciplined 
organization together with informal mechanisms of persuasion and power to acquire a 
large amount of land at compensation rates that were very low. Around 12,500 acres 
were acquired and rates of compensation offered were around 100 dollars per acre. 
This land now sells for close to two million dollars per acre. The land was initially of 
little agricultural value and the owners were poor peasants who were eking out a 
living. In addition, many were poor Muslims as Rajarhat had a roughly 40 per cent 
Muslim population, about twice the state average. Moreover, they were not well-
connected to opposition political factions. Finally, land acquisition was still an 
infrequent event and many people did not yet know their rights. This fortunate 
combination of factors (from the perspective of transition costs) was to change 
dramatically at Nandigram which was a Muslim majority area but with peasant 
farmers who also had significant bargaining power because they were clients of 
Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress. The very low transition costs in acquiring 
potentially valuable land cheaply in Rajarhat may have lulled the CPI-M into 
assuming that transition costs were in general low whereas they were actually low in 
Rajarhat for very accidental reasons. Even there, when the locals began to realize the 
immense increase in the value of their land immediately after the transfer, the CPI-M 
lost support rapidly to the Trinamool Congress. This too should have registered a 
warning but apparently it did not.  
 
There was a similar success story at Haldia where the state government acquired 6072 
hectares beginning in the late 1980s. As Calcutta port got silted up, Haldia emerged as 
West Bengal’s main port. It was an early beneficiary of the state government’s turn to 
industry and the state government began to buy up land to promote Haldia as an 
industrial area and petrochemical hub. Here too, the disciplined organization of the 
CPI-M was deployed to keep transition costs low. In Haldia land acquisition did 
generate conflicts and the sitting Left Front Member of Parliament lost his seat. But 
the gradual emergence of the region as an industrial hub and the growth of jobs had a 
positive effect on the Left Front’s popularity and the same MP managed to regain his 
seat. This experience too may have lulled the CPI-M into believing that it could ride 
out local storms as the long-run benefits of industrialization would pay off in the end. 
But in Haldia too, opposition parties had not fully mobilized and the transition costs 
were still low.  
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Finally, the example of Salboni is interesting as an example of a land acquisition deal 
involving a major corporate player that faced little local resistance. Salboni is an 
impoverished part of the state close to Jharkhand. The project in question is a 7 billion 
dollar integrated steel plant to be set up by JSW Steel, India’s third largest steel 
producer. The agreement was signed in January 2007. In short order the company was 
able to acquire 4300 acres of land with relatively little local protest. The project is 
currently stalled because of the global slowdown, the collapse of steel prices and 
ongoing Maoist violence in the area (in 2008 the Chief Minister’s motorcade was 
bombed when he was going to inaugurate the project). Nevertheless, as an example of 
a low transition cost land transfer, it is interesting to look at the features that allowed 
this to be negotiated.  
 
Again, a combination of factors was at play here. Of the 4300 acres, 3800 acres were 
already owned by the government so in fact the company ‘only’ had to acquire 
another 500 acres of privately owned land, which the company acquired on its own 
initiative. However, this is a big chunk of land in the West Bengal context and some 
specific factors were important here. First, the company offered a very generous 
compensation package. In private, officers of the company indicated they had paid 
around 7000 dollars per acre to owners when the going market price was around 4000 
dollars. In addition, the company offered a job to every affected family depending on 
skills and capabilities once the project was underway. Half of the compensation paid 
to each family would be used to buy an insurance annuity which would give a 
monthly income for life, and this alone would be significantly higher than the 
agricultural income. Finally, the company also offered warrants to its shares to ‘local 
stakeholders’ when the company would be floated, but specific details would not be 
made public. The floatation in any case is currently in abeyance and only the cash 
compensation part of the scheme has been implemented. But this is an example of a 
very detailed set of proposals that very significantly contributed to reducing 
opposition to the scheme.  
 
Secondly, it greatly helped that this was an area with poor soil conditions. It supported 
fewer people than other areas and so a relatively small number of families were 
affected: 741 families in 4000 acres, or roughly about 4000 individuals. In contrast in 
the more fertile Singur area where the Tata plant was to be located, 24,048 individuals 
were affected in an area of about 1000 acres. Third, the organization of local peasants 
and their bargaining processes were insulated from major factional organizations in 
the state. Trinamool tried to make the steel plant a political issue but failed in this 
area, largely because few people felt that a harder bargain may bring them much 
more. Finally, the company did its homework. Before it started compensating it spent 
around a year in the locality sorting out legal documents and titles so that there would 
be no dispute about who was entitled to compensation. The relatively small number of 
people in an agriculturally poor region where land was not very valuable clearly 
helped here too. Thus, in each of these cases, specific factors explained why transition 
costs were low and the land transfers could be negotiated.  
 
Debacles at Nandigram and Singur 
The turning point in the Left Front’s economic strategies came with botched attempts 
at land transfers in Nandigram and Singur that left the reputation of the Left Front in 
tatters. In Nandigram, near Haldia, the conflict began with a proposal in 2007 from 
Indonesia’s Salim Group to construct a petrochemical SEZ. Around 18,000 acres 
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were to be acquired under the compulsory purchase provisions of the Land 
Acquisition Act. The local CPI-M political boss Lakshman Seth jumped the gun at 
this development opportunity and was probably behind the issuing of a notice from 
the Haldia Development Authority to authorize acquisition, though legally only a 
notification under the Land Acquisition Act was legal.  
 
Taking advantage of local anger and government irregularities, Trinamool mounted 
an effective campaign of resistance with locals preventing outsiders from entering the 
area. It was a great opening for Trinamool because Nandigram was a Muslim-
majority area and Trinamool (which had in the past been part of the BJP-led coalition, 
the NDA) now emerged as a champion of minorities. In contrast, the CPI-M had 
traditionally been supported by Muslims but now began to lose some of this support 
base across the state. From March 2007, CPI-M cadres began an offensive to take the 
area by force. Battles continued over several months involving thugs from both sides 
and the police. Several people died. In December 2007 the Chief Minister announced 
that the petrochemical complex would not be constructed at Nandigram after all but in 
a river island across from the region. But since no formal acquisition order had been 
given, there was nothing to withdraw as far as Nandigram was concerned. Festering 
conflict continued between the parties. The CPI-M was a significant loser in political 
terms, which soon became evident in election results. An even more significant effect 
of Nandigram was to enable the Trinamool Congress to carry out an effective 
campaign in Singur where a real investment was at stake.  
 
Singur was to be the CPI-M’s showpiece success story for industrialization. In May 
2006 the Chief Minister announced the Tata Nano project was coming to West 
Bengal. Tata planned to build a 2000-dollar car for the Indian mass market. As it 
promised to be a successful project with export opportunities as well, it was an 
opportunity for West Bengal to shed once and for all its anti-business and anti-
industry image. The problem was that Tata insisted on the site at Singur although it 
was a rich farming area with relatively prosperous middle and rich peasant farming. 
Tata insisted on this site because it was on a national highway on the Delhi-Calcutta 
route and close to the rail station at Dankuni, also on the Delhi-Calcutta rail link. 
Dankuni could potentially have been a site for a township housing Tata’s managerial 
staff. 
 
This time Trinamool organized rapidly. By July 2006 the highway bordering the 
earmarked site was blocked by protestors. By September there was police violence 
and by November Special Forces had to be sent in to protect the site. When it became 
clear later on that additional land needed to be acquired for the ancillary industries, 
the already significant resistance became impossible to overcome. The conflict 
continued till October 2008 when Tata withdrew from West Bengal and relocated its 
production to Gujarat where the government made an appropriate plot of government-
owned land available for immediate use.  
 
The West Bengal government used the West Bengal Industrial Development 
Corporation (WBIDC) to identify and acquire the land. It identified 997 acres 
affecting the land rights of 12,000 owners. Compensation would be based on the 
number of crops on the land per year, but the average price of the land was 
determined at approximately 20,000 dollars per acre. Registered sharecroppers would 
be compensated at 25 per cent of the value of the land even though they were not 
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owners. The average compensation put in a bank account earning interest at 10 per 
cent could earn an income significantly more than the income from the land. But once 
inflation of 6 per cent is taken into account, the real return the compensation achieves 
was just about fair compared to expected real returns from agriculture (Sarkar 2007). 
The initial package also ignored unregistered sharecroppers whose number was 
variously estimated to be 170 to 1200. They and the landless would lose their 
livelihoods but were not promised anything. The compensation was therefore not very 
generous. But the growth-stability trade-off was becoming significantly worse (flatter) 
for land acquisitions after Nandigram because of the huge mobilizations that 
Trinamool was engaging in. With hindsight, it was clearly very foolish of the Left 
Front not to have significantly improved the offer immediately.  
 
They were constrained by another aspect of the problem that became much clearer 
later. The West Bengal government was aggressively competing to attract Tata to the 
state and was implicitly offering very significant hidden subsidies to them in the land 
leasing agreements and in other ways. The land acquisition was clearly not a market 
transaction for the landholders. But it was not a market transaction for the West 
Bengal government either. Tata was saving on significant transaction costs and 
transition costs and getting a substantial hidden subsidy on the market rental value of 
the land. One way to see this is as an industrial policy subsidy. But a proper industrial 
policy subsidy should be explicitly allocated to maximize some technology 
acquisition objectives of a state, and should come with performance expectations and 
a capacity to re-allocate or withdraw the subsidy over time. In hidden land subsidies 
this is very difficult to do and we will return to the efficiency aspects of this method 
of offering subsidies in a later paper. 
 
Here we can look at various estimates of the extent of the subsidy. The implicit 
subsidy can be broken down into a number of components using data provided by 
Sarkar (2007). First the purchase price of the land for the West Bengal government 
was 1300 million rupees. For the 90 year lease, Tata would initially pay 10 million 
rupees a year, increasing at 5-yearly intervals at substantially less than the inflation 
rate, so in effect declining in real terms over time. As the interest cost of the outlay for 
the West Bengal government (at 10%) would be 130 million rupees, there was an 
annual subsidy of 120 million rupees on the rent alone. In addition Tata was to get a 
2000 million rupee loan at a nominal interest of 1 per cent. Again, at a minimal 
market rate of interest of 10 per cent, this was a subsidy of 180 million rupees. 
Ignoring other incentives like rebates of VAT collections also offered to Tata, the 
subsidy on the land and the loan was in the region of 300 million rupees (6.4 million 
dollars) a year, growing in real terms over the lifetime of the project. Tata’s own 
estimate of its investment in West Bengal was 15 billion rupees. Compared to that, the 
West Bengal government was effectively putting 3 billion rupees in the bank (at a 
notional 10 per cent interest rate) to provide the annual subsidy. Using a slightly 
different methodology India’s Comptroller and Auditor General estimated that the net 
present value cost of the subsidy to the West Bengal government was 760 million 
rupees looking only at the subsidy on the land lease (Express India 2008). There was 
therefore not much leeway to make a more generous offer to the peasant occupants of 
the land.  
 
One implication that follows from this experience is that industrial policy subsidies 
should be explicit and the allocation should be based on an evaluation of costs and 
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benefits for the state. The bargaining power of corporate giants like Tata in India or 
multinationals approaching smaller developing countries is that implicit industrial 
policy subsidies are now demanded by corporates playing one state off against 
another. Even if land market subsidies are one way of responding to technology 
market failures, developing country states still need clear evaluation frameworks to 
make effective decisions. An ‘industrial policy subsidy’ extracted in this way may 
have nothing to do with solving a technology market failure but may simply be a way 
of corporate giants extracting revenue from taxpayers. Tata’s investment may well 
have brought in new technology with significant backward and forward linkages for 
the West Bengal economy. If so, the subsidy offered should have been the subject of 
an explicit calculation by the state government. Selling the integrated package of 
policy interventions to its core supporters would also have been easier for the CPI-M 
if the payback to the state was clearer in a cost-benefit analysis.   
 
A number of features of this conflict corroborate our argument that land market 
failures have to be looked at in an explicitly political economy framework. The first 
problem for the CPI-M was that Singur had a much greater number of middle and rich 
peasants who had the capacity to mobilize and demand a higher price for transferring 
their rights. A study of the peasants in Singur who first sold out shows that they were 
the small and marginal ones, while the more substantial peasants held out till the end 
(Mohanty 2007). This is consistent with our expectation. Secondly, Singur 
demonstrates how external political organizers can rapidly make the growth-stability 
trade-off curve flatter, making transition costs far too high for solving particular land 
market failures. This happened in Singur with the increasingly successful political 
organization and mobilization by the Trinamool Congress.  
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Figure 14 The Singur Transition Cost Trade-off after External Organizers Enter 
 
In Figure 14 the worsening of the growth-stability trade-off is so severe that the 
achievement of the improvement in growth prospects by setting up the project 
(represented as a move from GTC0 to GTC1) is no longer possible given the maximum 
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tolerable transition cost. The options open to the government were not good but it 
should have responded more rapidly. Assuming that an appropriate industrial policy 
assessment showed the project was very desirable for West Bengal, the government 
could have tried harder to persuade Tata to locate somewhere else in the state, if 
necessary adding a little to their already substantial subsidy. Alternatively, it could 
have offered significantly better terms to the holdout peasants to monetize some of the 
transition costs. Or if the sums did not add up, it should have decided that the deal 
was not worth it and withdrawn to save itself and the state a long and unnecessary 
conflict.  
 
In the longer run, the Singur experience tells us that it will be very difficult to 
institutionalize solutions to land market failures in these types of contexts. As 
transition costs are essentially political, there may not be a single optimal institutional 
way of addressing them, even within the same state or region. The conditions under 
which land market failures are being addressed (described by the growth-stability 
trade-off) are politically determined and changing over time and different in different 
parts of the same country. Our analysis suggests the need for flexibility and quick 
responses in states going through transitions, as well as the importance of knowing 
when to change tack. It is unlikely that institutional solutions alone will do the trick, 
but there are clearly more or less promising institutional approaches.  
 
Maharashtra: Facing Growing Land Market Failures  
At the time of independence in 1947 West Bengal and Maharashtra had comparable 
levels of industrialization. However, as we described in Khan (2008b) they diverged 
significantly after that. An important factor that contributed to this was the more 
favourable relationship between business and government in Maharashtra compared 
to West Bengal and the ability of Maharashtrian business interests to establish links 
with Congress politicians both at the state level and at Delhi. The post-colonial 
political settlement in Maharashtra was, as we have seen, different from that in 
Bengal because the power of middle peasants and the intermediate classes was less 
developed in Maharashtra. This allowed emerging capitalists and their allies to play a 
more dominant role in the politics of the state, at least for a while. These differences 
were not accidental and were related to colonial land policies and political strategies. 
These had their own autonomous effect but there were also differences in the 
productivity of the land which resulted in much lower densities of human settlements 
in Maharashtra. As we have described earlier, Maharashtrian agriculture remained 
rather poor and productivity was much lower than the Indian average. The greater 
poverty of Maharashtrian peasants paradoxically allowed Maharashtra to follow for a 
time land transformation policies with significantly lower transition costs compared to 
West Bengal.  
 
The MIDC 
A key player in Maharashtra was the Maharashtra Industrial Development 
Corporation (MIDC). As long ago as 1961, the Maharashtra Industrial Development 
Act provided for the acquisition of private land anywhere in the state by serving 
notice to landowners for compulsory acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act. The 
MIDC was given the task of identifying and carrying out these land acquisitions to 
assist industrial development. The core function of MIDC was to acquire land cheaply 
from private owners, typically poor peasants, develop infrastructure around the land, 
and sell it on to industry at a higher price. While MIDC made large profits, high 
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quality land with infrastructure was made available to small and medium industries at 
a price that was affordable. Land of this quality and price was not likely to have 
emerged through any other process. As a result, MIDC land was in high demand, 
particularly from small and medium industries that wanted to locate around large 
private industries as ancillary industries or component suppliers.  
 
The MIDC strategy was so successful because the agency was closely associated with 
political power in the state. Political power was in turn rooted not in its impoverished 
agriculture, but in the close association between industrial and political interests as 
outlined in a previous paper in this series (Khan 2008b). The Chairman of the MIDC 
was always the Minister of Industries and used the MIDC to distribute patronage by 
allotting plots, fixing lease rates, granting various types of tax exemptions and so on. 
Any opposition to MIDC policies was therefore more than balanced by powerful 
constituencies who were benefiting directly from it. By 1997 the MIDC had acquired 
35,000 hectares of land in over 200 locations. It has also planned the acquisition of 
another 30,000 hectares for 120 large industrial estates, and nine industrial townships 
ranging from 2000 to 7000 hectares each (Brahme 1997). By 2008 the MIDC had 
built 229 industrial complexes on 60,000 hectares of land, together with 2423 
kilometres of railways. This was one of the most exceptional achievements of 
industrial land acquisition for an Indian state.  
 
Once in operation, the MIDC was largely self-financing because it bought land cheap 
and sold it at a much higher price. The MIDC could do this because not only did it 
manage to acquire the land very cheaply in price and transition costs, it also 
constructed very high quality infrastructure on the land. The MIDC developed 
considerable expertise in infrastructure development, particularly in electricity and 
water supply, with a significant engineering base. It also has a civil engineering base 
involved in road construction. The availability of a dedicated cadre of engineers and 
technicians who focused on developing infrastructure for industry from the 1960s put 
Maharashtra at a huge advantage compared to most other Indian states. The plots that 
the MIDC developed were not necessarily cheap, so there was no significant 
‘industrial policy’ subsidy, unlike the proposed Nano deal in West Bengal, but they 
were high-quality plots in good locations with good infrastructure.  
 
The policy was simply to solve the land market failures and provide efficient 
infrastructural public goods. A typical breakdown of costs would be as follows. If the 
land was purchased for an initial price of one rupee, the infrastructure development 
cost would be four rupees, and the land would be sold at ten rupees. Even at a 100 per 
cent mark-up on development costs, the plots would represent very good value for 
those getting it because of their excellent infrastructure, the significant transaction and 
transition cost savings, and the locational advantages of clustering with other firms. 
They were also close to big industry near Pune or Nasik, so that SMEs could be near 
their potential customers and suppliers. Plots even at these ‘market’ prices were 
therefore highly desirable. The MIDC then had several types of patronage to dispense. 
Some plots were allocated by key people within the political system, though the vast 
majority were marketed. For the politicians the ability to get an estate in their 
constituency was also a payoff. And finally, the profits from the land sales were 
divided between the key ‘stakeholders’. 
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The politics behind the MIDC explains why the transition cost trade-offs it faced in 
addressing land market failures remained so favourable for so long. First, the MIDC 
was explicitly a tool in the hands of ministers and bureaucrats, who used it to dispense 
various types of patronage. This aligned the interests of politicians with the 
programme because the operations of MIDC provided electoral advantage to the 
ruling politicians. Secondly, patronage could be widely distributed because of a de 
facto operational rule that the MIDC did not help large industrial players to acquire 
significant amounts of land. Rather, its policy was to support medium and small 
enterprises that would have had difficulty in acquiring land on their own. As a senior 
bureaucrat told us, referring to the West Bengal debacle, the MIDC would never have 
been involved with a Nano-type mega-project. Indirectly, the support for small and 
medium industries was very important for big business in Maharashtra because these 
firms became ancillary and component suppliers, allowing sophisticated value chains 
to be developed in Maharashtrian industry. The MIDC’s industrial estates played an 
important role in the development of the ancillary industries serving Maharashtra’s 
automobile and chemical industries.  
 
Thirdly, the MIDC’s board had political representatives from each of the main regions 
of the state and they pushed hard to get industrial estates in their own regions. This 
was very useful to align the interests of local politicians with the activity of the 
MIDC. Politicians could use the MIDC to dispense patronage to their constituents 
given the high demand for allocations of industrial plots. More importantly, it meant 
that these local politicians would in turn help with land acquisition by putting pressure 
on local land owners not to resist land acquisition. This was very significant in 
reducing transition costs and ensuring that long local disputes did not happen. 
Maharashtra also developed a pro-business statute which enabled the MIDC to take 
over land even if the owners were engaged in litigation. The MIDC would give 
advance compensation, leaving the final compensation to be decided after the 
litigation. In many cases the final settlement could be decided ten or even twenty 
years after the takeover, but industry would not be blocked by these moves.  
 
This alignment of political, bureaucratic and industrial interests meant that the MIDC 
was a very effective industrial development agency despite also being very corrupt. 
Indeed, after the police and tax bureaucracy, it was probably the most corrupt public 
body in the state. The MIDC chairman dispensed patronage while the political 
representatives, described as ‘non-official members’, collected regular unofficial fees 
(‘hafta’) from industrial associations in their respective jurisdictions. And yet the 
MIDC’s success and efficiency is shown by the results. The agency demonstrates the 
importance of aligning political and bureaucratic interests with economic ones. A 
comparison with RAJUK in Bangladesh shows a similar alignment except that the 
MIDC achieved interest alignment for industrial land acquisition, while RAJUK’s 
alignment of interests was limited to achieving land acquisition for urban 
development. The MIDC is a particularly interesting model for developing countries 
because it demonstrates that transition costs in solving land market failures can be 
effectively lowered. It is an excellent example of growth-enhancing governance, 
though it would fail the test of good governance very easily.  
 
However, several specific features of Maharashtra need to be kept in mind. The 
viability of the MIDC strategy focusing only on small and medium industries required 
that Maharashtra’s big business was big enough to solve its land acquisition problems 
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by itself. Maharashtra had plenty of land that was under very low productivity 
agriculture and therefore available for purchase, even though land markets were not 
very efficient. The big players in Maharashtra had sufficiently deep pockets to address 
the relevant transition and transaction costs to acquire land for themselves. In states 
like West Bengal this is not the case, and some solutions would have to be found to 
assist the occasional large land purchase as well. 
 
Secondly, Maharashtra’s political structure was pro-industry from a very early stage. 
Even though most people were in agriculture, the intermediate class leadership even 
in peripheral areas was keen to dispense industrial patronage in the form that the 
MIDC provided. Indeed, agriculture was systematically neglected in Maharashtra for 
the benefit of industry. For instance, in a state where only 16 per cent of farm land is 
irrigated, industry still gets priority in getting water supplies. The fact that there is 
very little good land in the state helps to focus the minds of politicians that the 
landless have to be provided with other employment opportunities. This explains why 
Maharashtra has not attempted serious land reforms. It also explains why if land 
records are tampered with to facilitate land acquisitions, there is little risk of being 
taken to task by politicians with powerful rural constituencies. In these respects 
Maharashtra is very different from say West Bengal. But the general proposition 
holds that if the interests of politicians and the agencies engaged in correcting land 
market failures are aligned, market failures can be corrected at relatively low 
transition costs.  
 
The relative quiescence of Maharashtra’s agrarian sector is however cracking up over 
time. The significant numbers of agrarian suicides that we referred to earlier have 
politicized agricultural issues. And directly in response to the land movements 
elsewhere in India including West Bengal, peasant mobilization has increased in 
Maharashtra. For instance, following the mobilizations in West Bengal’s Nandigram 
and Singur, district administrators in Maharashtra held a referendum in 2008 to 
determine whether they should proceed with a land acquisition programme for an SEZ 
proposed by Reliance Industries. The outcome was that 90 per cent of farmers 
rejected the proposal and it remains in abeyance. The ease with which the MIDC 
addressed land market failures in the past may not be sustained in the future.  
 
Moreover, resistance from the poor has also resulted in compensation and 
rehabilitation packages evolving, so that levels of compensation in land acquisition 
strategies have been improving. Indeed, unlike other Indian states where the 
rehabilitation of displaced people has been legislated for typically under World Bank 
pressure, the Maharashtra Rehabilitation Act 1976 was passed by the state 
government on its own in response to the indigenous mobilization of thousands of 
displaced persons who lost their lands in the 1960s and 1970s due to dam construction 
in the state (Fernandes 2007). 
 
Tanzania: The Challenge of Multiple Transitions  
Tanzania faces challenges in property rights evolution that are somewhat different 
from our other cases. In addition to the types of problems that we have already 
discussed in our other case studies, Tanzania is also grappling with refining the 
operation of a property right system that is still distant from formally recognizing 
individual rights of land ownership. Thus, in addition to the problems of efficient 
markets for re-allocating land use, and devising rights that are appropriate for 
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maximizing productivity growth, Tanzania also has to address problems emerging as 
a result of collective decision-making about land use and the boundaries of lands. A 
lack of clarity in these decision-making procedures can create uncertainties that can in 
turn truncate time horizons of investors holding valuable assets. In our Tanzanian case 
studies we see that collective aspects of ownership rights can deter investors. In 
addition there are other problems similar to those we have come across in South Asia 
to do with land acquisition and productivity growth. But paradoxically, the absence of 
private land ownership helped Tanzania to reduce the transition costs of changing 
land use in the case of high-value mining.  
 
Multiple Agents Can Determine Land Use Rights 
In 1989 urban resident X bought two acres of unused farmland on the outskirts of a 
village about 10 kilometres from Dar es Salaam. The land was bought from the owner 
who was a village resident who owned around 20 acres of land. The sale was 
approved by the Village Council and the witnesses to the agreement of sale were the 
local village leaders of the ruling party, the CCM. The Village Council kept a record 
of this transaction and there was no involvement of the Ministry of Lands with the 
sale. The sale was recorded in an ‘official record’ which was a book kept in the 
village office. Later the Ministry of Lands started surveying the land and used the 
village records to undertake the ownership mapping of the area. 
 
However, ‘ownership’ of occupancy rights in village land does not enable the owner 
to prevent access to and use of the land in the owner’s absence. In subsequent years 
half of X’s land was occupied by some villagers who started building on the land. 
They did this with the approval of the Village Council who gave them the right to use 
the land on the basis that X had not sufficiently developed the land since its purchase. 
The occupiers got official papers from the village stating that they were official 
owners so now duplicate ‘official’ papers of ownership of the land existed. 
 
X reinforced the boundary markings of the land but villagers moved the physical 
boundaries and sold off some of the land to two people with senior positions within 
the political system. These people used the land to build personal residences. As the 
properties were built very quickly and were owned by influential people X decided 
not to challenge their land grab as he risked losing the whole area and being allocated 
a new plot by the courts that would be much further away from the city in an 
undesirable area. In 2006 X decided to build on the land. The area had now become a 
suburb of Dar es Salaam and was under the direct responsibility of the Ministry of 
Lands. In order to start building and to ensure that his investment would be safe X had 
to make sure that his ownership was recognised by the Ministry of Lands. 
 
He showed the Ministry of Lands his ownership papers that had been produced by the 
Village. Officials at the Ministry of Lands claimed that they had to verify these papers 
with the Village. The plot numbers recorded at the Village level were different from 
the plot numbers used by the Ministry of Lands. The process of getting the Ministry 
of Lands to recognise his claim involved various ‘side payments’, otherwise he was 
told that it would take many years for the recognition process to be finalised. His 
ownership of the land was eventually recognised and official records are now kept by 
the Ministry of Lands. 
 
 90
The interesting feature of the village rights system is that ownership does not preclude 
the collective village leadership from deciding a change in land use without reference 
to the nominal owner of the lease. The ownership system was devised for a society 
where everyone lived in the village, not for non-resident investors like X. He held off 
from investing in the property for many years as a result. The system also allows 
political power to be used at the village level to influence land use allocation as this 
case also demonstrates.  
 
Foreign Investors Need Political Connections to Protect Assets 
Very similar problems are demonstrated in the case of a foreign business investor Y 
engaged in agricultural production in the agricultural region of Arusha. Y is well 
connected to people within the CCM at the highest level and is able to use his 
influence to get the Regional Commissioner (RC) and District Commissioner (DC) to 
support him in his struggle with local villagers to exercise effective control over his 
land. While he is currently producing on some of the land there are constant land 
invasions. Making his ownership effective requires constant vigilance and political 
negotiation. The DC’s support tends to vary quite a lot. When higher level political 
pressure is called upon, he supports Y. Maintaining sufficient security in order to use 
the land has been very difficult and has led to a decline in output as Y is unable to use 
all the land that he owns for production. This in turn has affected local support for Y 
as he had promised to bring benefits to the area in terms of jobs. 
 
Y had bought the land in Arusha from a foreign owned company that had gone bust. 
This company had in turn bought the land from a privatized parastatal. There had 
been a struggle to acquire the lease which was finally granted to Y. The land was 
already being used and was occupied in some areas by people, some of whom had 
been given rights of occupancy by the previous owners. Despite the legality of Y’s 
lease, enforcing his rights proved very difficult. It was not until he had used his high 
level political contacts to get the RC on his side that things started improving. The RC 
pushed the DC to hold village meetings to ensure that the villagers started to 
recognize Y’s property. This was successful and for a while the business went well 
but when the business faced a downturn he stopped using as much of the land and 
local support collapsed. In order to retain local support and the support of the police 
he has to continue to use his high level contacts. 
 
Protection Strategies Are Vulnerable and Can Break Down 
In this case foreign investors ended up losing control over land they had bought in the 
Moshi region. In 2004 the investor (F) leased land from the owner (G) who was 
related to a very senior figure in Tanzania. The payment for the lease involved G and 
F both holding shares in the company holding the title to the land. The land was to be 
used for trials of genetically modified crops. A US company started carrying out trials 
but eventually pulled out. It was claimed by G that the company had gone bust and 
that gave him the right to reclaim the land for re-sale. The investor F claimed that the 
company had not gone bust and that there were no legitimate grounds for revoking his 
leasehold on the land. In 2005 G attempted to re-sell the lease to a neighbouring 
farmer (who was also an expatriate). Court cases were started by both sides to claim 
legitimate rights over the land. The conflict between F and G intensified and F and the 
managers and workers at the farm started to be intimidated by local police and thugs 
brought in by G.  
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There were high level interventions by the British Government in support of F and 
senior Tanzanian politicians voiced their support for the investors. However on the 
ground intimidation continued – F was arrested as well as his Tanzanian management 
team. Despite official pledges of support the local police arrested the investor twice 
based on the claims of G that F had not paid the full price despite official documents 
showing that the sale of the lease had been agreed by both sides. The local police and 
judiciary were firmly on G’s side and the intimidation continued over a three year 
period. At the national level, statements of support were given when there were 
interventions by the representatives of the British Government but these were not 
followed through on the ground. There are a number of legal cases still in the courts 
surrounding the lease of this land and claims and counter-claims of illegality and 
intimidation. In the end F fled the country in 2008 but due to the interventions of the 
British government in support of the investors the Chief Justice of Tanzania offered to 
mediate between the two parties. 
 
The multiple points at which decisions about land use and allocation can be taken 
means that very concerted political pressure is required from above to override local 
coalitions if they decide to re-interpret the terms of land lease agreements. This type 
of property right structure obviously has some basic problems in protecting the 
investment of investors. In terms of our property rights analysis, this property right 
system is not well suited for maintaining long time horizons for investors. 
Paradoxically, the absence of very well-defined rights for individuals means that land 
use can be changed relatively easily compared to say the South Asian case.  
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Figure 15 Possible High Transition Costs in Reforming Village Rights  
 
In theory, if local political interests are using village land leasing systems to allocate 
land to investors, it would be in their interest to re-allocate the land if it was being 
inefficiently used. In our case studies, foreign investors ran into trouble when their 
business was not doing well. A serious problem with this system is obviously that 
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local power groups have no interest in sticking with an investor if the business is 
going through a bad patch. A bad patch is not a good indicator of a failed investment, 
so this type of land use re-allocation rights may be too flexible in the short term to 
allow efficient long-term decisions. Growth-enhancing property right transformations 
in the Tanzanian case may require reducing or weakening the rights of village 
authorities and local power brokers to re-allocate land use while strengthening the 
rights of leaseholders to greater long-term security, perhaps specified for precise 
periods of time. These property right transitions can be expected to have moderate to 
high transition costs (Figure 15) as village authorities and powerful groups in villages 
are likely to resist any reduction in their ability to override and change land use 
decisions. 
 
The Advantages of Collective Rights: The Case of Mining 
One area where the absence of private property rights has been very efficient for land 
use decisions in Tanzania is the development of mining, particularly for gold. 
Compared to other African countries, conflicts over mining rights have been relatively 
muted in Tanzania and this is not accidental. The state owns the rights to the minerals 
under the ground and in theory it does not need the consent of those using the land 
surface when making decisions about the allocation of mining rights. It only has to 
compensate lease-holders for crops and structures that may be damaged on the surface 
by mining activities. The absence of full rights for users means that it is difficult to 
organize resistance to land use decisions associated with mining. As long as the 
interests of power at the centre are aligned with local power groups, it is very difficult 
if not impossible for other social groups to mobilize against these allocative decisions. 
This is another way of saying that transition costs for mining right allocations are 
minimal in Tanzania, a scenario shown in Figure 16.  
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Figure 16 Low Transition Costs for Allocating Mining Rights in Tanzania 
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In an extensive set of case studies on conflicts in the mining sector in Tanzania, Lange 
finds that the most common conflicts are between the rights of large, often foreign 
mining companies and small illegal miners who often resist them with small acts of 
local confrontation (Lange 2006, 2008). These appear most often to be 
demonstrations of anger rather than serious attempts to block central decisions. There 
are no examples where a big chunk of a local community backed by local politicians 
has mobilized to block mining activities, in the way that we see in many parts of India 
or Bangladesh. Local authorities and MPs representing their constituents or the 
opposition party will often make political statements against mining companies and in 
favour of local residents of mining areas but at the cabinet level there is much more 
support for the mining companies. And even if they may have wanted to, there is little 
evidence that opposition politicians or others can organize significant mobilizations.  
 
Compared to other parts of the continent, conflict over land and mining in Tanzania is 
relatively less significant. There certainly seem to be more disputes since the sector 
was opened up to large scale foreign investment but the conflicts are not really more 
ferocious. Importantly, most conflicts are not about the rights over the land but about 
the right to mine. Local landowners often receive rents from the companies or miners 
for the use of the land. Small-scale miners are usually immigrants to the area and are 
often in dispute with local landholders. Local landowners are therefore more likely to 
be interested in the rent-paying big companies than to side with the illegal small 
miners. Only very occasionally is there a conflict between a local community as a 
whole and a major mining company. Lange provides an example where Masai tribes 
people were able to protect a water source from a mining investment (Lange 2008: 
17-18).  
 
The coordination of political power within the ruling CCM combined with a structure 
of property rights that makes it difficult for legitimate resistance to be organized 
allows Tanzania to allocate mining rights with very limited transition costs. Thus, 
while improving the rights of investors in a growth-enhancing direction may in 
general face a potentially unfavourable trade-off curve, in mining the Tanzanian rights 
structure allows rights to be allocated or re-allocated at relatively low transition cost, 
implying a steep (favourable) trade-off in terms of our diagram.  
 
The question is whether the political leadership’s interests are sufficiently aligned 
with the long-term national interest to ensure that the allocation of mining rights will 
maximize national development goals. Given the stability of the political system in 
Tanzania, it is less likely that the political leaders in Tanzania will be making 
allocative decisions with very short term interests or concerns at heart, though we 
have no reason to doubt the veracity of at least some rumours of corruption and 
misallocation in the granting of mining rights. The more serious problem in Tanzania 
may be a different one, and related to the industrial policy issue that we came across 
in West Bengal. Global mining companies can exert significant market power to 
extract conditions from developing countries in exchange for their offer to invest. In 
the case of mining this can take the form of demanding very low royalties on leases, 
low income tax, carry forward of losses, and so on (Khan and Gray 2006). These are 
often presented as legitimate demands to cover the risks of investing in developing 
countries, the absence of skilled labour and so on. In other words, big corporates have 
become quite adept at making the case for industrial policy in all kinds of sectors, 
including mining. 
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An important area where growth-enhancing governance capabilities need to be 
developed is in building capacity within developing countries so that the allocation of 
rights to mining companies, and to corporate investors in general, does not give away 
too many rents that are not necessary from an industrial policy perspective. Without 
developing local governance capabilities to determine ‘fair’ levels of royalties and 
taxes for mineral companies, and the development of bargaining capabilities on the 
part of the state, states like Tanzania cannot be expected to allocate mining rights in 
ways that sustain growing benefits for the country and high levels of productivity 
growth, including efficiency in protecting the environment.  
 
5. Policy issues 
Policy-makers need to be aware that property rights can be used to help achieve 
different objectives. These include protecting investors to take a long view in 
investment and conservation decisions, enabling efficient resource re-allocations, and 
creating conditions for sustained productivity growth. The property right adjustments 
that will further these conditions may in reality be conflicting. It is therefore important 
to have an assessment of immediate priorities, based on an analysis of the factors that 
are most seriously constraining growth.  
 
We need to get away from the simplification that the creation of any new property 
rights or the strengthening of any existing property rights is growth enhancing. In 
some cases, the strengthening of existing rights in a context where transaction costs 
are high overall can increase the transaction costs for growth sectors and 
accumulators. 
 
In addition, the property right transformations that are the priority for any society are 
not likely to be implementable by purely bureaucratic measures. This is because any 
development, amendment or change in property rights produces winners and losers, 
and losers will contest the change. The likely magnitude of transition costs, the 
determinants of transition costs and political and institutional measures to reduce 
transition costs have to play a significant role in any analysis informing policy in this 
area. 
 
Growth-enhancing governance capabilities for addressing market failures in land 
markets refers to the political economy capabilities that enable states to address one or 
more market failures associated with inappropriate property rights. Since managing 
transition costs are a critical determinant of success, growth-enhancing governance 
requires a sufficient alignment of political and institutional interests to achieve 
interventions that correct these market failures at an acceptable transition cost. 
 
We have seen there are examples from within developing countries where agencies 
have achieved limited success in addressing these market failures because they had by 
accident or design aligned the interests of some political forces and bureaucratic 
capabilities to pursue property rights changes that turned out to be moderately growth 
promoting. There were elements of these aligned interests in the MIDC in 
Maharashtra, the allocation of mining rights in Tanzania, and to some extent in the 
land acquisition strategies of RAJUK in Bangladesh. None of these cases are close to 
good governance and all of them have been identified with moderate to serious 
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corruption and patronage. Nor are they in their existing form models of growth-
enhancing governance that could be supported as replicable models. Nevertheless, 
they provide examples in embryonic form of the types of conditions that need to be 
satisfied for effective growth promoting governance capabilities to be developed in 
poor countries. These capabilities would have to be appropriate for achieving the 
necessary growth-enhancing changes in rights given the political settlement and the 
transition cost trade-offs in that sector and society. By understanding these issues 
better we are more likely to devise improvements in growth-enhancing governance 
capabilities to sustain growth with social justice.  
 
The other alternative is to monetize some of the transition costs by offering significant 
compensations to affected parties who can hold out in conflicts. Successful land 
acquisitions in the Jamuna Bridge case in Bangladesh or in the Salboni acquisition in 
West Bengal illustrate this possibility. Here too, an alignment of political and 
economic interests is required and implicitly also the exclusion of outside political 
organizers taking advantage of potential disputes. In addition, this strategy requires a 
significant upfront economic investment, and for many developing countries this 
implies that access to long-term soft loans may be required to finance the setting up of 
industrial zones. This could be a potentially important area for development partners 
to focus on, together with the development of growth-enhancing governance 
capabilities to manage these transactions effectively.  
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